Politics As Sport: The Effects Of Partisan Media On Perceptions Of Electoral Integrity by Daniller, Andrew Michael
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2016
Politics As Sport: The Effects Of Partisan Media
On Perceptions Of Electoral Integrity
Andrew Michael Daniller
University of Pennsylvania, adaniller@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Communication Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2246
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniller, Andrew Michael, "Politics As Sport: The Effects Of Partisan Media On Perceptions Of Electoral Integrity" (2016). Publicly
Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2246.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2246
Politics As Sport: The Effects Of Partisan Media On Perceptions Of
Electoral Integrity
Abstract
Just as fans of two opposing teams watching the same game reach opposite conclusions about the quality of
referees, citizens’ assessments of the legitimacy of their democratic institutions depend to a worrying degree
upon the outcome, rather than the procedures, of an election. Citizens who voted for the losing side in an
election are much less likely to believe that the process was fair than citizens who voted for the winner.
However, little attention has been paid to partisan media’s potential to exacerbate this phenomenon. I
hypothesized that like-minded media amplify the effects of winning and losing on perceptions of electoral
integrity. In other words, supporters of a winning candidate or party become even more confident in the
legitimacy of the process when exposed to media that favors their side, while supporters of a losing candidate
or party become even less confident in the legitimacy of the process when exposed to media that favors their
side. At the same time, I hypothesizes that cross-cutting media mute the effects of winning and losing,
decreasing the magnitude of changes in perceptions of electoral integrity.
I tested my predictions using nationally representative panel surveys from the 2008 and 2012 presidential
elections as well as the 2014 midterm elections. Whereas past research has produced little evidence that
perceptions of legitimacy are affected by winning and losing in U.S. congressional levels, supporters of the
winning party clearly increased in perceptions of legitimacy and supporters of the losing party clearly
decreased in perceptions of legitimacy in response to the 2014 midterm elections. Nonvoters who nonetheless
preferred one presidential candidate or the other likewise increased or decreased in perceptions of legitimacy
according to whether their preferred candidate won or lost. Finally, like-minded media exacerbated the
negative effects of losing in each of these election cycles, indicating that partisan media increase the size of the
gap between winners’ and losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity. The long-term effects of partisan media are
to weaken aggregate levels of confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral process itself.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Communication
First Advisor
Diana C. Mutz
Keywords
American politics, Elections, News media, Partisan media, Political trust
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2246
Subject Categories
Communication | Political Science
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2246
 
 
POLITICS AS SPORT: THE EFFECTS OF PARTISAN MEDIA ON PERCEPTIONS 
OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY 
Andrew M. Daniller 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
Communication 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2017 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation       
________________________      
Diana C. Mutz, Ph.D. 
Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and Communication   
    
Graduate Group Chairperson 
________________________ 
Joseph Turow, Ph.D. 
Robert Lewis Shayon Professor of Communication 
 
Dissertation Committee 
Diana C. Mutz, Ph.D., Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and 
Communication    
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Ph.D., Walter H. Annenberg Dean of the Annenberg School of 
Communication 
Joseph N. Cappella, Ph.D., Gerald R. Miller Professor of Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLITICS AS SPORT: THE EFFECTS OF PARTISAN MEDIA ON PERCEPTIONS 
OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY 
COPYRIGHT 
2017 
Andrew Michael Daniller
iii 
 
For my parents, Gene and Sheri 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
I feel a very uncomfortable obligation to acknowledge Donald Trump for 
spending three months of the 2016 presidential election openly questioning the fairness of 
the electoral process in the United States. Just as I entered the home stretch of writing this 
dissertation, Trump’s comments turned the topic I had been working on for several 
years—citizens’ perceptions of electoral integrity—into something seemingly half the 
country was talking about. If nothing else, Trump has reaffirmed the relevance of the 
issues I addressed herein. 
 Turning to people whose contributions I am much happier to acknowledge, this 
dissertation would not have been possible without a great deal of guidance and support 
from my advisor Diana Mutz. For five years Diana has made me a better writer, 
researcher, and thinker, always pushing me to keep revising until I get it right. Michael 
Delli Carpini and Joseph Cappella contributed immeasurably as members of my 
dissertation committee, and I thank them for their wisdom and experience as teachers as 
well as their comments and suggestions on the dissertation itself. Devra Moehler also 
played a major role in shaping my thinking and approach as I began to develop this 
research project.  
I would like to thank each of the other faculty members I’ve had the opportunity 
to work with and learn from since arriving at the University of Pennsylvania, including 
Paul Allison, Daniel Hopkins, Amy Jordan, Elihu Katz, Matthew Levendusky, Carolyn 
Marvin, Monroe Price, Victor Pickard, and Barbie Zelizer. My sincere apologies to 
v 
 
anyone I’ve forgotten. I would also like to thank the faculty at the School of Media and 
Public Affairs at the George Washington University where I received my Master’s 
degree, in particular Catie Bailard, Kimberly Gross, and Silvio Waisbord. 
I join dozens of previous Annenberg School graduates in thanking the amazing 
staff that works so hard to make ASC such a wonderful place for graduate students, as 
well as the generosity of the Annenberg family without whom the school would not exist. 
I’d also like to thank the friends and colleagues I’ve had the opportunity to work with, 
particularly Doug Allen, Lyndsey Beutin, and Laura Silver. I owe a huge debt of 
gratitude to Barbie Zelizer, Emily Plowman, and everyone who participated in the 2015 
Summer Culture program in Puerto Rico for providing me not just with an amazing trip, 
but a much-appreciated new perspective on my research as I was writing my dissertation 
proposal.  
On a more personal level, thanks to my parents, Sheri and Gene, for a lifetime of 
love and support that I can’t possibly recognize in this brief acknowledgement. I know 
they’ve been waiting to see this dissertation for a long time, and I hope it was worth the 
wait. Thanks as well to my parents-in-law, Anne and Mitch, for welcoming me into their 
family (and for more than a few home-cooked meals as I was writing). Thanks to Jamie, 
Brady, and all of the other family members too numerous to list who have helped me 
with this dissertation both directly and indirectly. I’d also like to specifically mention Phil 
Folkemer, Sean Kates, Steven Maloney, Brad Morse, John Rackson, and Liam Toohey, 
each of whom provided assistance in some form or another along the way. 
vi 
 
Finally, a special thanks to Larissa Klevan, my best friend, partner, and now wife, 
who until now has only ever known me while I was working on this dissertation. I can’t 
wait to see where we go together from here. 
 
vii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
POLITICS AS SPORT: THE EFFECTS OF PARTISAN MEDIA ON PERCEPTIONS 
OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY 
Andrew M. Daniller 
Diana C. Mutz 
Just as fans of two opposing teams watching the same game reach opposite 
conclusions about the quality of referees, citizens’ assessments of the legitimacy of their 
democratic institutions depend to a worrying degree upon the outcome, rather than the 
procedures, of an election. Citizens who voted for the losing side in an election are much 
less likely to believe that the process was fair than citizens who voted for the winner. 
However, little attention has been paid to partisan media’s potential to exacerbate this 
phenomenon. I hypothesized that like-minded media amplify the effects of winning and 
losing on perceptions of electoral integrity. In other words, supporters of a winning 
candidate or party become even more confident in the legitimacy of the process when 
exposed to media that favors their side, while supporters of a losing candidate or party 
become even less confident in the legitimacy of the process when exposed to media that 
favors their side. At the same time, I hypothesizes that cross-cutting media mute the 
effects of winning and losing, decreasing the magnitude of changes in perceptions of 
electoral integrity. 
I tested my predictions using nationally representative panel surveys from the 
2008 and 2012 presidential elections as well as the 2014 midterm elections. Whereas past 
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research has produced little evidence that perceptions of legitimacy are affected by 
winning and losing in U.S. congressional levels, supporters of the winning party clearly 
increased in perceptions of legitimacy and supporters of the losing party clearly 
decreased in perceptions of legitimacy in response to the 2014 midterm elections. 
Nonvoters who nonetheless preferred one presidential candidate or the other likewise 
increased or decreased in perceptions of legitimacy according to whether their preferred 
candidate won or lost. Finally, like-minded media exacerbated the negative effects of 
losing in each of these election cycles, indicating that partisan media increase the size of 
the gap between winners’ and losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity. The long-term 
effects of partisan media are to weaken aggregate levels of confidence in the legitimacy 
of the electoral process itself.  
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1. THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN DOUBTING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS  
 
 Psychology confirms what many sports fans understand instinctively: two 
spectators watching the same game, one a supporter of the home team and the other a fan 
of the visitors, will appear afterwards to have observed two completely different events. 
Duke University students will cheer the team’s great defense to prevent a North Carolina 
buzzer beater while the entire student body at UNC simultaneously groans as one at the 
referee’s failure to call a seemingly obvious foul on the shooter. A lifelong New Yorker 
sees the Yankees score the winning run in a close play at the plate whereas a Bostonian is 
absolutely certain the Red Sox tagged the runner out before he could score. Even the 
introduction of instant replay by the major sports leagues hasn’t eliminated this 
phenomenon.  
 Psychologists have understood that fans of opposing teams experience two 
different versions of the same game since Hastorf and Cantril’s (1954) classic case study 
involving a particularly divisive football game played by Dartmouth College and 
Princeton University. Players from both sides, including Princeton legend Dick Kazmaier 
playing in the final game of his career, were forced to leave the game with severe 
injuries. Princeton and Dartmouth supporters, including alumni as well as students, 
diverged sharply in their assessments of whether the game was played fairly and, if not, 
which side was responsible for any unnecessary roughness. These differences led Hastorf 
and Cantril to conclude, “It seems clear that the ‘game’ actually was many different 
games and that each version of the events that transpired was just as ‘real’ to a particular 
person as other versions were to other people” (1954, p. 132). A spectator’s experience of 
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a sporting event relies just as much upon the significance they attach to the outcome, 
driven by an allegiance to a team or to individual players, as it does upon the reality of 
what occurs on the field. 
 More recently, political scientists have discovered that for many citizens, Hastorf 
and Cantril’s description of sporting events applies just as well to national elections. Just 
as sports fans align themselves with one team or another, Americans root for their 
preferred parties, Team Republican and Team Democrat, complete with mascots 
(elephants vs. donkeys) and team colors (red vs. blue). The “National Political League” 
can’t compete with the National Football League in the weekly television ratings, but 
once every few years Americans gather around their televisions to see whether Team 
Republican or Team Democrat will emerge victorious in the championship game that 
determines control of the White House.  
More importantly, much like Dartmouth and Princeton fans evaluating the 
referees, citizens decide whether the democratic process is operating fairly and justly—
whether the democratic process is legitimate—based in part on how their team performs 
(Anderson et al., 2005). There are numerous examples of Americans who rooted for the 
losing team finding fault with the process itself following recent elections. The day after 
Barack Obama defeated Mitt Romney to win a second term as President of the United 
States, Fox News Channel host Sean Hannity turned from a discussion of the political 
left's incivility to a story of alleged voter intimidation: 
All right, every Election Day unfortunately always brings us new 
disturbing examples of voter intimidation. Like four years ago, we saw new 
members of the new Black Panther party showing up outside polling places. 
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And Jerry Jackson, he was one of them and Fox News caught him on tape 
outside a polling site in Northern Virginia. Now in 2008, he along with another 
Black Panther member were charged with voter intimidation. But the charges 
were eventually dropped by the Eric Holder Justice Department. 
But this year, Fox News has confirmed, he was in fact, a designated poll 
watcher, pretty unbelievable. (“President Obama Reelected,” 2012)  
 
 Hannity was far from the first Fox host to mention Jackson in 2012 election 
coverage. This lone Black Panther at a single polling location was among the stars of the 
Fox network on Election Day. The following week, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart 
(“November 12, 2012,” 2012) reported that Fox had featured Jackson a total of 21 times 
on Election Day. The racially charged story of voter intimidation in 2012 would seem to 
be a natural companion to the popular conservative narrative of widespread voter fraud, 
often linked to the activist organization ACORN, which was alleged to have helped 
Obama win his first presidential election in 2008 (Dreier & Martin, 2009). In both 
elections, the underlying message from proponents of these narratives was clear: Barack 
Obama and his supporters were using illegal methods to undermine the electoral process. 
If “Team Democrat” won, it could only be because it cheated. 
Conservatives are by no means alone in questioning the legitimacy of recent 
unfavorable election results. In 2004, Democrats shocked by John Kerry's loss to then-
President George W. Bush pointed to discrepancies between exit polls and final vote 
tallies. Stories of irregularities involving electronic voting machines served as further 
evidence to these partisans that the election had somehow been stolen (Bradley, 2005). 
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And, of course, the 2000 presidential election's split between the popular vote and the 
Electoral College and the protracted legal battle over Florida's vote counting procedures 
were more than enough to raise questions about the legitimacy of the outcome among 
disappointed Al Gore supporters. 
 
Conceptualizing Democratic Legitimacy  
Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of democracy. When an election is 
conducted fairly, citizens will ideally grant the chosen leaders the legitimacy needed to 
make and enforce the law. Fair elections also allow peaceful transitions of power from 
one party to another by ensuring that even the voters who preferred a losing candidate 
will accept the legitimacy of the outcome (Tyler, 2013). If the process was democratic 
and just, citizens will acknowledge that even in a fair process, not everyone gets what 
they want. 
 Of course, as any sports fan might expect, citizens of democracies are seldom 
quite so sanguine as theory would hope when they face disappointing election outcomes. 
Citizens who supported a losing candidate or party in a national election consistently 
display lower levels of satisfaction with democracy, trust in government, and weaker 
beliefs that the political system is responsive to citizens than citizens whose preferred 
side won (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005; Esaiasson, 2011). Fair procedures can help to 
minimize rejection of an unfavorable outcome, but fair procedures cannot eliminate the 
distance between winners’ and losers’ evaluations of the legitimacy of the democratic 
system sometimes described as the legitimacy gap. The persistence of legitimacy gaps is 
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troubling. For democracy to remain viable, losers must put aside their negative feelings 
and consent to be governed by the winners. The alternatives to this “losers’ consent” 
range from an inability to govern effectively to the destabilization of the democratic 
regime (Nadeau & Blais, 1993; Anderson et al., 2005). 
 In the United States and other well established democracies, peaceful transfers of 
power are taken as a given. And yet, diminished perceptions of the political system’s 
legitimacy can produce real effects in otherwise stable democracies, from limiting the 
latitude leaders have to implement potentially desirable policies, to encouraging citizens 
to embrace potentially risky changes to the democratic process (Hetherington, 1998; 
2005; Bowler & Donovan, 2007; Hetherington & Husser, 2012). Scattered protests may 
develop following a closely disputed election, such as the 2000 presidential race. The 
more disruptive protests of the 1960s and 70s were frequently linked to declining trust in 
government (e.g. Citrin, 1977; see Levi & Stoker, 2000). More recently, the likelihood of 
citizens engaging in protests against democratic governments has been directly attributed 
to distrust resulting from unfavorable election results (Anderson & Mendes, 2006) and to 
distrust of the electoral process in particular (Norris, 2014). 
 The concept of political legitimacy derives from early studies of deference to 
authority (e.g. Flacks, 1969; Bickman, 1974). Do citizens accept the authority of the state 
and obey its designated officials and agents? Or, do they deny the legitimacy of such 
actors, protesting and otherwise working to subvert the regime? The underlying attitudes 
towards the regime which promote obedience on the one hand, and resistance on the 
other, form the core of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy has since grown to 
encompass such diverse but related concepts as confidence, trust, skepticism, alienation, 
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and efficacy. The result, unfortunately, is an “unwieldy and complex,” “too often 
muddied” concept which can hold different meanings in different contexts (Weatherford, 
1992, p. 149; Norris, 2011, p. 19).  
 Most modern conceptions of political legitimacy depend upon Easton’s (1965) 
analysis of support for the political system. Political support depends upon the 
evaluations citizens hold of the regime and its core institutions and officials. Negative 
evaluations produce low levels of system support while positive evaluations lead to 
greater support. Moreover, support can apply to multiple levels of the political system. In 
the classic conception, diffuse support refers to evaluations of the principles, ideals, and 
general rules of the game that define the political regime. By contrast, specific support 
refers to evaluations of the current operation of the government, in particular, attitudes 
towards current office holders and the actions of government institutions (Easton, 1965; 
1975). 
 More recent efforts to examine political legitimacy have presented a continuum of 
system support ranging from most specific to most diffuse rather than a simple 
dichotomy. Norris (1999; 2011) identifies five levels to which evaluations of the system 
might apply. Approval of incumbent officeholders lies at the most specific level. Slightly 
more diffuse attitudes include evaluations of institutions such as the national legislature 
or the military, followed by assessments of the regime’s performance in policy areas of 
importance to citizens. Agreement with the regime’s core principles such as a 
commitment to majoritarian rules or to freedom of religion sit at the second-most diffuse 
level. Finally, at the most diffuse level is a sense of belonging to the national community, 
often evidenced by pride in the national identity. Numerous factors, including the 
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perceived fairness of the electoral process, personal feelings of efficacy, the competence 
of officials, and the existence of mechanisms for government accountability can influence 
attitudes at each of these levels (Weatherford, 1992).  
 The idea that legitimacy can be affected by election outcomes is closely tied to 
theories of procedural fairness (also called procedural justice). Theories of procedural 
fairness suggest that people will tend to accept unwanted outcomes if they perceive the 
decision-making process that produced those outcomes as fair (Grimes, 2006; Tyler, 
2006; Levi, Sacks, & Tyler, 2009). In the case of an election, losers should accept a loss 
so long as they perceive the process itself as a just one. Competent and knowledgeable 
poll workers, for example, can help to assure voters that their ballots will be counted 
accurately, producing confidence in the process and legitimacy for the outcome (Atkeson 
& Saunders, 2007; Hall, Monson, & Patterson, 2009). Even so, the desirability of an 
outcome can sometimes outweigh considerations of procedural fairness in individuals’ 
minds (e.g. Arnesen, 2014; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2005). The importance of 
outcomes is particularly apparent in winners’ and losers’ divergent perceptions of 
legitimacy following an election.  
This dissertation focuses in particular on perceptions of electoral integrity; in 
other words, how citizens view the electoral process itself. Citizens perceive the electoral 
process as legitimate to the extent that they perceive elections as both fairly conducted 
and effective in promoting government accountability. Importantly, the concept of 
electoral integrity is specific enough to depend on citizens’ direct experiences of elections 
yet diffuse enough that it does not depend on citizens’ evaluations of the present 
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government’s particular policy goals. Perceptions of electoral integrity require approval 
of the basic process of voting without which modern democracy could not succeed.  
 
Media, Spectatorship, and Losers’ Consent 
For much of the twentieth century the American news environment was 
dominated by an institutional media committed to the values of objective, professional 
journalism (Schudson, 1978; Ladd, 2012). The massive expansion in the number of 
media choices available to consumers, led initially by cable and satellite television and 
more recently by the internet, has greatly undermined the dominance of traditional news 
outlets (Prior, 2007; Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011). 
In the world of sports, the vast increase in the number of media channels available 
to Americans sometimes gives fans the option to watch two different versions of the same 
game, with one broadcast favoring the home team and the other the visitors. In the world 
of politics, expanded media choice similarly allows fans of Team Republican or Team 
Democrat to choose coverage that favors their side. Fox News Channel and MSNBC 
generally fill these roles for supporters of the Republican and Democratic parties, 
respectively. Despite a wealth of recent research examining various effects of partisan 
media, little to no attention has been paid to the effects of partisan media on perceptions 
of legitimacy.  
I hypothesize that like-minded partisan media amplify the effects of winning and 
losing on perceptions of electoral integrity. In other words, supporters of a winning 
candidate or party become more trusting of the process when exposed to media that 
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favors their own preferred side, while supporters of a losing candidate or party become 
less trusting of the process when exposed to media that favors their preferred side. On the 
other hand, I predict cross-cutting media mute the effects of winning and losing, 
decreasing the magnitudes of both winners’ gains and losers’ losses.  
I expect partisan media to affect perceptions of legitimacy through two potential 
mechanisms. First, partisan media may affect citizens’ pre-election expectations for the 
outcome of the election, with like-minded media raising one’s expectations of victory. 
Second, partisan media may affect citizens’ explanations for the outcome. To the extent 
that media from the losing side emphasize unfairness, it should amplify the decline in 
legitimacy among losers. Using long-term panel data comprising multiple election cycles, 
I test how individual-level exposure to partisan news content affects changes in 
perceptions of the electoral process. 
In partisan media, voices from the favored political party tend to be 
overrepresented. As a result, audience members may overestimate support for the favored 
party in the nation at large. At the same time, partisan media may overstate a preferred 
candidate’s chances based on an inaccurate or misleading reading of polling and other 
public opinion data either out of genuine optimism or in order to strategically maintain 
optimism among members of the party’s base. In both cases, the most likely result is 
inflated expectations for the preferred side’s electoral chances. To the extent those 
expectations are eventually frustrated, audience members may view the process itself as 
illegitimate. 
Partisan media are also likely to affect perceptions of legitimacy through their 
effect on audience members’ explanations for the outcome. In the middle and late 
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twentieth century, the relatively monolithic media environment encouraged Americans to 
accept the consensus explanations for electoral outcomes promoted by established 
political elites and widely reported by journalists (Hershey, 1992; 1994). Today, MSNBC 
might cater to liberals' belief in 2004 that Bush relied on faulty voting machines while 
Fox News Channel might reassure conservatives in 2012 by telling them that Obama won 
only due to voter fraud and racial intimidation.  
Even if partisan news outlets don’t actively fan the flames of conspiracy theories, 
they may tacitly encourage delegitimizing narratives to flourish simply by allowing their 
audiences to remain unaware of competing explanations for electoral outcomes. Voters 
who received their public affairs information exclusively from Fox during the 2012 
election cycle would presumably have had little reason to believe that any of Barack 
Obama’s policies were beneficial to the country. How, then, could these viewers’ fellow 
citizens have made a legitimate decision to reelect Obama? And why were the election 
results so contrary to what viewers’ trusted experts had predicted?  
It is by now well established that citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy are affected 
by the outcome of an election, with winning increasing perceived legitimacy, and losing 
decreasing it. However, past work on this topic has failed to address the actual process by 
which most citizens observe the democratic process and render judgments about its 
legitimacy. The vast majority of citizens in modern democracies experience national 
elections primarily through media and the act of voting. And yet, the effects of media are 
almost entirely unexplored in the existing literature on winning and losing. This oversight 
is particularly troubling in light of the reemergence and increasing prominence of news 
outlets with distinct partisan agendas in the United States. This dissertation therefore 
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brings together these two bodies of research, asking how exposure to partisan media 
conditions winners’ and losers’ perceptions of legitimacy after an election is decided. 
 In addition to examining how partisan media conditions the effects of winning 
and losing, this dissertation presents a second major contribution to the existing literature 
through its emphasis on citizens who are primarily spectators rather than participants in 
the electoral process. Democracy depends upon the consent of the large number of 
citizens who did not actively participate in the process just as much as it depends upon 
the consent of losers. In the United States, voter turnout in presidential elections tends to 
hover in the neighborhood of 60 percent of eligible voters, with turnout in off-year 
congressional and local elections generally even lower (Leighley & Nagler, 2013). 
Winning politicians would be unable to implement their agendas, let alone maintain a 
stable and effective system of government, without the implicit consent of citizens who 
observe the process for the most part only passively.  
Nonvoters may not exercise their voices in elections, but spectatorship of the 
electoral process allows voters and nonvoters alike to make necessary determinations 
about the process’s legitimacy. After all, most sports fans only watch their favorite teams 
rather than join them on the field, but those fans still have opinions about why their teams 
won or lost. Moving beyond definitions of winners and losers as those who voted for the 
winning and losing candidates, I predict that a preference for a losing candidate can lead 
to disappointment with the outcome and produce decreases in perceptions of electoral 
integrity just as in the case of losers who voted. Likewise, those whose preferred 
candidate wins should have higher levels of perceived integrity, even if they did not vote. 
Further, I expect partisan media to condition the effects of this vicarious winning and 
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vicarious losing for nonvoters. Media are necessary for nonvoters to observe and become 
involved in the political process. Thus partisan media are likely to affect nonvoters’ 
perceptions of legitimacy as well as voters’ perceptions of legitimacy.  
 
Plan for the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical foundation for my predictions. I begin by 
describing the growing body of work that addresses the gap between electoral winners 
and losers in perceptions of democratic legitimacy. I explain why the concept of losers’ 
consent is of central importance to the health of a democratic regime and why a trend in 
the political information environment that has the effect of undermining losers’ trust in 
the process should concern observers of American politics. Next, I explore the 
reemergence of partisan media in the United States in recent decades. I review the limited 
evidence to date suggesting that media might play a role in shaping post-election 
perceptions of legitimacy, pointing to important gaps in this literature. Finally, I argue 
that past research points to two possible mechanisms through which partisan media might 
affect changes in perceptions of electoral integrity: shaping citizens’ expectations and 
promoting post-election explanations for the outcome. 
Chapter 3 describes the data and methods used throughout the analysis. My 
analysis drew on a unique set of three panel surveys that followed a large group of voters 
through two presidential elections and one national midterm election. Together the three 
panels tracked the same individuals from late 2007 through early 2015. The panel surveys 
allowed me to measure individual changes in perceptions of electoral integrity. As a 
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result, I am able to make unusually strong inferences about the effects of winning and 
losing and exposure to partisan media. 
I begin my empirical analysis of the panel data in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
Chapter 4 focuses on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity during the 2008 and 
2012 presidential elections. I start by illustrating the patterns of changing perceptions of 
electoral integrity among supporters of the winning and losing candidates in both 
elections. The general pattern in both cases is consistent with the predictions of the 
existing body of literature on winners and losers, with Barack Obama supporters 
becoming more positive towards the process after each of Obama’s victories and 
supporters of the Republican candidates becoming more negative from pre- to post-
election in both 2008 and 2012. I then presents tests of my predictions that exposure to 
like-minded partisan media increases the gains in perceptions of legitimacy among 
winners and increases the magnitude of losses among losers, whereas exposure to cross-
cutting media has the reverse effects, decreasing the gains experienced by winners and 
decreasing the magnitude of losses experienced by losers.  
Chapter 5 focuses on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity during the 2014 
midterm elections. The 2014 panel allowed me to test my central prediction in the 
particularly stringent case of a relatively low salience midterm election. While there is 
some evidence of a legitimacy gap among winners and losers following regional elections 
in other democracies, there is to date no evidence that Americans’ perceptions of 
legitimacy are significantly affected by the outcome of non-presidential elections. If my 
theoretical explanation for why partisan media affects perceptions of integrity is correct, I 
should observe changes in perceptions among winners and losers who are exposed to 
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high volumes of one-sided partisan media even in an election where the effects of 
winning and losing are otherwise quite small or even nonexistent. Just as partisan media 
tend to treat the midterm elections as national rather than local, I identified winners and 
losers in the midterm election based on the national election results. Winners in a 
midterm election supported the party that won control of Congress while losers supported 
the minority party. 
Chapter 6 focuses on changing perceptions of electoral integrity among 
nonvoters. I expected nonvoters to vicariously experience the effects of winning or losing 
based on their candidate preferences, even though they fail to act on those preferences by 
voting. For nonvoters, media’s role is particularly important since nonvoters do not 
directly experience the electoral process. I therefore predicted that partisan media will 
condition the effects of vicarious winning and vicarious losing among nonvoters. To the 
extent that nonvoters are less susceptible to the effects of partisan media due to weaker 
partisan attachments, nonvoters may serve as an important moderating influence on 
changes in perceptions of legitimacy within the population as a whole. 
Chapter 7 examines the two mechanisms through which I expected exposure to 
partisan media to condition the effects of winning and losing, expectations and 
explanations. First, I examined the pattern of changes in perceptions of electoral integrity 
among voters interviewed throughout the post-election period. I then conducted a 
mediation analysis in order to test whether exposure to partisan media produces an 
indirect effect on perceptions of electoral integrity through an effect on voters’ 
expectations for the election’s outcome. 
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Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the major findings of the preceding analyses. I also 
acknowledge potential weaknesses of my methodological approach while highlighting 
the steps I’ve taken to address those issues. I conclude by discussing the normative 
implications of the findings. Does the continued success of partisan news necessarily 
imply that partisans will distrust the results of every election for the foreseeable future? 
Or is it possible for partisan news and electoral legitimacy to coexist? 
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2. EFFECTS OF WINNING AND LOSING IN THE POST-BROADCAST ERA 
 
Why might media play a role in promoting or undermining losers’ consent? I 
begin by reviewing the growing body of recent literature documenting the size and shape 
of winner-loser gaps in numerous democracies around the world. I devote particular 
attention to examinations of winner-loser gaps in the United States. Evidence that 
winners hold greater perceptions of legitimacy than losers has been inconsistent in the 
United States despite the fact that features of the American election process would seem 
to favor a sizable legitimacy gap. The United States is therefore ripe for additional study 
using the type of panel data that is best suited to tracking individual changes in 
perceptions of legitimacy. 
After reviewing the existing literature on the winner-loser phenomenon, I turn my 
attention to the growth of partisan media in the United States over the past two decades. 
The vast expansion in media choice available to Americans in the post-broadcast era has 
included a significant increase in the number of outlets that present news and public 
affairs information from a distinctly partisan perspective. Further, a significant portion of 
Americans have begun using these partisan outlets for political information. I argue that 
the rise of partisan media holds important implications for the winner-loser gap insofar as 
exposure to like-minded partisan media is likely to amplify the gains in legitimacy 
experienced by winners as well as the losses experienced by losers. By bringing together 
these two previously distinct literatures, I hope to shed light on a phenomenon that 
significantly impacts how Americans view their electoral process. 
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Winners’ and Losers’ Perceptions of Legitimacy 
 There is evidence that in dozens of democracies, including both relatively new 
and fully consolidated regimes, as well as in states located in every region of the world, 
winners tend to have higher perceptions of legitimacy than losers following an election. 
Perceptions of legitimacy are most commonly measured in terms of satisfaction with 
democracy, derived from a survey item that asks respondents how satisfied they are with 
the way democracy works in their country (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005; Esaiasson, 2011; 
Singh, Lago, & Blais, 2011; Curini, Jou, & Memoli, 2012). Unfortunately, this single-
item measure is fraught with confusion over what, precisely, it measures (Canache, 
Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Linde & Ekman, 2003). The satisfaction with democracy 
item might appear at first glance to capture fairly diffuse system support, serving as a 
question about democratic principles. At the same time, it may appear to ask something 
much more specific: How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working right 
now? 
 Persistent evidence of winner-loser gaps when other measures of legitimacy are 
employed is reassuring given a high degree of person-to-person and country-to-country 
variation in interpretations of the satisfaction with democracy item. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that at the level of highly specific support individuals who recently voted for 
a losing candidate would report lower levels of trust in the government officials they 
voted against (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Moehler, 2009). Losers are also more likely 
to doubt that the winners have earned the right to implement a specific disliked policy by 
virtue of their electoral victory (Nadeau & Blais, 1993; Moehler & Lindberg, 2009). 
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More troubling is the finding that losers also feel a diminished sense of political efficacy 
when compared to winners (Clarke & Acock, 1989; Brunell, Clausen, & Buchler, 2012). 
 The most appropriate indicator of the prevalence of the winner-loser phenomenon 
may be the low regard in which losers tend to hold the electoral process itself. Contrary 
to the predictions of theories of procedural fairness and the hopes of democrats that 
elections might legitimate their own outcomes through widespread participation in which 
everyone’s voice matters, losers have been found to judge the electoral process as less 
fair than winners and to be less confident that votes were counted accurately (Holbert, 
2004; Holbert, LaMarre, & Landreville, 2009). They are also more likely to express 
doubts about the responsiveness of government officials and institutions (Banducci & 
Karp, 2003; Craig, Martinez, Gainous, & Kane, 2006; Brunell, 2008), a second 
component of electoral legitimacy quite closely related to assessments of electoral 
fairness in Weatherford’s (1992) model of political legitimacy. 
 I treated perceptions of electoral integrity—evaluations of whether elections are 
fair, whether votes are properly counted, and whether elections are effective in increasing 
the responsiveness of government to citizens—as the primary outcome of interest in my 
own exploration of the winner-loser phenomenon. Perceptions of electoral integrity hold 
particular theoretical interest due to the centrality of elections both in democratic 
principles and in democratic practice as the primary opportunity for the ordinary citizen 
to actively participate in democratic governance. Assessments of the electoral process are 
also directly tied to specific events. By contrast, questions related to other aspects of 
legitimacy, such as trust in government officials, have a high probability of holding 
different meanings for respondents immediately following an election as opposed to in 
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the middle of a president’s term. Finally, my focus was consistent with other recent work 
that emphasizes the importance of public perceptions of the electoral process for the 
health of the democratic regime (e.g. Norris, 2014). 
In the United States, features of the highly professionalized American campaign 
process such as targeted television advertising and strategically oriented news coverage 
are believed to undermine citizens’ faith in the democratic process (e.g., Ansolabehere & 
Iyengar, 1995; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Additionally, winner-loser gaps are in 
general particularly pronounced in majoritarian political systems like Great Britain’s 
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997), which would presumably apply to the United States’ 
majoritarian system as well. And yet, evidence of winner-loser gaps in the United States 
in particular has been surprisingly mixed. 
A limited number of American election panel studies make it possible to examine 
changes in perceptions of legitimacy from pre to post-election. Following the 1972 
presidential election, winners increased in system responsiveness, whereas losers 
declined; in 1984, winners and losers both increased by the same amount (Esaiasson, 
2011). In 1996, winners increased in their perceptions of how much of a “say in 
government” they felt by 10% in the post-election survey, while losers also increased but 
by a slightly lesser amount. In another study using the same American National Election 
Studies (ANES) panel data, Anderson and LoTempio (2002) found that voting for the 
losing presidential candidate in 1972 or 1996 had systematic negative effects on political 
trust.  
Losers became less confident that votes throughout the country were counted 
fairly after Election Day in 2008 and 2012, whereas winners became more confident in 
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the national vote count (Sances & Stewart, 2015). However, losers in both election years 
as well as in 2004 actually became more confident that their own votes were counted 
fairly after the conclusion of the election, even as they lost trust in the national process. 
The results from cross-sectional analyses are similarly mixed. For example, using 
1964 through 2004 ANES data, Craig and colleagues (2006) found a post-election 
winner-loser gap in the predicted direction in 6 out of 11 presidential elections when 
analyzing political trust and democratic responsiveness, but in only one out of three 
presidential elections when analyzing satisfaction with democracy.  Focusing on the 
aggregate gap between winners and losers in post-election data is not ideal because it 
does not tell us which individuals gained or lost in perceived legitimacy relative to before 
the election outcome was known.  Nonetheless, in the U.S. case, scholars have had to 
make do with limited available data, and less than ideal forms of analysis. 
The effects of winning and losing may well depend upon a broader historical 
context and not merely upon the results of the election in question. Specifically, winning 
repeatedly appears to be subject to diminishing returns whereas losing repeatedly appears 
to lead citizens to increasingly doubt that the system is fair and that they have a genuine 
chance to win (Anderson et al., 2005; Curini et al., 2012). Additional data that is capable 
of incorporating the broader context of an election should help to clarify the effects of 
winning and losing in the United States. 
 In addition to producing mixed results in the US context, past work on winners 
and losers offers little information regarding how nonvoters react to election outcomes. 
Thus far, only a small number of studies using the winner-loser framework have 
incorporated nonvoters, and these studies have tended to treat nonvoters as homogenous 
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“control” groups (Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Singh, Karakoç, & Blais, 2012). This 
approach is inconsistent with current work in political theory that emphasizes the actual 
role of citizens in most modern democracies. Citizens observe and develop appraisals of 
the democratic process regardless of whether they voice their own personal views. It is 
customary to understand the democratic citizen as a decision-maker, but in reality most 
ordinary citizens—particularly in the US where voter turnout is often low—are not 
political decision-makers so much as spectators who watch and listen to others while 
monitoring governmental institutions, officials, and processes (Schudson, 1998; Green 
2009). 
 Nonvoters can experience wins and losses vicariously, particularly to the extent 
that they follow election outcomes through the media. Despite their decision not to 
participate, nonvoters in the US frequently hold strong preferences for one candidate or 
another. Further, their perceptions of electoral legitimacy change in response to the 
election outcome based on these preferences, much like winners and losers who cast a 
ballot. This dissertation specifically examines the effects of vicarious winning and 
vicarious losing on nonvoters. In doing so, it addresses a traditionally understudied yet 
theoretically important aspect of the winner-loser phenomenon. 
 
The Return of Partisan Media 
Americans’ media choices began to grow at a seemingly exponential rate towards 
the end of the twentieth century. Introduced in the 1970s and 1980s and steadily adopted 
by an increasing number of households, cable and satellite television provide dozens or 
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even hundreds of television channels. In the 1990s and early 2000s, digital technologies 
began to make available a seemingly infinite variety of websites, audio channels, video 
channels, and eventually social media platforms via the internet. As a result, Americans 
have a much greater choice of news formats than the selection between three nearly 
identical network news programs available during the "broadcast era" of news of the 
middle-to-late twentieth century; moreover, Americans today can choose between 
countless entertainment options in place of news (Prior, 2007; Williams & Delli Carpini, 
2011). 
Among the varied media choices available today are dozens of political 
information sources with a perspective that favors one of the two major political parties. 
While overtly partisan newspapers were dominant in the US in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries (Schudson, 1978; Gentzkow, Glaeser, & Goldin, 2004), the 
current prominence of partisan outlets represents a significant change from the model of 
objective, centrist journalism that dominated for much of the twentieth century.  
Since the repeal of the fairness doctrine in the 1980s, conservative hosts have 
come to dominate the genre of talk radio (Holbert, 2004; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). 
Beginning with the founding of the Republican-leaning Fox News Channel in 1996 and 
followed by MSNBC’s shift to capture liberal audiences during the 2000s, viewers on 
both sides of the partisan divide have had the ability to select television channels and 
programs that present news and public affairs information from a perspective consistent 
with their prior beliefs. And, of course, the internet provides partisan-oriented sites 
ranging from the simple text-based blogs that received national notice during the 2004 
election campaign to multi-media ventures such as the Glenn Beck-founded TheBlaze, 
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which offers streaming feeds of its associated television channel and radio network online 
in addition to frequently updated web-based content. 
While less dominant than it once was, television remains a primary source of 
news and political information for many Americans (Pew Research Center, 2013; 2014a). 
Even though the audience for the network evening news programs has declined in recent 
decades, the networks have consistently recorded combined audiences of between twenty 
and twenty-five million viewers per night since 2008, with slight year-to-year upticks in 
2013 and 2014 (Pew, 2015). Over the same period, approximately three million 
Americans per night have watched the prime time programming of the three major 24-
hour cable news channels, Fox, CNN, and MSNBC. Viewership of the news channels 
tends to increase surrounding major political and news events, including in the lead-up to 
an election. In 2008, 72 million Americans watched Election Night coverage on 
television; in 2012, 67 million Americans tuned in to the news on Election Night (Stelter, 
2012).  
I focus in particular on the effects of partisan television news due to the continued 
prominence of television among Americans’ news options. Partisan news, public affairs, 
and talk programs on television give individuals the option to consume like-minded (or 
attitude-congruent) media versus cross-cutting (or counter-attitudinal) media (Mutz, 
2006; Goldman & Mutz, 2011). Experimental and survey evidence confirms that many 
individuals engage in selective exposure to information by seeking out like-minded 
sources (e.g. Hart et al., 2009; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). For 
example, Republicans in one experiment were significantly more likely to choose news 
articles labeled as Fox News articles while Democrats were significantly more likely to 
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choose articles labeled as coming from CNN and NPR even though the actual content of 
the articles was held constant (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).  
For my purposes, it is not necessary to evaluate why partisans may or may not 
engage in selective exposure to like-minded media. However, it is important to establish 
that Americans are using partisan media sources in addition to the traditional news outlets 
represented on television by the three broadcast networks. To the extent that some 
Americans tend to consume like-minded media and some Americans tend to consume 
cross-cutting media, I was able to test my major predictions. 
Recent studies demonstrate that a significant number of Americans are using 
partisan media sources, and particularly partisan television sources. In 2004, partisanship 
and ideology significantly predicted the cable news viewing habits of respondents to the 
National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES). Liberal Democrats were significantly 
more likely to watch MSNBC or CNN while conservative Republicans were significantly 
more likely to watch Fox News (Stroud, 2008). Additionally, liberal Democrats became 
more likely to watch MSNBC or CNN as the campaign progressed while conservative 
Republicans became more likely to watch Fox. 
Respondents to the 2008 NAES showed a similar preference for like-minded 
television programs. 27 percent of programs habitually watched by the average 
Republican respondent favored the Republican party and 28 percent of programs 
habitually watched by the average Democratic respondent favored the Democratic party 
(Dilliplane, 2011). Despite a preference for like-minded programs, many survey 
respondents did watch at least some cross-cutting programs. 15 percent of programs 
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watched by the average Republican favored the Democrats while 8 percent of programs 
watched by the average Democrat favored the Republicans (Dilliplane, 2011).  
Notably, the 2008 study identified respondents as viewers of individual television 
programs rather than as viewers of entire networks. This allows for analyses of television 
viewing habits that more accurately describe the content a given individual watches. For 
example, though MSNBC is widely identified as a Democratic-leaning network, its 
morning news program is hosted by a former four-term Republican member of Congress 
who espouses many conservative positions. 
Despite findings showing that many Americans watch partisan television 
programs, news viewership overall is certainly lower than it was in past decades. Both 
experimental and observational evidence suggest that many Americans will tend to 
choose entertainment over news given the plethora of choices available from media today 
(Prior, 2007; Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013). However, it is clear that a significant number 
of Americans who do habitually watch news and public affairs programming on 
television choose partisan programming. In the past, news media in the U.S. tended to 
present the same basic set of messages and the effects of media on public opinion were 
believed to depend primarily on the amount of news to which individuals were exposed 
(e.g. Zaller, 1992; 1996). Today audience members may encounter quite different 
messages depending on which news sources they prefer. Differing content could 
potentially lead Americans who get their political information from different sources to 
quite different conclusions about the legitimacy of the electoral process. 
 
26 
 
Partisan Media and the Winner-Loser Gap 
 The renewed focus on partisan news has addressed several substantively 
important hypothesized effects. For example, partisan polarization has drawn substantial 
attention due to the ongoing debate over whether the American public has become more 
polarized in recent years (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 
2008). Partisan news has been shown to have strong persuasive effects on audience 
members’ issue positions for a variety of current issues as well as an effect on the 
certainty with which audience members hold issue attitudes, producing polarization when 
Republicans and Democrats watch different sources of news that present opposite sides to 
an issue (Stroud, 2010; Feldman, 2011; Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & 
Leiserowitz, 2012; Levendusky, 2013).  
Partisan news has also been shown to mobilize voters, with exposure to Fox News 
increasing voter turnout among like-minded Republicans during the 2000 election and 
exposure to a variety of like-minded television programs increasing turnout among all 
partisans in 2008 (Hopkins & Ladd, 2014; Dilliplane, 2011). Some evidence even 
suggests that exposure to partisan media can induce changes in voting preferences. When 
several British newspapers defied their traditional conservative allegiances to support the 
Labour party in 1997, a significant proportion of their readers followed suit (Ladd & 
Lenz, 2009). Habitual exposure to cross-cutting news also caused a small but significant 
proportion of Americans to shift their vote preferences away from their normally 
preferred party in the 2008 presidential election (Dilliplane, 2014). 
The potential effects of partisan news on perceptions of legitimacy following an 
election have not been studied. In only two instances, to the best of my knowledge, has 
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media exposure been studied in connection with the effects of winning and losing. A 
cross-national comparison of the effects of winning and losing in the United States’ 1996 
national elections, Great Britain’s 1997 national elections, and New Zealand’s 1999 
national elections examined whether attention to a variety of media sources affected pre 
to post-election changes in perceptions of legitimacy (Banducci & Karp, 2003). In the 
United States, media sources included both local and national television, newspapers, talk 
radio, and campaign advertisements. The results of this analysis are somewhat mixed. In 
the United States, attention to local television predicted an increase in trust in government 
and attention to newspapers predicted an increase in efficacy. Meanwhile, attention to 
campaign advertisements predicted a decrease in both trust and efficacy. None of the 
other media variables had significant effects in the United States. 
Banducci and Karp (2003) argue that traditional news outlets, including public 
broadcasters in Britain and New Zealand and newspapers in the United States, were more 
likely to increase perceptions of legitimacy while outlets that were overly negative 
towards the political process decreased perceptions of legitimacy. However, this 
argument only partially explains the findings. This logic suggests that if local television 
news increased trust in the US, national television news, which is often a primary 
example of the centrist, objective news style that dominated in the mid-twentieth century, 
should also have had a positive rather than a non-significant impact. Similarly, it fails to 
explain why attention to Britain’s notoriously partisan and tabloid-style press had a 
positive effect on legitimacy or why American talk radio, which was both highly partisan 
and extremely critical of President Clinton’s government in the mid-1990s (Jamieson & 
Cappella, 2008), did not decrease legitimacy. 
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On one hand, the cross-national comparison of the US, Britain, and New Zealand 
provides evidence that media can affect changes in perceptions of legitimacy in the 
context of an election. On the other hand, the results of this analysis tell us little about 
what types of media are most likely to produce what effects. Media are likely to affect 
perceptions of legitimacy through the effects of specific types of content. Partisan media 
regularly convey messages about both the likely outcome of upcoming elections and the 
reasons why an election produced a certain result. I expect these types of messages in 
particular to condition changes in perceptions of electoral integrity.  
A second, more recent study incorporating data from 28 European countries 
produced strong evidence political parallelism in a country’s media system—the degree 
to which individual media outlets are aligned with specific political parties or ideologies 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004)—is closely associated with a larger gap between winners’ and 
losers’ perceptions of legitimacy (Lelkes, 2016). Additionally, the relationship between 
political parallelism and the legitimacy gap was strongest for survey respondents who 
reported consuming greater amounts of news. In combination, these findings suggest that 
partisan news amplifies the effects of winning and losing. 
Unfortunately, Lelkes’s (2016) study, while a significant contribution to the 
literature, suffers from two key methodological weaknesses. First, the study relied on 
cross-sectional survey data. Cross-sectional data allow for comparisons of winners’ and 
losers’ attitudes after an election, but do not allow for a direct measure of changes in 
attitudes in response to the election. Secondly, Lelkes was forced to rely on an aggregate 
estimate of parallelism in a given country’s media system combined with individual self-
reports of overall media use. Despite his study’s several strengths, Lelkes was unable to 
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directly account for the specific television programs, newspapers, or websites a particular 
individual consumed. A better test of the hypothesized causal relationship between 
exposure to partisan media and changes in perceptions of legitimacy, requires individual-
level measurement of exposure to different types of media content, as well as panel 
survey data that measure changes in individual attitudes over time. 
I predict that exposure to like-minded media amplifies the effects of winning and 
losing. In other words, a supporter of Mitt Romney who watched a lot of Fox News in the 
weeks leading up to the 2012 presidential election would experience a larger decrease in 
perceptions of electoral integrity than a Romney supporter who did not watch very much 
like-minded television. I also expect exposure to cross-cutting media to mute the effects 
of winning and losing. In other words, a Barack Obama supporter who watched the same 
Fox News coverage in 2012 would experience a smaller increase in perceptions of 
electoral integrity than they would have otherwise. 
Of course, exposure to partisan media could potentially have a spurious 
correlation with changes in perceptions of integrity insofar as strong partisans might be 
more likely to consume like-minded media and also experience greater changes in 
perceptions of integrity based on an election’s outcome. To eliminate the possibility that 
my results were driven by this type of confounding relationship, I was careful to control 
for strength of partisanship throughout my analysis.  
There are two specific mechanisms through which exposure to partisan media is 
most likely to condition the relationship between winning or losing and perceptions of 
electoral legitimacy.  First, partisan news may contribute to audience members’ 
expectations for the election outcome and, insofar as those expectations are ultimately 
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frustrated, produce post-election distrust of the process. Individuals who consumed more 
like-minded partisan media in both the 2004 and 2012 presidential elections were more 
likely to expect their preferred candidate to win than otherwise similar individuals who 
consumed more balanced or cross-cutting media (Tsfati, Stroud, & Chotiner, 2014; 
Hollander, 2015). This effect, which was significant in both elections even after 
controlling for strength of partisan preferences, is most likely caused by a combination of 
partisan news consumers encountering fewer opposition voices and therefore having a 
distorted perception of the national opinion climate, and the habit of partisan outlets 
overstating the preferred candidate’s chances of winning.  
In theory, partisan outlets might tend to understate a preferred candidate’s chances 
of winning in order to encourage partisans to turn out to vote. No studies to date have 
comprehensively analyzed whether partisan outlets are more likely to share horse-race 
results that are favorable to the preferred candidate or results that are unfavorable to the 
preferred candidate. Findings that exposure to like-minded media increased expectations 
for a preferred candidate’s chances in the recent 2004 and 2012 elections suggest a 
tendency towards promoting favorable results and downplaying unfavorable ones. 
Without a direct assessment of the polling results presented by different outlets, though, it 
is impossible to say with certainty that exposure to an increased number of favorable poll 
results produced this effect.  
Over a decade’s worth of television coverage of presidential approval ratings are 
similarly suggestive. From 1997 through 2008, Republican-leaning Fox News preferred 
to report on polling results that were favorable to Republican President George W. Bush 
and unfavorable to Democratic President Bill Clinton whereas the Democratic-leaning 
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traditional broadcast networks preferred approval polls that were favorable to Clinton and 
unfavorable to Bush (Groeling, 2008). Though presidential approval polls are not directly 
equivalent to candidate preference polls, it seems reasonable to generally expect partisan 
outlets to exhibit the same preference for favorable results in the context of an election, 
though strategic considerations may occasionally outweigh this preference. 
The second mechanism through which partisan media are likely to influence 
perceptions of electoral integrity is the impact of media exposure on how citizens explain 
both favorable and unfavorable election outcomes. News media play a central role in 
constructing political mandates through the interpretation of electoral results in relatively 
broad and sweeping terms (Mendelsohn, 1998; Shamir, Shamir, & Sheafer, 2008). In the 
1980s, when national news was still centered around the three broadcast networks and 
major national dailies, media played a significant role alongside political elites in filtering 
numerous potential explanations for why a candidate won or lost into a small number of 
accepted narratives that came to dominate mediated conversation within a relatively short 
period following Election Day (Hershey, 1992; 1994). Today, partisan media associated 
with each of the two major parties are likely to emphasize quite different explanations to 
their audiences. There is some evidence that partisan media drive citizens’ interpretations 
of an outcome, as when Rush Limbaugh listeners were less likely to accept substantive 
explanations for Bill Clinton’s 1996 reelection victory (Hall & Cappella, 2002).  
These two theoretical mechanisms lead me to predict that exposure to like-minded 
media amplifies the effects of winning and losing while exposure to cross-cutting media 
mutes the effects of winning and losing. Like-minded media are most likely to present 
messages that reinforce the elation of winning or disappointment of losing while cross-
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cutting media will present messages that counter these main effects. In Chapter 7, I 
further test whether evidence for the conditioning effect of partisan media is consistent 
with each of the two possible mechanisms.  
 
33 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
I drew on a unique set of panel studies to test whether partisan media condition 
the effects of winning and losing. The first of these studies, the 2008 National Annenberg 
Election Survey (NAES), was a five-wave election survey with interviews for the first 
wave conducted in late 2007 and interviews for the final, post-election wave conducted 
between November 2008 and January 2009. I primarily relied upon data from the pre-
general election survey and the post- election survey. The 2008 NAES included a much 
larger number of respondents than most traditional election studies, with n=28,985 
respondents participating in at least one wave of the panel and n=10,472 respondents 
completing all five waves.1  
 The other studies I utilized were the 2012 and 2014 Institute for the Study of 
Citizens and Politics (ISCAP) panels. What makes this set of studies unique is that the 
2012 ISCAP study was designed as a direct follow-up to the 2008 NAES study, and the 
2014 study was a follow-up to both previous studies. The 2012 ISCAP panel (n=2,471) 
was a representative subset of panelists who were previously interviewed both pre-
election and post-election in 2008. Respondents were asked to participate in an initial 
                                                           
 
1 A full discussion of 2008 NAES response rates is available in Annenberg Public Policy 
Center (2009). Response rate calculations for the NAES are consistent with the 
recommendations for probability-based internet panels made by Callegaro and DiSogra 
(2008). 54.6 percent of Wave 1 cases completed all five waves of interviews while the 
average cumulative response rate CUMRR1 was 8.92 percent across all five waves.  
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pre-election survey during the final two weeks of October 2012 and then re-contacted for 
the second post-election interview.2  
The 2014 ISCAP study (n=1,493) followed a similar procedure, with the sample 
selected as a representative subset of panelists who completed both waves of the 2012 
study. Respondents were once again invited to participate in a pre-election survey during 
the final two weeks of October. Participants were then re-contacted for the post-election 
survey following the November midterm elections.3 Participants in the 2014 ISCAP study 
were members of the complete panel for at least six years and in many cases over seven 
years depending on when they first joined the 2008 panel. The result is an unusually rich 
source of data on changes in both habitual media exposure and key political attitudes over 
an extended period of time. Table 3.1 provides the dates during which interviews were 
conducted as well as the number of participants in each of the pre-election and post-
election surveys. 
In all three election years, dates of the post-election interviews were randomly 
assigned such that each respondent was invited to complete the survey during a randomly 
selected week of the post-election interview period. This allowed me to test whether the 
effects of winning and losing on perceptions of legitimacy grew stronger, diminished, or 
                                                           
 
2 For the 2012 ISCAP study, a stratified sample of 3,621 NAES respondents was 
selected, and of those, 2,606 participated in the pre-election wave for a cooperation rate 
of 72.0 percent. 2,471 of the pre-election participants completed the post-election survey 
for a cooperation rate of 94.8 percent. 
3 A stratified sample of 2,094 ISCAP participants from 2012 were contacted for the 2014 
study. 1,693 participated in the pre-election survey for a cooperation rate of 80.9 percent. 
Of those respondents, 1,493 also completed the post-election survey for a cooperation 
rate of 88.2 percent. 
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remained constant as time passed following the election. Interviews for the post-election 
survey were randomly divided over the twelve weeks following the election in 2008. In 
2012 the post-election interviews were randomly divided over a ten-week period 
following the election, and in 2014 they were divided over an eight-week period. 
 
Table 3.1: Interview Dates and Numbers of Participants in Pre-Election and Post-
Election Survey Waves 
 
Election 
Year 
 
Interview 
Wave 
Interview 
Dates 
Number of 
Participants in 
Interview Wave 
Number of Participants 
Who Completed Both 
Interviews 
2008 
Pre Aug. 29 - Nov. 
4 
19,241 
16,242 
Post Nov. 5 - Jan. 
31 
19,234 
2012 
Pre Oct. 19 - Oct. 
29 
2,606 
2,471 
Post Nov. 14 - Jan. 
29 
2,471 
2014 
Pre Oct. 17 - Oct. 
31 
1,693 
1,493 
Post Nov. 19 - Jan. 
14 
1,493 
Note: Pre and Post in this table refer to the pre-election and post-election surveys. 
 
Interviews for all three panels were conducted online by GfK, formerly 
Knowledge Networks. GfK conducts probability-based online surveys by using a 
combination of random digit dialing and address-based sampling methods to recruit 
panelists for its very large KnowledgePanel of potential survey respondents. Households 
that lack internet access are provided with internet access to ensure representativeness. 
The company uses probability sampling to select members of the KnowledgePanel to 
participate in individual surveys. While nonprobability internet panels pose distinct 
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problems for survey researchers interested in generalizing to a larger population (see 
Baker et al., 2010), online probability panels such as GfK’s are not subject to the same 
issues of unrepresentativeness due to opting in because respondents are selected using 
random sampling methods (Chang & Krosnick, 2009).  
The probability sampling method used for initial recruitment helped to ensure the 
representativeness of the 2008 sample while the stratified sampling method used to select 
2012 and 2014 panelists guarded against differential rates of attrition over the seven-year 
life of the complete panel. Table 3.2 presents demographic statistics for each of the three 
panels alongside population estimates from the Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey for October of each election year. The table demonstrates that each panel was 
largely representative of the US adult population at the time of the interviews. While 
some groups are slightly overrepresented, such as whites, and some are slightly 
underrepresented, notably the least educated, these differences are consistent across all 
three studies, suggesting that variable attrition is not a significant concern. 
The one clear exception appears in the distributions of ages of participants in the 
2012 and 2014 ISCAP studies. While the youngest cohort of voters was only somewhat 
underrepresented in the 2008 NAES, 18-24 year olds have completely disappeared from 
the sample by 2014. However, the absence of the youngest group of voters in the final 
panel is a product of the study design rather than a result of variable attrition. Since 
minors were not included in the original 2008 election study, only respondents who were 
18 or older by the time of the 2008 presidential election were eligible to be re-contacted 
for the subsequent panels. 
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 Aside from the absence of 18-24 year olds in the final panel, the three studies 
provide representative samples of the adult American population and variable attrition 
does not appear to be a significant threat to validity. I therefore used the unweighted 
panel data for the bulk of my analyses to promote ease of interpretation. To assuage any 
remaining concerns about the representativeness of this unique set of panel studies, I 
replicated my core regression models using GfK’s recommended population weights in 
Appendix B following the main empirical analysis of the dissertation.
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Table 3.2: Demographics of US Adult Population and of Respondents in the Post-
Election Waves of the 2008 NAES, 2012 ISCAP, and 2014 ISCAP Panels 
 Oct. 2008 
US Adults 
2008 
NAES 
Oct. 2012 
US Adults 
2012 
ISCAP 
Oct. 2014 
US Adults 
2014 
ISCA
P 
Gender       
Male 48.3% 43.4% 48.1% 47.0% 48.2% 48.7% 
Female 51.7% 56.6% 51.9% 53.0% 51.8% 51.3% 
Age       
18-24 12.6% 4.4% 12.8% 1.9% 12.4% 0% 
25-34 17.8% 12.6% 17.5% 12.0% 17.6% 8.3% 
35-44 18.4% 20.0% 16.8% 25.3% 16.5% 20.0% 
45-54 19.6% 23.4% 18.5% 15.5% 17.8% 18.1% 
55-64 15.0% 22.0% 16.4% 21.5% 16.7% 22.5% 
65+ 16.6% 17.6% 18.0% 23.8% 18.9% 31.1% 
Race       
White  68.5% 79.1% 66.2% 70.3% 65.2% 73.5% 
African American 11.4% 9.7% 11.5% 13.1% 11.7% 11.7% 
Hispanic 13.7% 6.3% 15.0% 9.8% 15.3% 9.1% 
Other 5.4% 2.5% 6.1% 4.8% 6.4% 3.7% 
Two or more races 1.0% 2.4% 1.3% 2.0% 1.3% 2.1% 
Education       
No high school 
diploma 
13.2% 4.9% 12.3% 4.1% 11.6% 4.6% 
High school 
diploma or GED 
31.3% 22.2% 29.9% 37.6% 29.9% 39.5% 
Some college 28.2% 35.7% 28.9% 23.3% 28.9% 22.0% 
Bachelor's degree + 27.3% 37.1% 28.8% 35.0% 29.7% 34.0% 
Household Income       
$9,999 or less 6.5% 4.0% 6.9% 5.5% 6.7% 4.7% 
$10,000 to $24,999 15.3% 13.0% 16.5% 14.5% 15.2% 15.4% 
$25,000 to $49,999 26.4% 29.7% 25.9% 26.5% 25.7% 28.1% 
$50,000 to $74,999 19.9% 20.7% 19.0% 21.6% 18.6% 19.4% 
$75,000 and over 32.0% 31.7% 31.7% 31.9% 33.8% 32.3% 
Note: Population figures are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the 
indicated months. Percentages for each demographic variable may not sum to 100 
percent due to rounding errors. 
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Identifying Winners and Losers 
 The method by which I identified survey respondents as either winners or losers 
was crucial to my analysis. The first step was to identify individuals as voters or 
nonvoters. Past work on winners and losers has generally emphasized the importance of 
casting a ballot for the winning or losing candidate as opposed to simply favoring one 
candidate over the other (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005).  
 For all respondents who participated in the 2012 survey, I used verified data from 
state voter records indicating whether these respondents voted in the 2008 and 2012 
presidential elections. Political data and consulting firm Catalist collected this 
information by coordinating with GfK to identify panel participants and search state 
records to determine whether these individuals cast ballots in each election.4 Based on 
this data, I identified all 2012 respondents as either voters or nonvoters in both 
presidential elections. 
 No equivalent data was available for 2008 survey respondents who were not also 
part of the 2012 study. To code these panel members as voters or nonvoters in 2008, I 
relied upon self-reports from the 2008 post-election survey. Similarly, I relied upon self-
reports from the 2014 post-election survey to code all 2014 respondents as voters or 
nonvoters in the midterm elections. Self-reports are not ideal given the well-known 
                                                           
 
4 While Catalist and GfK had access to individually identifying information, no 
individual identifiers were provided to the study investigators. Catalist provided 
anonymous records of whether each respondent voted using randomly assigned 
participant identification numbers that were keyed to GfK’s similarly anonymized survey 
response data. 
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tendency for survey respondents to over-report socially desirable behaviors such as 
voting (e.g. Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). However, a comparison of self-reports and 
verified voter information for the subset of respondents for whom both types of data are 
available suggested that the tendency to over-report having voted was relatively small 
among members of these panels. Of all 2012 participants who reported casting a ballot in 
the 2008 election (n=2,072), 83 percent were verified as voters in that election. Of those 
who reported casting a ballot in 2012 (n=2,059), 87 percent were also verified as voters. 
 Among voters, it was possible to identify winners and losers in the presidential 
elections based on either vote intentions as reported before the election or vote choices as 
reported after the election. Survey respondents have in some cases shown a tendency to 
over-report having voted for the winner when asked for their vote choice after an election 
(e.g. Wright, 1990; Atkeson, 1999). I identified winners and losers based on their pre-
election vote intentions to avoid the possibility that post-election reports were tainted by 
knowledge of the outcome. Voters who reported an intention to vote for Barack Obama 
in 2008 were classified as winners while voters who reported an intention to vote for 
John McCain or for a third party candidate were classified as losers. Voters who reported 
an intention to vote for Obama in 2012 were classified as winners in the second 
presidential election while voters who reported an intention to vote for Mitt Romney or a 
third party candidate were classified as losers. 
 In the 2014 election, I identified winners and losers based on the national election 
results. Americans increasingly tend to view elections in national rather than local terms 
(Hopkins, 2014). Observers have described this trend as the ‘nationalization’ of 
congressional elections, whereby voters increasingly choose who to vote for in House 
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and Senate elections based not on the characteristics of the individual candidates, but 
based on attitudes towards the national political parties and the incumbent president 
(Jacobson, 2015; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). In the first two decades of the twenty-
first century, congressional election outcomes have come to depend more and more upon 
party loyalty and evaluations of the sitting president as opposed to local considerations. 
The national media also tend to treat midterm elections as national, placing a 
premium on each party’s overall performance in the congressional elections. The 
Republican Party was generally presented as the winner in 2014, as Republicans won 
control of the Senate and retained control of the House while gaining seats in each 
chamber. For example, the front page of The New York Times led the paper’s coverage on 
the day after the election by describing the Republican Party as “resurgent” in its 
victories and the results as a “repudiation of President Obama” (Weisman & Parker, 
2014). Since Americans do not vote directly for a party in congressional elections, I used 
partisan identification to identify winners and losers. Self-identified Republicans who 
reported voting in the election were categorized as winners and self-identified Democrats 
who reported voting were categorized as losers. 
 Although the majority of past research on the winner-loser phenomenon has 
focused on voters, I tested whether media condition the effects of vicariously winning or 
vicariously losing in Chapter 6. While nonvoters by definition cannot win or lose by 
voting for a winning or losing candidate, they can vicariously win or lose through their 
passive support for a candidate. I expected nonvoters who “root for the home team” in 
part by consuming like-minded media to be particularly affected by their vicarious 
experiences of an election. 
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To classify nonvoters as vicarious winners and losers, I relied on survey 
respondents’ feeling thermometer ratings of the two presidential candidates. 2008 and 
2012 survey respondents were asked to rate both major party candidates (Barack Obama 
and John McCain in 2008; Obama and Mitt Romney in 2012) on scales ranging from 
zero to one hundred, with higher values indicating more positive ratings. Feeling 
thermometer items in which survey respondents are asked to rate candidates based on 
how warmly they feel towards each individual have historically served as excellent 
predictors of vote choice (see Bartels, 1988). Responses to the feeling thermometer items 
from the 2008 and 2012 surveys thus served as strong indicators of candidate preferences 
among nonvoters. I classified nonvoters who rated Obama more positively than McCain 
as vicarious winners in 2008 and nonvoters who rated Obama more positively than 
Romney as vicarious winners in 2012. Nonvoters who rated the Republican candidate 
more positively than Obama in a given election year were classified as vicarious losers. 
 
Measuring Partisan Media Exposure 
 Measurement of partisan media exposure was made possible by the program list 
technique, first introduced in the 2008 NAES panel. With this technique, respondents 
were first asked whether they had heard anything about the election campaign from 
television news programs or from other types of talk shows and public affairs programs. 
Any respondent who answered in the affirmative was then shown a series of four screens, 
each containing a list of approximately 13 television programs, and asked which if any of 
those programs they watched regularly. Respondents could select as many programs from 
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each list as they wished, or select a box indicating they watched none of the programs 
listed on that screen. 
 The program list technique was designed to decrease the cognitive demands on 
survey respondents as well as provide researchers with better information about the 
specific content respondents are exposed to (Dilliplane, Goldman, & Mutz, 2012). 
Traditional survey items that ask respondents to estimate the amount of time they spent 
watching, reading, or listening to the news over a recent time period are notoriously poor 
predictors of current events knowledge (Price & Zaller, 1993). These items also correlate 
poorly with measures of audience that are not based on survey self-reports, with survey 
respondents tending to inflate their actual news exposure (Prior, 2009). Recall items can 
be cognitively taxing and prone to measurement error insofar they require respondents to 
accurately estimate and report the frequency of a past behavior (e.g. Tourangeau, Rips, & 
Rasinski, 2000). 
The program list technique, on the other hand, requires only that respondents 
recognize a habitually watched program’s name, minimizing the amount of recall or 
estimation required for an accurate response. The technique has been shown to have a 
high degree of reliability as well as greater predictive validity in explaining campaign 
knowledge than other, more traditional self-report approaches to measuring media 
exposure (Dilliplane et al., 2012; Goldman, Mutz, & Dilliplane, 2013; but cf. Prior, 2013, 
for a critique of this method). It has since been adopted by the American National 
Election Studies in addition to being utilized in the 2012 and 2014 ISCAP panels. Panel 
members were asked to respond to the program lists in the primary election, pre-general 
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election, and post-election survey waves of the 2008 NAES, in both the pre-election and 
post-election waves of the 2012 ISCAP, and in the pre-election wave of the 2014 ISCAP.  
 Responses to the program list items served as my main source of data regarding 
exposure to partisan news and public affairs content. Despite continued concerns over the 
shrinking audience for programs such as the evening newscasts of the three major 
broadcast networks, television remains a vital source of political news and information 
for most Americans (Pew Research Center, 2013; 2014a). In the pre-election wave of the 
2008 NAES, 90 percent of respondents reported getting information about the election 
campaign from television news programs or talk shows. By comparison, just under two-
thirds of respondents reported getting election information from traditional print sources 
and only 43 percent reported getting information online. Four years later nearly as many 
respondents to the pre-election wave of the 2012 ISCAP survey, 89 percent, reported 
receiving campaign information from television sources.5 
Programs were selected for inclusion on the initial NAES lists by including the 
most watched programs as measured by Nielsen ratings at the time each list was 
constructed (Dilliplane et al., 2012).6 The programs appearing on the lists and the order in 
                                                           
 
5 Only 74 percent of 2014 ISCAP respondents reported getting campaign information 
from television news programs or talk shows. However, this decrease is most likely 
attributable in significant part to the lower salience of 2014’s midterm election campaign. 
Only 40 percent of 2014 respondents reported getting campaign news from newspapers 
compared to 56 percent in 2012. The declines from 2012 to 2014 were comparable for the 
proportions of respondents who reported receiving campaign news from websites and 
from radio, as well.  
6 A small number of apolitical entertainment programs, including scripted series and 
reality programs, were included so as to retain the attention of survey respondents who 
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which they appeared were deliberately held constant from one survey to the next 
wherever possible, with programs that were canceled by the time of later surveys 
replaced by the highest rated news programs available. This consistency allows for a high 
degree of comparability across the three panels. Table 3.3 presents the full list of 
programs from each of the three panels. 
 
Table 3.3: Television Programs Appearing on 2008 NAES, 2012 ISCAP, and 2014 
ISCAP Program Lists 
 
2008 NAES 
24 Colbert Report Hannity and Colmes O'Reilly Factor 
20/20 Countdown Hannity's America Oprah 
60 Minutes CSI: Miami Hardball Out in the Open 
ABC World News Daily Show Heartland Reliable Sources 
America This Morning Dateline Larry King Live Scrubs 
Anderson Cooper 360 Early Show Late Edition Simpsons 
Beltway Boys Ellen DeGeneres Show Late Show Situation Room 
BET News Face the Nation Law and Order Special Report 
Big Love Family Guy Lou Dobbs Studio B 
Big Story Fox and Friends McLaughlin Group The View 
Brothers and Sisters Fox News Meet the Press This Week 
CBS Evening News Fox Report MSNBC Live Today Show 
CBS Morning News Frontline NBC Nightly News Tonight Show 
CBS Sunday Morning Geraldo At Large NewsHour Your World 
CNN Newsroom Good Morning America Nightline  
 
To evaluate my hypotheses, I required measures of exposure to both like-minded 
and cross-cutting media. Dilliplane (2011, 2014) coded each of the news programs listed 
in the 2008 NAES as Democratic-leaning, neutral, or Republican-leaning according to 
audience members’ perceptions of the partisan leanings of programs they watched as 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
have less interest in news and political affairs programming (see Dilliplane et al., 2012, p. 
239). 
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measured in a separate 2008 election survey. For programs that were watched by too few 
survey respondents to produce a reliable coding of partisanship based on audience 
members’ perceptions, Dilliplane conducted a Lexis-Nexis search of news coverage to 
determine whether a program or its host was generally associated with a particular 
partisan orientation (2014, p. 84).  
Table 3.3: Television Programs Appearing on 2008 NAES, 2012 ISCAP, and 2014 
ISCAP Program Lists, Continued 
 
 
2012 ISCAP 
20/20 Chris Matthews Show Huckabee Person of Interest 
60 Minutes CNN Newsroom Jimmy Kimmel 
Live 
Rachel Maddow 
Show 
ABC World News Colbert Report Key and Peele Rock Center 
America Live Daily Show Late Late Show Saturday Night Live 
America This Morning Dancing with the Stars Late Show Special Report 
America's Newsroom Dateline Meet the Press Tavis Smiley 
American Idol Ed Show Mentalist The Five 
Anderson Cooper 360 Ellen DeGeneres Show MSNBC Live The Insider 
Any local news program Face the Nation NBC Nightly News The Talk 
Big Bang Theory Fox Report NCIS The View 
CBS Evening News Frontline Nightline The Voice 
CBS Sunday Morning Good Morning America O'Reilly Factor This Week 
CBS This Morning Hannity On the Record Today Show 
 
2014 ISCAP 
20/20 CBS Sunday Morning Hardball Person of Interest 
60 Minutes CBS This Morning Huckabee Rachel Maddow Show 
ABC World News CNN Newsroom Kelly File Saturday Night Live 
All In Colbert Report Key and Peele Shepard Smith Reporting 
America This Morning Daily Show Late Late Show Special Report 
America's Newsroom Dancing with the Stars Late Show Tavis Smiley 
American Idol Dateline Meet the Press The Five 
Anderson Cooper 360 Ed Show MSNBC Live The Insider 
Any local news program Ellen DeGeneres Show NBC Nightly 
News 
The Talk 
Big Bang Theory Face the Nation NCIS The View 
Blue Bloods Frontline Nightline The Voice 
Castle Good Morning 
America 
O'Reilly Factor This Week 
CBS Evening News Hannity On the Record Today Show 
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 Dilliplane subsequently categorized Democratic-leaning programs as like-minded 
and Republican-leaning programs as cross-cutting or vice versa for each NAES based on 
the individual respondent’s self-reported partisan orientation. Finally, she calculated the 
proportion of like-minded programs watched to total programs watched as well as the 
proportion of cross-cutting programs watched to total programs watched for each 
respondent, resulting in measures of exposure to both like-minded and cross-cutting 
media. 
 Unlike human content analyses which rely on the potentially subjective decisions 
of human coders, Dilliplane’s method, previously validated in her own work, has the 
advantage of being readily replicated by other researchers in analyses of the 2008 NAES 
data. This method also produces coding for the partisanship of news programs that is 
highly correlated with both human content analyses of the same programs and other 
audience-based measures of exposure to partisan media (see Dilliplane, 2011; 2014; 
Moehler & Allen, 2016).  I followed Dilliplane’s procedure to construct measures of the 
proportions of like-minded and cross-cutting programs consumed by respondents in all 
three panel studies. For the small number of new news programs and talk shows added to 
the 2012 and 2014 editions of the program lists, I followed Dilliplane in using a Lexis-
Nexis search to determine whether each program and host is associated with a specific 
partisan orientation. 
 I used measures of the proportion of like-minded programs watched to total 
programs watched and the proportion of cross-cutting programs watched to total 
programs watched to test each of my hypotheses related to the effects of partisan media. 
An alternative method would have be to construct counts of the numbers of each type of 
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program watched by a given respondent, but this method would fail to account for an 
individual’s overall diet of news and public affairs content. I expect partisan media 
exposure to condition the effects of winning and losing based on the prevalence of certain 
types of messages within an individual’s overall media diet. In other words, I expect like-
minded messages about the election to produce a stronger effect upon a Republican who 
is exposed only to like-minded messages than upon a Republican who encounters a 
balance of like-minded, neutral, and cross-cutting messages, even if the latter watches 
more like-minded programs overall. I therefore used proportions of like-minded and 
cross-cutting programs watched to total programs watched as my primary independent 
variables of interest. 
My central prediction states that if two otherwise identical electoral losers watch 
different proportions of like-minded media in the period surrounding an election, the one 
who consumes more like-minded content relative to neutral or cross-cutting content will 
experience the larger decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity. This prediction 
assumes that media habits remain highly stable in the short period of time surrounding 
the election. In fact, past research involving the 2008 NAES shows that television 
viewing habits are quite stable from one interview period to the next (Dilliplane, 2011; 
Dilliplane et al., 2012). I therefore focused on how stable partisan news viewership 
affects changes in perceptions of electoral integrity, averaging pre- and post-election 
measures of partisan media exposure in both 2008 and 2012 to obtain more reliable 
measures of the proportion of like-minded programs watched and the proportion of cross-
cutting programs watched.  
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Pre and post election measures of the proportion of like-minded programs 
watched and the proportion of cross-cutting programs watched were quite highly 
correlated in both 2008 (like-minded: r=0.80, cross-cutting: r=0.71) and 2012 (like-
minded: r=0.83, cross-cutting: r=0.77). In 2014, respondents were only asked about their 
television viewership in the pre-election survey, so I used this single measure of 
programs watched to calculate proportions of like-minded and cross-cutting programs in 
my analyses of 2014 data. 
 
Perceptions of Electoral Integrity 
I measured perceptions of electoral integrity using an index comprised of four 
items that appeared in the pre and post-election surveys for each of the three elections. 
These items asked whether elections make government pay attention to the people, 
whether the best candidates or those with the most money tend to win elections, whether 
elections in the US are fair, and whether votes are counted fairly. The inclusion of all four 
items both before and after each election allowed me to measure changes in perceptions 
of electoral integrity not only during an election campaign but from one election to the 
next. I combined the four items into a single index of perceptions of electoral integrity by 
first placing responses to each item on a standardized scale and then taking the mean 
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value of the four standardized responses for each respondent in each survey wave.7 This 
index serves as the key dependent variable throughout my analyses.  
All four items explicitly referred to the electoral process, meaning that they have a 
high degree of face validity for testing my hypotheses regarding perceptions of electoral 
integrity. Two items explicitly referred to the perceived fairness of the electoral process. 
The item asking whether elections make government listen to the people effectively 
captured the idea that elections serve as a key mechanism for accountability 
(Weatherford, 1992). Finally, the item asking whether the best candidates or those with 
the most money win incorporated the idea of fairness as well as accountability.  
It was important to identify items that could be combined to produce a reliable 
index. A single-item measure would have been subject to much greater measurement 
error that could potentially obfuscate the results. For example, the single-item 
“satisfaction with democracy” indicator often used in studies of winners and losers due to 
its frequent appearances in comparative surveys is heavily context dependent and subject 
to a great deal of variability (Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Linde & Ekman, 
2003). The four items I used for my index of perceptions of electoral integrity are 
reasonably well correlated with one another (Cronbach’s α=0.69, 0.74, and 0.66 for the 
post-election waves of the 2008, 2012, and 2014 studies, respectively). While these 
reliabilities are lower than is ideal for a multi-item scale, they do fall into the acceptable 
                                                           
 
7 In the 2008 study the legitimacy items were asked of respondents three different times: 
in the surveys conducted before and during the primary election season as well as in the 
post-election survey. In all of the following analyses I use the mean value of each item in 
the two pre-election waves for a given respondent to produce a single, more reliable 
measure of 2008 pre-election perceptions of integrity. 
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range. Moreover, removing any one item from the four-item scale would have reduced 
the overall reliability. 
Heise (1969) provides a method for calculating reliability of measures 
independent of the change or stability of the underlying true scores. Heise’s method 
suggests that the combined index of perceptions of electoral legitimacy is a fairly reliable 
measure after correcting for changes in actual perceptions over time. Across the 2008 
election study, in which perceptions of legitimacy were measured at three different points 
in time, the true-score reliability of the index is .67. The reliability is higher later in the 
panel. Over the period comprising the 2012 post-election survey, the 2014 pre-election 
survey, and the 2014 post-election survey, the true-score reliability of the index is a quite 
reliable .84. 
To situate my findings more firmly within the existing literature on winners and 
losers, in which system support broadly conceived is frequently the dependent variable of 
interest, I also created a second index designed to measure more generalized system 
support using data from the 2012 surveys. A series of four items in the 2012 pre and post-
election surveys asked respondents to express their general attitudes towards “our system 
of government” or “our political system,” relatively abstract concepts. The items asked 
respondents to report whether they would rather live under our system of government 
than any other; whether our system of government is in need of serious changes; whether 
our form of government is best for representing the people; and whether they felt very 
critical of our political system at present.  
An index comprised from the means of the four standardized system support 
items correlates at a weak but statistically significant level with the index of perceptions 
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of electoral integrity (r=.375, p<.001 in the pre-election survey; r=.412, p<.001 in the 
post-election survey). This weak but significant correlation suggests that the two indexes 
are effective in discriminating between the two distinct but related concepts of 
generalized system support and perceptions of electoral integrity.  
 
Approaches to Studying Winners and Losers  
 While there is a plethora of evidence that winners and losers differ in their 
perceptions of legitimacy following an election, most past research has been unable to 
directly test whether winners increase in legitimacy and losers decrease in legitimacy due 
to the rarity of panel surveys that interview the same individuals both before and after the 
election (see also Esaiasson, 2011). Instead, researchers have generally relied upon cross-
sectional surveys to estimate the size of winner-loser gaps. Cross-sectional surveys can 
provide strong evidence of between-group difference, but they are unable to tell us 
whether the election caused winners to gain in legitimacy, losers to decrease, or changes 
in both groups. Repeated cross-sectional surveys, which ask the same questions of 
different samples at multiple points in time in order to measure winners and losers in the 
same country over different election cycles (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005), shed some light 
on the causal process but still allow only for relatively weak causal inferences. 
 An experiment might allow for a strong test of the effects of winning and losing, 
but only if it were able to effectively simulate the experience of supporting the winner or 
loser in a national election, a difficult task at best. Results of one randomized experiment 
provide some support for the prediction that perceptions of the electoral process are 
53 
 
influenced by election results (Vonnahme & Miller, 2012). This study relied on a purely 
hypothetical election, making it difficult to draw direct inferences about the real 
experiences of winning and losing. A second randomized experiment also tested the 
effects of winning and losing on how individuals think about electoral reforms (Bowler & 
Donovan, 2007). However, participants in this latter experiment were not randomly 
assigned to conditions that represented winning or losing. Instead, they were asked to 
identify themselves as winners or losers based on recent elections and then randomly 
assigned to conditions that presented electoral reforms in terms of either potential costs or 
potential benefits.  
The strongest evidence for the effects of winning and losing come from panel 
studies. Panels tracking the same individuals over time allow for stronger causal 
inferences than cross-sectional surveys. Panel surveys also allow for stronger tests of the 
effects of individual characteristics that might enhance or diminish the effects of winning 
and losing. Whereas a cross-sectional survey might show, for example, that Fox News 
viewers held lower perceptions of electoral integrity than viewers of the traditional 
broadcast news programs after the 2008 election, it would not allow us to rule out the 
possibilities of reverse causation (i.e., some aspect of Fox News’s post-election coverage 
appealed to people who already doubted the fairness of the process) or a spurious 
relationship driven by some unmeasured third variable. Panel data analyzed with 
appropriate statistical techniques can offer better evidence of an over-time relationship 
between two variables as well as the ability to control for all stable individual variables 
whether measured or unmeasured.  
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  Almost all studies of the effects of winning and losing that have incorporated 
panel data to date have modeled individual changes in legitimacy using multiple 
regression with a lagged dependent variable as a predictor (e.g. Anderson & LoTempio, 
2002; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Singh, Karakoç, & Blais, 2012). 
These models predict post-election perceptions of legitimacy using a conventional 
regression model that controls for pre-election perceptions of legitimacy as one of many 
independent variables. While lagged dependent variable models are quite prevalent in the 
political science and communication literatures, they possess several disadvantages when 
used to estimate individual change over time using panel data. 
 Lagged dependent variables rely on between-person variation rather than within-
person variation to estimate effects, as do conventional models used to analyze cross-
sectional data (Allison, 1990; 2009). Lagged models are therefore subject to the same 
potential for omitted variable bias as conventional analyses of cross-sectional survey 
data. Any variable that affects individual perceptions of legitimacy must be included in 
these models or else the estimated effects of the independent variables of interest will be 
biased. The appropriateness of the lagged variable model is undermined to the extent that 
a potentially confounding variable may have been omitted from a lagged regression 
model (Allison, 1990). This includes variables that may not have been measured.  
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a regression model can often 
improve the overall fit of the model, but at the cost of suppressing the estimated effects of 
substantively important variables (Achen, 2000). The resulting estimates can lead 
researchers to incorrect conclusions. In essence, the lagged variable “pick[s] up some of 
the effect of unmeasured variables” (Achen, 2000, p. 7). In extreme cases, it can also pick 
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up the effect of measured variables, decreasing the magnitude of the coefficients 
associated with other predictors and rendering them statistically insignificant. 
 My hypotheses focused on individual changes in perceptions of electoral 
integrity, necessitating an approach that was designed to assess within-person change as 
opposed to between-person differences. I therefore used fixed effects regression in each 
of my major statistical tests. Fixed effects regression uses each individual as their own 
control, sacrificing statistical efficiency in favor of eliminating the bias that results from 
omitted or unmeasured variables (Allison, 2009). As a result, fixed effects regression 
using panel data allows for much stronger causal inferences than other approaches to 
observational data. While fixed effects models have traditionally been used sparingly in 
political communication, they have appeared quite prominently in other recent analyses 
of the NAES and ISCAP panels (Dilliplane, 2011; 2014; Goldman & Mutz, 2014). 
In fixed effects regression, it is unnecessary to control for any stable individual 
characteristic because both measured and unmeasured time-invariant characteristics are 
automatically controlled for. Characteristics such as gender or race cannot, by 
themselves, produce individual changes over time insofar as those characteristics remain 
constant for a particular individual. In fact, stable individual characteristics cannot be 
directly included in a fixed effects regression model; these variables simply drop out of a 
model where individuals already serve as their own controls. The lack of potential for 
omitted variable bias represents a significant improvement over lagged dependent 
variable models. 
Even though stable variables drop out of a fixed effects model, it is possible to 
estimate the effects of these variables when their effects are expected to change over 
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time. Conceptually, simply holding a preference in an election cannot produce changes in 
perceptions of electoral legitimacy any more than being male can produce changes in 
perceptions. It is the experience of winning (or losing), a time-dependent event 
represented by the interaction between time and winner status, that produces the effect. 
Including an interaction between time and status in the fixed effects models produces a 
test of the prediction that winners and losers changed differentially on average in 
response to the election results. I therefore included this interaction as a key independent 
variable of interest in my analyses. 
The possibility of including interactions between time and stable variables of 
interest in a fixed effects model means that it was also possible to include interactions 
between time and stable control variables in my regression models. However, it remained 
unnecessary to do so barring a specific theory-driven reason to believe that a particular 
variable produced differential changes in the dependent variable over time. Moreover, it 
would only have been worth doing if this differential change might have produced a 
spurious relationship between the independent variable of interest and the dependent 
variable. In the case of gender, for example, there was no reason to predict that men and 
women would have experienced differential changes in legitimacy in relation to their 
media use in response to any of the elections I studied. There was therefore no theory-
driven or statistics-driven reason to include gender in my fixed effects models. 
Even though fixed effects regression eliminates the constant effects of stable 
characteristics, the impact of individual characteristics could vary over time. I present 
models that include interactions between time and a variety of time-invariant 
demographic variables in Appendix C. In particular, I incorporated interactions between 
57 
 
time and age, time and gender, time and race, and time and educational attainment. Doing 
so allowed me to account for the possibility that the varying effects of these 
characteristics over time might have altered the strength or pattern of the effects I was 
primarily interested in. However, the regression models presented in Appendix C do not 
differ in any substantively meaningful way from the main results presented throughout 
the dissertation. 
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4. AMPLIFYING THE EFFECTS OF WINNING AND LOSING: PARTISAN 
MEDIA’S EFFECTS ON PERCEIVED ELECTORAL INTEGRITY IN THE 2008 
AND 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
 
 In this chapter I examine whether media conditioned the effects of winning and 
losing in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. I consider the effects of three types of 
media: like-minded media, cross-cutting media, and neutral media. Like-minded media 
favor an individual’s preferred political party by promoting arguments consistent with the 
preferred party’s issue positions and featuring hosts who tend to adopt favorable attitudes 
towards that party on the air. Cross-cutting media tend to favor the opposing party. 
Finally, neutral media present a relatively balanced take on news and public affairs, 
typically by following the traditional model of objective journalism and giving 
approximately equal time and emphasis to guests and arguments from both sides of the 
political spectrum. 
Consistent with other studies of winners and losers, voters who supported the 
winning candidate significantly increased in their perceptions of electoral integrity from 
pre to post-election in both 2008 and 2012, whereas supporters of losing candidates 
significantly decreased in their perceptions of electoral integrity. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
these gains and losses for participants in the 2008 and 2012 panels. 
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Figure 4.1: Effects of Presidential Election Outcomes on Perceptions of Electoral 
Integrity 
 
 
 
Note: 4,650 voters who reported preferring John McCain in October 2008 are classified 
as Losers and 4,452 voters who reported preferring Barack Obama in October 2008 are 
classified as Winners in the top panel of this figure. 779 voters who reported preferring 
Mitt Romney in October 2012 are classified as Losers and 847 voters who reported 
preferring Barack Obama in October 2012 are classified as Winners in the bottom panel 
of this figure. 
Electoral integrity is measured using an index calculated as the mean of four standardized 
survey items. Fixed effects regression confirms that the changes in perceptions of 
integrity shown here were significant among both winners and losers in each election 
year (p<.001). 
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  I expected media to condition the effects of winning and losing on perceptions of 
electoral integrity through two possible mechanisms. First, media may shape 
expectations for an election’s outcome. Partisan media are likely to distort audience 
members’ expectations by selectively sharing polling and public opinion data as well as 
expert predictions that favor the preferred candidate. To the extent that audience 
members’ expectations are subsequently unmet, they may believe the outcome was the 
result of irregularities.  
Secondly, media may shape explanations for an election’s outcome. Following a 
victory for the preferred party, partisan media are more likely than other news sources to 
argue that the election results are legitimate and evidence that the party’s message 
resonated with voters. Following a loss, partisan media are more likely than other sources 
to argue that the outcome is somehow illegitimate, perhaps because voters were misled 
by a flashy campaign or wealthy interest groups. To the extent that audience members 
accept these explanations, their perceptions of the integrity of the electoral process will 
be affected. 
 
Hypotheses 
I hypothesized that exposure to like-minded partisan media produces even greater 
gains among winners and even greater losses among losers in comparison to exposure to 
traditional, neutral media. For winners, like-minded media’s emphasis on the positive 
reasons why the preferred candidate won will increase these winners’ confidence in the 
electoral process. Like-minded media is likely to argue that the winning candidate’s 
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policy proposals and obvious leadership qualities resonated with voters and congratulate 
the voters on making a wise decision. In other words, like-minded media will assure 
audience members that the electoral process worked precisely as it was supposed to. 
Media aligned with the losing party are likely to take a very different approach. 
Losers who consume like-minded media in the days leading up to the election may hold 
expectations for a doomed candidate and their preferred media outlets will be more likely 
to tell losers that something went wrong with the process itself. Whether there are 
allegations that the results were somehow illegitimate or simply claims that the decision 
made by the majority of voters was irrational and inexplicable, like-minded media may 
assure losers that the process, as opposed to the favored party’s platform or candidate, 
was flawed. 
H4.1: Exposure to like-minded partisan media amplifies the positive effects of winning 
and the negative effects of losing in a presidential election. 
 I further hypothesized that exposure to cross-cutting partisan media mute the 
effects of winning and losing, decreasing the magnitude of gains among winners and 
decreasing the magnitude of losses among losers relative to the effects of neutral media. 
A winner who consumes cross-cutting media should encounter messages and arguments 
that detract from electoral integrity while a loser who consumes cross-cutting media 
should encounter messages and arguments that promote electoral integrity.  
For example, a loser who consumes cross-cutting media might be more likely to 
encounter arguments explaining why the winning candidate’s economic proposals were 
so popular among middle-class Americans. Even though this individual loser continues to 
oppose the policies in question, he might accept that the voters made an understandable 
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decision. By contrast, even though a winner voted for the winning candidate, cross-
cutting media might inform her of allegations of voter fraud in a key swing state. Even 
though this individual winner is happy with the outcome, she might begin to doubt that 
the outcome was fair. In both cases, media would counter the main effects of winning and 
losing. My second hypothesis therefore predicted that exposure to cross-cutting media 
will result in decreased effects from winning and losing:  
H4.2: Exposure to cross-cutting partisan media mutes the positive effects of winning and 
negative effects of losing in a presidential election. 
 
Data & Methods 
I tested the effects of both like-minded and cross-cutting media exposure on 
perceptions of electoral integrity using fixed effects regression models that incorporated 
three key independent variables: loser status, proportion like-minded, and proportion 
cross-cutting, as well as a dummy variable representing survey wave (pre-election vs. 
post-election) and the control variable strength of preference. Loser status indicates 
whether a survey respondent voted for the winning (0) or losing (1) candidate in the 
presidential election. Proportion like-minded is a proportion calculated as the number of 
like-minded programs a given participant reported watching divided by the total number 
of programs that participant reported watching. Similarly, proportion cross-cutting 
indicates the proportion of cross-cutting programs watched to total programs watched for 
a given respondent.  
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While it would be possible to test whether changes in partisan news exposure 
from pre to post-election produced changes in perceptions of electoral integrity using the 
separate pre and post-election measures of program exposure, past research involving the 
2008 NAES shows that television viewing habits are highly stable from one interview 
period to the next (Dilliplane et al., 2012). I therefore focused on how stable partisan 
news viewership affects changes in perceptions of electoral integrity, averaging the pre- 
and post-election measures to obtain more reliable measures of proportion like-minded 
and proportion cross-cutting. 
Because fixed effects regression models require an interaction between time and 
any variable that remains stable over time in order to test the effect of the stable variable, 
the interpretation of these models is slightly more complex than standard linear 
regression models. Each fixed effects regression model included a constant term in 
addition to wave; an interaction between wave and loser status; an interaction between 
wave and strength of preference; a three-way interaction between wave, strength of 
preference, and loser status; an interaction between wave and proportion like-minded; a 
three-way interaction between wave, loser status, and proportion like-minded; an 
interaction between wave and proportion cross-cutting; and a three-way interaction 
between wave, loser status, and proportion cross-cutting. 
 The three-way interactions were necessary given that I expected proportion like-
minded, proportion cross-cutting, and strength of preference to have differential effects 
on losers versus winners. In interpreting the following results, it is important to note that 
wave is dummy-coded such that 0 indicates the pre-election wave and 1 indicates the 
post-election wave, while loser status is dummy-coded such that 0 indicates an electoral 
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winner and 1 indicates an electoral loser. From there, interpretation of a given fixed 
effects regression model becomes quite similar to a more common linear regression. 
Predicted perceptions of electoral integrity for any given winner or loser are estimated as 
a linear combination of the value of each variable for the individual multiplied by the 
coefficient estimated by the regression model for that variable. All the coefficients for 
terms that include an interaction with wave take a value of zero when calculating an 
individual’s predicted level of electoral integrity in the pre-election wave, and all 
coefficients for terms that include an interaction with loser status take a value of zero 
when considering the effect of any other variable on changes in perceptions of integrity 
for a given winner.  
In each regression model, the coefficient associated with the main effect of survey 
wave indicates the main effect of time (moving from pre to post-election) on perceptions 
of electoral integrity. An interaction between wave and loser status indicates the 
differential effect of losing on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity. The coding of 
loser status means that this interaction should be expected to produce a negative 
coefficient in each of the main regression models. A negative coefficient for the wave x 
loser status term would indicate that, consistent with the existing literature describing the 
effects of winning and losing, losers decreased disproportionally in perceptions of 
electoral integrity because of the election. 
A statistically significant coefficient for the two-way interaction between wave 
and proportion like-minded would indicate that the proportion of like-minded media 
consumed had a significant effect on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity among 
all respondents, even after controlling for the main effects of losing and of strength of 
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preference. If this coefficient is both statistically significant and positive, like-minded 
media amplified the effects of winning, since the effects of like-minded media on winners 
are exclusively estimated with this coefficient and since the main effect of winning 
predicts an increase in perceptions of electoral integrity.  
If exposure to like-minded media decreases trust among losers, we would observe 
a coefficient on the three-way interaction term that is not only statistically significant, but 
also negative and larger in magnitude than the coefficient for the two-way interaction 
(assuming the two-way interaction had a significant effect). Calculating the estimated 
effect of proportion like-minded on electoral losers requires adding the terms for the two-
way and three-way interaction. If I obtained a statistically significant and negative 
coefficient for the three-way interaction that was smaller in magnitude than the positive 
coefficient for the two-way interaction, it would indicate that exposure to like-minded 
media’s total effect for losers was to increase rather than decrease perceptions of electoral 
integrity.  
 
Results 
I began by looking at the effects of partisan media exposure on voters in the 2008 
presidential election. To test the effects of like-minded and cross-cutting media in 2008, I 
regressed changes in perceptions of electoral integrity on proportion like-minded, 
proportion cross-cutting, loser status, and survey wave. Table 4.1 presents the results of 
this analysis. 
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As expected, the experience of voting for a losing candidate in 2008 produced a 
significant and negative effect on perceptions of electoral integrity. The coefficient for 
the two-way interaction between wave and loser status is statistically significant and 
negative, indicating that losers in 2008 experienced a decrease in perceptions of electoral 
integrity from before the election to after the election.  
 
Table 4.1: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, 2008 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.003 
(0.034) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.36*** 
(0.043) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.003 
(0.064) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.13† 
(0.077) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.0055*** 
(0.00036) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.012*** 
(0.00052) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.15*** 
(0.031) 
Wave  0.74** 
(0.023) 
Constant  0.032*** 
(0.0044) 
N   8,982 
†p<.10   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
 
Did exposure to like-minded media condition the relationship between winning or 
losing and changes in perceptions of electoral integrity? The answer is a qualified yes. 
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Contrary to my first hypothesis, exposure to like-minded media does not appear to have 
conditioned the relationship between winning and perceptions of electoral integrity. This 
is demonstrated by the coefficient for the two-way interaction between wave and 
proportion like-minded, which is not statistically distinguishable from zero. However, 
consistent with my first hypothesis, exposure to like-minded media did have a significant 
effect on electoral losers. The three-way interaction between wave, proportion like-
minded, and loser status is both statistically significant and negative. Exposure to like-
minded media therefore exacerbated the negative effect of losing. 
My second hypothesis predicted that exposure to cross-cutting media would mute 
the effects of winning and losing. If exposure to cross-cutting media muted winners’ 
positive reactions to winning, we would see a negatively-signed and statistically 
significant two-way interaction between wave and proportion cross-cutting. Cross-
cutting media did not have this hypothesized effect according to the results of the fixed 
effects regression shown in Table 4.1. The effects of winning in 2008 do not appear to 
have been conditioned by either like-minded or cross-cutting media exposure. 
Exposure to like-minded media affected losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity 
but not winners’. Does the same apply to exposure to cross-cutting media? Possibly, but 
the results are less clear-cut in this case. The coefficient for the three-way interaction 
between wave, loser status, and proportion cross-cutting is positive, consistent with the 
prediction that cross-cutting media mutes the otherwise negative effects of losing. 
However, this interaction is only statistically significant at the marginally-accepted p<.10 
level. As a result, there is some evidence that exposure to cross-cutting media can have a 
muting effect, but this evidence is not fully convincing by itself.  
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Is it possible that the apparent conditioning effects of partisan media on losers 
were actually the result of a confounding variable? One of the major advantages of fixed 
effects regression is that by focusing on individual-level change and using each 
individual as their own control, it eliminates the need for extensive control variables. 
However, it may still be necessary to control for a stable variable in fixed effects 
regression if this stable variable could plausibly explain the observed effects of the 
independent variables of interest.  
In this case, strength of candidate preference could plausibly produce a spurious 
relationship between exposure to partisan media, losing, and changes in perceptions of 
electoral integrity. We should reasonably expect a loser with a stronger preference for 
their chosen candidate to experience a larger decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity 
than a loser with a weaker preference (Daniller, 2016). If like-minded media is simply a 
proxy for stronger candidate preferences or exposure to cross-cutting media is simply a 
proxy for weaker preferences, I would be incorrect to attribute the observed effects to 
partisan media.  
Somewhat surprisingly, strength of preference was not very highly correlated 
with partisan media exposure among 2008 losers. The positive correlation between 
strength of preference and proportion like-minded (r=0.11) and the negative correlation 
between strength of preference and proportion cross-cutting (r=-0.034) were both 
relatively weak. Nonetheless, the inclusion of strength of preference in the regression 
model helped to confirm that the relationship between partisan media exposure and 
changes in perceptions of integrity was not spurious. 
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Although strength of preference had a significant effect on changes in electoral 
losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity, with stronger preferences leading to larger 
declines in perceived integrity, the inclusion of the control variable did not affect the 
substantive findings shown in Table 4.1. The interaction between wave, proportion like-
minded, and loser status had a significant negative effect on changes in perceptions of 
electoral integrity, while the interaction between wave, proportion cross-cutting, and 
loser status had a marginally significant positive effect. Thus this potentially confounding 
variable cannot account for the observed effects of partisan media on losers. 
To illustrate the estimated effects of partisan media exposure on an individual 
loser, Figure 4.2 plots the predicted changes in perceptions of electoral integrity from pre 
to post-election for a hypothetical loser given different proportions of like-minded 
programs consumed. These estimates were calculated for an individual who had a 
strength of candidate preference equal to the mean for all voters who supported a losing 
candidate in 2008 (x̄=46) and who watched only like-minded or neutral programs. 
 A 2008 electoral loser who, like 38.5 percent of 2008 losers surveyed, reported 
watching zero like-minded programs is expected to have experienced a relatively 
moderate decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity. If three out of every ten programs 
watched by this same loser were like-minded, equivalent to the mean proportion like-
minded for 2008 losers, the magnitude of the decrease would have been larger by one-
third. At the extreme end of the scale, a loser who watched exclusively like-minded 
programs (as did 8.5 percent of those surveyed) is expected to have reported a decrease in 
perceptions of electoral integrity twice as large as the decrease experienced by losers who 
avoided like-minded content entirely. Importantly, these results are valid even while 
70 
 
controlling for strength of candidate preference, which was held constant at the 
population mean in this analysis. 
 
Figure 4.2: Predicted Effects of Exposure to Like-Minded Media on Losers’ Pre to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2008 
 
 
 
Note: This figure represents predicted changes in perceptions of electoral integrity based 
on the fixed effects regression reported in Table 4.1. Proportion cross-cutting is held 
constant at zero while strength of preference is held equal to the population mean, x̄=46. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Effects of Exposure to Cross-Cutting Media on Losers’ Pre to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2008 
 
 
 
Note: This figure represents predicted changes in perceptions of electoral integrity based 
on the fixed effects regression reported in Table 4.1. Proportion like-minded is held 
constant at zero while strength of preference is held equal to the population mean, x̄=46. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 Figure 4.3 plots predicted changes in perceptions of electoral integrity for a 
hypothetical loser given different proportions of cross-cutting programs consumed. 
Strength of preference was once again held equal to the sample mean, and proportion 
like-minded was held constant at zero to estimate the marginal effects of cross-cutting 
media exposure absent like-minded media. Exposure to increasing amounts of cross-
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cutting media moderated the negative effects of losing, although this effect was not as 
dramatic as the effect of like-minded media exposure. A loser who consumed exclusively 
cross-cutting media in 2008 is predicted to have experienced a decrease in perceptions of 
integrity of approximately 64 percent the size of the decrease experienced by an 
otherwise similar loser who did not consume any partisan media whatsoever. Of course, 
it was relatively rare for individuals to consume this much cross-cutting media. The mean 
value for proportion cross-cutting was just 0.17, and only 2 percent of losers watched 
exclusively cross-cutting programs. 
Like-minded media amplified the effects of losing and cross-cutting media may 
have muted losers’ reactions to losses in 2008. Did these results also hold for the 2012 
presidential election? To find out, I regressed changes in perceptions of electoral 
integrity on proportion like-minded, proportion cross-cutting, loser status, and survey 
wave for 2012 voters. Table 4.2 presents the results. 
 As in 2008, the experience of losing in 2012 resulted in a significant negative 
effect on perceptions of electoral integrity. Additionally, exposure to like-minded media 
once again had a significant conditioning effect, as represented by the significant three-
way interaction between proportion like-minded, loser status, and wave. However, unlike 
in 2008, cross-cutting media do not appear to have conditioned either winners’ or losers’ 
changes in perceptions of integrity.  
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Table 4.2: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, 2012 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.076 
(0.072) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.28** 
(0.10) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.19 
(0.44) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.044 
(0.46) 
Wave * Strength of Preference  
0.0033*** 
(0.00081) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -
0.0081*** 
(0.0012) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.079 
(0.074) 
Wave  0.066 
(0.053) 
Constant  0.031** 
(0.010) 
N   1,593 
**p<.01   ***p<.01 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
 
 What do these results mean for an individual electoral loser in 2012? Figure 4.4 
illustrates the estimated effects of different levels of like-minded media exposure for a 
hypothetical individual loser. I estimated these effects for an individual whose strength of 
preference was equal to the population mean (x̄=57) and whose proportion of cross-
cutting media consumed was held constant at zero. 
74 
 
Figure 4.4: Predicted Effects of Exposure to Like-Minded Media on Losers’ Pre to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2012 
 
 
 
Note: This figure represents predicted changes in perceptions of electoral integrity based 
on the fixed effects regression reported in Table 4.2. Proportion cross-cutting is held 
constant at zero while strength of preference is held equal to the population mean, x̄=57. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
  
The amplifying effect of like-minded media was not as pronounced in 2012 as it 
was four years earlier, yet it was still apparent. An electoral loser who watched the mean 
proportion of like-minded programs (20 percent among 2012 losers) is predicted to have 
experienced a decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity approximately 115 percent the 
size of the decrease experienced by a loser who watched zero like-minded programs. 
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Watching exclusively like-minded programs would have led to a decrease 70 percent 
larger than watching zero like-minded programs. The size of the amplifying effect of 
like-minded media may have varied somewhat from one election to the next, but the 
amplifying effect was clearly present in both presidential elections.  
 
Summary 
 Partisan media conditioned the relationship between losing and perceptions of 
electoral integrity in both presidential elections. As predicted, exposure to higher 
proportions of like-minded media amplified the effects of losing in both election cycles. 
This finding demonstrates that exposure to partisan media exacerbates the negative 
opinions typically expressed by losers following an election. Exposure to cross-cutting 
media could potentially balance this negative effect, as consuming higher proportions of 
cross-cutting media had a marginal muting effect on losing in 2008. However, the failure 
to observe a similar muting effect in 2012 implies that we should not put too much stock 
in the marginal evidence from 2008. On balance, partisan media likely do more to 
undermine than encourage losers’ consent.  
While partisan media conditioned the relationship between losing and changes in 
perceptions of integrity, neither like-minded media nor cross-cutting media conditioned 
the effects of winning in either presidential election year. I therefore found only partial 
support for my hypotheses: exposure to partisan media conditions the effects of losing, 
but not of winning. The estimated effects of partisan media exposure among losers 
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suggest that the resurgence of partisan news outlets in the United States has important 
implications for aggregate perceptions of electoral integrity. 
 Exposure to like-minded media had significant effects upon losers in both 
presidential elections examined here. In the following chapter I use an additional test of 
my theory to address two remaining questions. First, does exposure to like-minded media 
similarly amplify losers’ decreases in perceptions of electoral integrity in a non-
presidential election? Second, given that Republicans were the losers in both 2008 and 
2012, might the phenomenon I identified be a function of Republican-leaning media in 
particular rather than partisan media in general? To answer these questions, I examined 
changing perceptions of electoral integrity in response to the 2014 midterm election. The 
2014 congressional elections allowed me to test my key hypotheses using data from an 
election cycle in which no presidential candidates were on the ballot and in which 
Democrats emerged the losers. 
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5. WINNERS AND LOSERS IN A LOW SALIENCE ELECTION: PARTISAN 
MEDIA’S EFFECTS ON PERCEIVED ELECTORAL INTEGRITY IN THE 2014 
MIDTERM ELECTION 
 
I previously tested whether exposure to partisan media conditions the effects of 
winning and losing in presidential elections. Presidential elections are by far the biggest 
contests in American politics. As late night comics are fond of noting, news media begin 
reporting on an upcoming presidential election almost as soon as the previous election 
concludes. If winning and losing produce changes in perceptions of electoral integrity, 
they are most likely to do so in the context of a presidential election when Americans are 
generally most invested in the electoral results. 
By contrast, midterm elections are quite low in salience for the majority of 
citizens. Whereas 62 percent of eligible Americans voted in the 2008 presidential election 
and 58 percent voted for president four years later, only 36 percent of eligible voters—
just one out of every three—voted in the 2014 midterm elections (Alter, 2014). Because 
interest surrounding midterm elections is so low, we might not expect media to condition 
the experiences of winning and losing in these elections. A great deal of media influence 
would be necessary to observe a significant effect in this context. Testing whether media 
condition the effects of winning and losing in a midterm election therefore represents a 
particularly stringent test of my core prediction. 
Past research on winners and losers in congressional elections is quite limited, and 
the research that exists provides little evidence that winning and losing at the 
congressional level differentially affect measures of diffuse system support such as trust 
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in the electoral process. Although there is evidence that winning in a recent regional 
election increased Germans’ satisfaction with democracy (Singh, Karakoç, & Blais, 
2012), this effect has not been replicated in studies of American congressional elections 
to date. Cross-sectional data from the American National Election Studies show that 
voting for the winning candidate in an individual’s own congressional district is, as 
should be expected, a strong predictor of approval of the representative (Brunell, 2008). 
More interestingly, voting for the winning candidate in one’s own district also predicts 
trust in Congress as a whole. However, Brunell (2008) did not test whether voting for a 
winning congressional candidate predicts the types of broad support for democratic 
institutions and procedures most commonly examined in studies of winning and losing. 
In the 1972 and 1996 American elections, when presidential and congressional 
candidates were both on the ballot, winning versus losing at the congressional level had 
no discernable effect on changes in political trust, perhaps because the experience of 
winning or losing at the congressional level was overwhelmed by the more salient 
experience of winning or losing at the presidential level (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002). 
In the more recent 2006 and 2010 presidential elections, cross-sectional data similarly 
provided no evidence of a significant effect from winning or losing (Sances & Stewart, 
2015). I improved on these past studies, however, by using panel survey data in which the 
same respondents were interviewed before and after a midterm election. These data 
allowed me to track changing perceptions of electoral integrity among the same 
individuals in a year when no highly salient presidential contest would have distracted 
citizens from the competition for control of Congress. 
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What does it mean for a voter to win or lose in a congressional election? In the 
United States, voters vote for individual candidates for the House and Senate as opposed 
to voting for a party. Winning versus losing could therefore depend upon voting for a 
winning candidate to represent one’s district in the House or one’s state in the Senate. Of 
course, only a relatively small proportion of House races are truly competitive in any 
given election (e.g. Abramowitz, Alexander, & Gunning, 2006), meaning that by this 
definition winning or losing at the House level is all but a foregone conclusion for most 
American voters. While Senate races are more likely to be competitive than House races, 
a combination of incumbency advantage and the strong partisan leanings of many states’ 
electorates render many Senate races uncompetitive in any given election cycle, as well 
(Jacobson & Carson, 2016). 
The lack of competition in many individual races may mean that voters are 
unlikely to experience substantial effects from winning or losing. On the other hand, 
winning and losing may depend upon national results rather than the results of an 
individual race. Even though voters vote for candidates rather than parties, the current era 
of American politics features parties sharply divided by ideology at the elite level. 
Citizens tend to have much stronger affective attachments to one party or the other than 
in the middle and late twentieth century (Levendusky, 2009; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 
2012; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). Voting in recent congressional elections has been 
especially dependent upon voters’ evaluations of the incumbent president, to an even 
greater extent than was already true of American politics (Jacobson, 2015). Recent 
elections have also seen a marked increase in party-line voting, contributing to the sense 
that congressional elections have become nationalized with voters choosing between the 
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national political parties rather than the two candidates whose names are on the ballot 
(Hopkins, 2014; Jacobson, 2015; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016) Winning versus losing 
in congressional election may therefore be a function of which party wins control of 
Congress. 
Republicans gained seats in both houses of Congress in 2014, retaking control of 
the Senate and expanding their majority in the House. Whereas some congressional 
election cycles produce divided outcomes, at the national level Republicans were clearly 
the winners in 2014. I identified voters as winners or losers in the 2014 midterm elections 
using partisan identification rather than preference for a local candidate. The high degree 
of party-line voting in recent congressional elections suggests that most Americans are 
voting for parties, not candidates, and that their feelings of winning or losing should 
depend primarily on their preferences for one party versus the other. The Republican 
Party’s straightforward victory at the national level in 2014 means that this definition 
avoids the need to defining some voters as winners in the House and losers in the Senate 
or vice versa, as well as the need to treat voters who did not have the opportunity to vote 
for a Senate candidate in 2014 differently from those who did. Focusing on winners and 
losers at the national level also makes sense for my predictions regarding partisan media 
due to the tendency of partisan media in the United States, such as the 24-hour cable 
news networks, to cover elections at the national rather than the local level. 
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Hypotheses  
No studies to date have uncovered evidence that winning or losing in U.S. 
midterm elections affects perceptions of legitimacy. In presidential election years, 
winning and losing at the congressional level do not appear to influence political trust. 
This could be attributable to the fact that congressional elections simply are not important 
enough to most Americans to significantly impact their underlying beliefs about 
democratic processes and institutions. Alternatively, it is possible that winning and losing 
at the congressional level produce changes in perceptions of legitimacy, but that changes 
in perceptions are primarily driven by the results of the most salient race. In this case, 
winning and losing at the congressional level may produce measurable effects in a 
midterm year but not in a year when the White House is also up for grabs.  
The psychological processes that cause citizens to gain trust in the process 
following a victory and to lose trust in the process following a defeat should apply at the 
congressional level just as they do at the presidential level. While a presidential election 
may dominate voters’ attention in presidential election years, in midterm years the fight 
for control of Congress should drive changes in perceptions of legitimacy. Many citizens 
may not be tuned in to the election campaign in a midterm year, but those who go to the 
polls and cast a ballot should be subject to feeling like winners and losers and their 
perceptions of the process should be affected accordingly. I therefore hypothesized that 
winning in a midterm election increases perceptions of electoral integrity while losing 
decreases perceptions of integrity.  
H5.1: Winning in a midterm election increases perceptions of electoral integrity. 
H5.2 Losing in a midterm election decreases perceptions of electoral integrity. 
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As in my analysis of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, I expected 
exposure to like-minded media to amplify the effects of winning and losing relative to 
exposure to neutral media or cross-cutting media. I also expected exposure to cross-
cutting media to mute the effects of winning and losing relative to exposure to neutral or 
like-minded media. Even if there was no main effect of winning and losing due to the low 
salience of the midterm election, my theory implies that individuals exposed to high 
volumes of partisan media should experience effects from winning or losing. A loser who 
consumes a great deal of like-minded media will be exposed to numerous messages that 
inflate pre-election expectations as well as partisan explanations for a midterm outcome 
despite the otherwise subdued nature of midterm elections. This loser should therefore 
experience a larger decrease in perceptions of legitimacy relative to a loser who 
consumed a higher proportion of neutral or cross-cutting media. The resulting effect 
would be observed as a significant interaction between like-minded media exposure, 
status as a loser, and survey wave.   
H5.3: Exposure to like-minded partisan media amplifies the positive effects of winning 
and the negative effects of losing in a midterm election. 
H5.4: Exposure to cross-cutting partisan media mutes the positive effects of winning and 
the negative effects of losing in a midterm election. 
 
Data and Methods 
I classified individuals as winners and losers based on self-reported partisan 
preferences. Because Republicans won control of both houses of Congress in 2014, I 
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classified self-identified Republicans and Republican-leaners as winners and self-
identified Democrats and Democratic-leaners as losers. Respondents who did not report 
voting in the 2014 election (n=401) as well as the small number of respondents who did 
not indicate a preference for either major party in the 2014 pre-election survey (n=68) 
were omitted from this analysis. Since I was interested in winners and losers in terms of 
control of Congress, partisan preference served as the best available measure of which 
party an individual respondent preferred to hold the majority in the legislature. 
An obvious drawback of this approach is that loser status is confounded with 
partisanship. Identifying a respondent as a winner or loser based on self-reported 
partisanship means that any effects I observed could, in theory, be effects related to being 
a Democrat or a Republican rather than effects of winning or losing. However, for this to 
be the case, some event other than the election would have had to occur between October 
2014 (when interviews for the pre-election survey were conducted) and January 2015 
(when post-election interviewing concluded) that produced differential changes in 
perceptions of electoral integrity among Democrats versus Republicans. No events 
occurring in late 2014 aside from the election itself seem particularly likely to have 
produced such an effect. 
A secondary problem with the use of partisan identification to code winners and 
losers stems from the fact that some self-identified Republicans in the sample may have 
voted for Democratic candidates in 2014 and some Democrats may have voted for 
Republicans. If so, I would have incorrectly coded some winners as losers and vice versa. 
If this were the case, the most likely implication is that I underestimated the effects of 
winning and losing. If, for example, a survey respondent who decreased in perceptions of 
84 
 
electoral integrity in response to the outcome were a self-identified Republican who for 
any number of reasons typically votes with the Democrats and did so in 2014, I would 
have incorrectly coded this individual as a winner rather than a loser. This respondent’s 
decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity would have therefore lowered the estimate 
of the gain in perceptions of electoral integrity experienced by all winners, making it 
more likely that I would have failed to detect a significant effect of winning on 
perceptions of electoral integrity. 
As in my analysis of the 2008 and 2012 elections, I tested the effects of partisan 
media exposure on perceptions of electoral integrity using fixed effects regression models 
that incorporated three key independent variables: loser status, proportion like-minded, 
and proportion cross-cutting, as well as a dummy variable representing survey wave (pre-
election vs. post-election) and the control variable strength of preference. Loser status 
indicates whether a survey respondent preferred the winning (0, the Republicans) or 
losing (1, the Democrats) party. Proportion like-minded is a proportion calculated as the 
number of like-minded programs a given participant reported watching divided by the 
total number of programs that participant reported watching. Similarly, proportion cross-
cutting is the proportion of cross-cutting programs watched to total programs watched for 
a given respondent. Unlike in the presidential election panels, exposure to television 
programs was only measured in the pre-election wave of the 2014 survey. I therefore 
used pre-election exposure alone to calculate proportion like-minded and proportion 
cross-cutting rather than taking an average of pre and post-election exposure to partisan 
media. 
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In my analysis of the presidential elections, I calculated the absolute value of the 
difference between an individual respondent’s feeling thermometer ratings of the two 
presidential candidates as a measure of strength of preference. No directly equivalent 
measure existed in the 2014 panel study. Instead, I used a standard seven-point party 
identification scale to construct a measure of the strength of a respondent’s preference for 
one party over the other. I collapsed the scale such that 0 indicates an independent, 1 
indicates a respondent who leans towards either the Democratic or Republican Party, 2 
indicates a self-reported Democrat or Republican who characterizes their party affiliation 
as not very strong, and 3 indicates a self-reported strong Democrat or strong Republican. 
 
Results 
 My first two hypotheses predicted that supporters of the winning party increase in 
perceptions of electoral integrity in response to the outcome of the midterm election 
whereas supporters of the losing party decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity. Was 
this the case in 2014? The panel data provided strong support for these predictions. 
 Figure 5.1 illustrates changes in perceptions of electoral integrity from pre to 
post-election among winners and losers who completed both waves of the 2014 study. 
Because Republicans won control of the Senate and maintained control of the House 
while gaining seats in both chambers, Republicans were coded as winners and Democrats 
as losers in this analysis. Figure 5.1 provides initial evidence that the predicted effects of 
winning and losing occurred among 2014 panelists. Republican voters in 2014 increased 
in perceptions of electoral integrity while Democratic voters decreased. The sizes of the 
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aggregate changes were not as large as those that occurred in response to the 2008 and 
2012 presidential elections, but the changes were nonetheless in the predicted directions. 
On average, losers decreased by 0.11 and winners increased by 0.15 on the standardized 
scale measuring perceptions of electoral integrity in response to the 2014 midterm results. 
Losers decreased by 0.41 and 0.31 on average in 2008 and 2012, respectively, while the 
average increases for winners in the two presidential years were 0.35 and 0.29 (see Figure 
4.1). 
Figure 5.1: Effects of the 2014 Midterm Election Outcome on Perceptions of 
Electoral Integrity 
 
 
Note: 541 voters who identified as Democrats or Democratic-leaners in the 2014 pre-
election survey are classified as Losers and 519 voters who identified as Republicans or 
Republican-leaners are classified as Winners in this figure.  
Electoral integrity is measured using an index calculated as the mean of four standardized 
survey items. 
The results of fixed effects regressions of loser status on perceptions of electoral 
integrity showed that the effects of both winning and losing were each statistically 
significant (see Table 5.1). 
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 The results from the figure are suggestive, but were winners’ gains and losers’ 
declines statistically significant when considered at the individual level? To answer this 
question, I regressed perceptions of electoral integrity on survey wave and loser status 
using fixed effects regression. Because wave is dummy-coded with the pre-election wave 
taking a value of zero, and because loser status is dummy-coded with winners taking a 
value of zero, the predicted change in perceptions among winners from pre-election to 
post-election is equivalent to the coefficient associated with the wave variable. Therefore, 
if winners significantly increased in perceptions of electoral integrity, we should observe 
a statistically significant and positive coefficient for the effect of wave. The change from 
pre to post-election among losers is represented by a linear combination of the coefficient 
associated with wave and the coefficient for the interaction between wave and loser 
status. If losers significantly decreased in perceptions, we should observe a statistically 
significant and negative coefficient for the interaction term. In addition, the coefficient 
for this interaction term should be greater in magnitude than the coefficient associated 
with the simple wave variable. Table 5.1 presents the results of the fixed effects 
regression. 
 The results of this analysis represent strong evidence in favor of my first two 
hypotheses. Winners significantly gained while losers significantly decreased in response 
to the election outcome. Contrary to past studies that have been unable to detect winner-
loser effects in congressional elections using either cross-sectional data or panel data 
from a presidential election year, I found clear evidence of the predicted winner-loser 
effects using panel data from the 2014 midterm election. The experiences of winning and 
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losing even in a relatively low salience election have the potential to alter voters’ 
confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral process. 
 
Table 5.1: Effects of Winning and Losing on Pre-Election to Post-Election Changes 
in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, 2014 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.27*** 
(0.034) 
Wave  0.15*** 
(0.024) 
Constant  0.018 
(0.012) 
N   1,060 
***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
 
 Winning and losing in a midterm election affect perceptions of electoral integrity. 
Does exposure to partisan media condition this relationship? I tested my next set of 
hypotheses, which predicted that like-minded media exposure would amplify the positive 
effects of winning and the negative effects of losing and that cross-cutting media 
exposure would mute these effects, using a fixed effects regression model that 
incorporated the proportion like-minded and proportion cross-cutting independent 
variables as well as the control variable for strength of preference. As in the presidential 
election models, the coefficient associated with the main effect of survey wave indicates 
the main effect of time on perceptions of electoral integrity while an interaction between 
wave and loser status indicates the differential effect of losing on changes in perceptions 
of electoral integrity. The crucial tests of the conditioning effects of partisan media on 
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winners appear in the pair of two-way interactions between each type of partisan media 
and wave. The tests of the conditioning effects of partisan media on losers appear in the 
pair of three-way interactions of each type of partisan media with loser status, and wave. 
 Table 5.2 presents the results of the regression model testing my predictions 
related to the conditioning effects of partisan media in the midterm election. I first 
hypothesized that partisan media amplifies the effects of winning and losing. There is no 
evidence that partisan media amplified the effects of winning in 2014. The two-way 
interaction between time and proportion like-minded is not statistically significant. 
However, there is clear evidence of a conditioning effect of like-minded media exposure 
on the effects of losing. The coefficient associated with the three-way interaction is both 
statistically significant and negative, indicating that Democrats who watched like-minded 
television programs experienced significantly larger decreases in perceptions of electoral 
integrity than Democrats who watched neutral or cross-cutting programs. This effect 
persists even though I controlled for the strength of individual Democratic voters’ 
partisan identification.  
 Like-minded media exposure had a conditioning effect on losers but not winners, 
just as in the presidential election years. Did exposure to cross-cutting media mute the 
effects of winning or losing in 2014? Table 5.2 indicates that there was no significant 
effect of cross-cutting media exposure among either winners or losers. The coefficients 
for both the two-way and three-way interaction terms are not statistically significant. 
Although there was marginal evidence of a possible muting effect of cross-cutting media 
exposure on electoral losers in 2008, I observed no further evidence of this hypothesized 
effect in either the 2012 presidential election or the 2014 midterm election. 
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Table 5.2: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, 2014 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.12 
(0.074) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.33** 
(0.12) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.037 
(0.14) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.25 
(0.49) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.023 
(0.089) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.083* 
(0.040) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.022 
(0.091) 
Wave  0.080 
(0.065) 
Constant  0.018 
(0.012) 
N   1,060 
*p<.05   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
 
 What, precisely, was the impact of like-minded media exposure on midterm 
election losers? To help answer this question, Figure 5.2 illustrates the predicted changes 
in perceptions of electoral integrity for a hypothetical electoral loser at different values of 
proportion like-minded. The estimates are for a hypothetical individual who watched no 
cross-cutting media and whose strength of preference was at the mean for all Democratic 
voters in 2014 (x̄=2.0). 
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Figure 5.2: Predicted Effects of Exposure to Like-Minded Media on Losers’ Pre to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2014 
 
 
 
Note: This figure represents predicted changes in perceptions of electoral integrity based 
on the fixed effects regression reported in Table 5.2. Proportion cross-cutting is held 
constant at zero while strength of preference is held equal to the population mean, x̄=2.0. 
Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 The overall effect of losing was smaller in the 2014 midterms than in either of the 
presidential elections, but the conditioning effect of like-minded media on the 
relationship between losing and changes in perceptions of electoral integrity was 
proportionally larger. 22 percent of programs watched by the average electoral loser in 
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2014 were like-minded. The predicted decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity for a 
loser who consumed this much like-minded media was approximately two-thirds larger 
than the predicted decrease for an electoral loser who watched only neutral or cross-
cutting programs. By comparison, the predicted decrease in perceptions for electoral 
losers who watched the mean proportion of like-minded programs in 2008 was only one-
third larger than the predicted decrease for electoral losers who watched no like-minded 
programs. In 2012, the decrease among losers at the mean value was only about 15 
percent larger than the decrease among those who watched no like-minded programs. 
The size of the conditioning effect in 2014 was even larger at the extreme end of 
the scale. A Democratic voter who watched exclusively like-minded programs in 2014 
would have experienced a decline in perceptions of integrity 4.5 times the size of the 
decline experienced by a Democratic voter who watched zero like-minded programs. 
Only 18 out of 541 Democratic voters (3.3 percent) reported watching exclusively like-
minded programs in 2014, meaning that the predicted change for losers who watched 
exclusively like-minded programs is fairly noisy. Nonetheless, the evidence clearly 
indicates that exposure to like-minded media played a substantively important role in 
conditioning the relationship between losing and changes in perceptions of integrity in 
the midterm election. 
 
Summary 
 The 2014 panel study provided clear evidence that the experience of winning in 
the midterm election produced a small but significant increase in perceptions of electoral 
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integrity whereas the experience of losing produced a small but significant decrease. This 
represents a significant contribution to our understanding of how voters experience 
elections. Though existing theory predicted that winning and losing at the congressional 
level should influence perceptions of legitimacy, the scarcity of panel studies of U.S. 
midterm elections has forced scholars examining this question in the past to rely on either 
cross-sectional studies or panel studies conducted during presidential election years, 
when most citizens’ attention was presumably focused on the presidential race. The 
results presented here confirm that winner/loser effects are not limited to presidential 
elections in the United States. 
 These results also confirm that the pattern of trusting winners and distrusting 
losers does not require Republicans to be on the losing side and Democrats to be on the 
winning side of an election. In theory, the lowered trust experienced by Republicans in 
2008 and 2012 could have been attributable to ideological differences, with the 
Republican preference for a smaller federal government being reflected in a distrust of 
the national election results. Or, this effect might have been attributable to current policy 
positions, with Republican leaders’ arguments in favor of laws designed to prevent in-
person voter fraud producing distrust in election results among their party’s voters. The 
fact that Democrats experienced a decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity when 
their party lost a national election, and Republicans experienced a simultaneous increase 
in perceptions, runs contrary to these alternative explanations for the previously observed 
winner/loser effects. 
 My use of partisan identification to code respondents as winners or losers in 2014 
makes it possible that I could have misattributed the effects I observed in the panel data. 
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Because Americans vote for district and state-level representatives as opposed to a 
preferred party in congressional elections, and because I lacked a survey question that 
specifically asked respondents which party they preferred to control Congress, I was 
forced to rely on a less than ideal definition of winners and losers. Strictly speaking, my 
results show only that self-identified Democrats who voted decreased in trust from pre to 
post-election and that self-identified Republicans increased, not that citizens who voted 
for the losing party decreased and citizens who voted for the winning party increased. By 
far the most likely explanation for this finding, however, is that self-identified 
Democratic voters experienced the 2014 elections as a loss for their party and 
Republicans experienced it as a victory.  
 Given that repeated losses by the same party at the presidential level have been 
shown to produce decreasing levels of legitimacy with each consecutive defeat, the 
general tendency for the president’s party to lose seats in Congress during midterm 
elections (e.g. Erikson, 1988; Bafumi, Erikson, & Wlezien, 2010) may provide an 
important boost to perceptions of legitimacy among supporters of the out-party. The 
positive effect of the Republicans’ midterm win in 2014 on the party’s supporters was 
smaller than the negative effect of the Republicans’ presidential loss in 2012. The 2014 
election results nonetheless helped reassure Republicans that the electoral process gave 
their candidates a fair chance. Insofar as voters choose divided government by voting 
against the president’s party in midterm years, this choice may have the unintended but 
beneficial consequence of preventing presidential losers from becoming overly convinced 
that the process is rigged against them. 
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 The midterm election panel data also clarify the role of partisan media in 
conditioning the effects of winning and losing. Previously, I found strong evidence that 
exposure to like-minded media exacerbated the negative effects of losing in both the 
2008 and 2012 presidential elections. The finding that exposure to like-minded media 
also exacerbated the effects of losing in the 2014 midterm election confirms the existence 
of a consistent pattern. The pattern persists even when controlling for the effect of 
strength of candidate or party preference, demonstrating that like-minded media exposure 
did not merely serve as a proxy for strength of preference in my analysis.  
On the other hand, exposure to neither like-minded nor cross-cutting media 
conditioned the effects of winning in any of these three elections. The marginal evidence 
suggesting that exposure to cross-cutting media may have conditioned the effect of losing 
in 2008 should most likely be discounted because no similar conditioning effect was 
apparent in 2012 or 2014. Why does exposure to like-minded media produce larger 
decreases in losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity if exposure to partisan media has no 
impact on winners’ perceptions? One possibility lies in the fact that most citizens 
generally expect to be on the winning side in an upcoming election (Granberg & Brent, 
1983; Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2010; Delavande & Manski, 2012). A combination of 
wishful thinking and the belief that most other people hold opinions similar to one’s own, 
sometimes referred to as either a false consensus or a looking-glass effect (Fields & 
Schuman, 1976; Mutz, 1998; Nickerson, 1999), may lead losers to be consistently 
surprised by unfavorable election results.  
The negative effects of a loss are amplified by like-minded media insofar as losers 
are more in need of explanations for an unexpected outcome than winners. Just as 
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participants in classic “forced compliance” experiments changed their attitudes towards a 
tedious task in order to justify their decision to complete the task (Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959), cognitive dissonance theory predicts that losers must engage in some level of self-
justification after discovering a candidate they voted for lost (Anderson et al., 2005; 
Sances & Stewart, 2015). A voter who expected to lose before casting her ballot would 
presumably experience little change in perceptions of legitimacy as a result of the 
anticipated outcome, but an unanticipated outcome would require a reconsideration of 
relevant attitudes in the post-election period. Attitudes that might change include 
opinions of the candidates, beliefs about the electorate, and perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the process. Like-minded partisan media may provide surprised losers with additional 
evidence that the electoral process itself is to blame for the surprising loss. 
 Like-minded media exposure conditioned the effect of losing in two elections in 
which Republicans were on the losing side and one election in which Republicans were 
the victors. The conditioning effect therefore cannot be a product of some characteristic 
unique to the way in which Republican-leaning or Democratic-leaning outlets discuss 
election results. Based solely on my results from the 2008 and 2012 elections, it would 
have been reasonable to hypothesize that Republican-leaning media was undermining 
Republican voters’ legitimacy due to some feature of conservative media or of the 
Republican Party’s current platform. For example, a Democrat might argue that the 
Republican Party’s recent messaging related to laws requiring voter identification at 
polling places, amplified by Republican-leaning media, convinced many Republicans 
who consume like-minded media that elections in this country are unfair.  
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It may be true that Republican-leaning media in the Obama era were unusually 
prone to delegitimizing narratives about the electoral process, but if Republican-leaning 
outlets were alone in undermining legitimacy, I would not have found clear evidence that 
Democrats who consumed Democratic-leaning media in 2014 became less confident in 
the integrity of the process. Instead of being a function of Republican-leaning media, the 
conditioning effect of like-minded media appears is attributable to the way in which 
partisan television programs on both sides have presented losses to their viewers in recent 
years.  
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6. PARTICIPATING BY SPECTATING: PARTISAN MEDIA’S EFFECT ON 
PERCEIVED ELECTORAL INTEGRITY AMONG NONVOTERS 
 
 Nonvoters have typically been omitted from past studies of winners and losers. 
Following recent work in political theory that emphasizes the value of a citizen’s role as a 
spectator to politics and a monitor of the political process (Green, 2009; Schudson, 1998), 
I’ve argued that nonvoters’ perceptions of electoral integrity are of as much interest as 
voters’ perceptions. The consent of the governed, after all, does not refer only to voters. 
All citizens are among the governed, and the consent of the governed requires even non-
participants to believe that the process itself is legitimate. 
 Consuming political media allows citizens, even nonvoters, to monitor their 
elected officials and democratic institutions. Participants in the electoral process are only 
active decision makers once every few years. Observation and spectatorship—most 
frequently through news media—are the primary ways that most citizens engage with 
democratic governance most of the time (Green, 2009). Beyond the democratic function 
of monitoring government, I argue that individuals who watch like-minded partisan news 
do so in part as a means of “rooting for the home team.” Their vicarious involvement in 
politics is conceptually similar to the vicarious involvement of a football or basketball fan 
who watches their team from the comfort of their own living room.  
 While some nonvoters lack preferences for one of the political parties over the 
other or for either candidate in a given election, many other nonvoters hold distinct 
preferences but fail to go to the polls (Doppelt & Shearer, 1999; King & Hale, 2016). 
Some express doubts that they are informed enough to cast ballots, unaware that they are 
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at least as knowledgeable as many voters. Others prefer one candidate or party, but not so 
strongly that they believe the individual act of voting is worth the time or effort. Still 
others express sincere intentions to vote prior to an election but fail to properly register in 
time to cast a ballot. And, of course, some Americans who would like to vote are unable 
to do so due to the complexities of the registration process, inflexible schedules on 
Election Day, or laws that make it more difficult for certain groups to vote. 
 What do nonvoters’ preferences look like in comparison to voters’ preferences? 
One way of answering this question is by using feeling thermometer ratings of the 
candidates in a presidential election, historically one of the strongest predictors of vote 
choice among voters (Bartles, 1988). I calculated voters’ and nonvoters’ strengths of 
preference in both the 2008 and 2012 elections by taking the absolute value of the 
difference between survey respondents’ ratings of the two presidential candidates in each 
year. The results are shown in Figure 6.1. 
Nonvoters had weaker preferences than voters in each election, but large numbers 
of nonvoters nonetheless expressed preferences for one candidate or the other. In fact, 
strength of preference among nonvoters in 2012 was statistically indistinguishable from 
strength of preference among voters in 2008. The fact that many nonvoters hold 
preferences in elections implies that their perceptions of legitimacy may depend upon 
outcomes in the same way that voters’ perceptions depend upon outcomes. Even though 
nonvoters cannot properly be labeled winners and losers because they never cast ballots, 
they can vicariously experience the effects of winning and losing. 
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Figure 6.1: Voters’ and Nonvoters’ Strengths of Preference in the 2008 and 2012 
Presidential Elections 
 
 
Note: Strength of preference is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between 
a respondent’s ratings of the major party presidential nominees, averaged across the pre 
and post-election surveys. 
15,952 voters and 2,649 nonvoters who participated in the 2008 study are represented in 
this figure while 1,778 voters and 636 nonvoters who participated in the 2012 study are 
represented. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Columns with the same pattern indicate 
means that are not statistically distinguishable at the p<.05 level. 
 
 Is it true that even nonvoters engage in spectatorship of democracy through 
attention to the news media? If so, do they engage in consumption of partisan media that 
accords with the rooting interests predicted by their (potentially weak) partisan ties? The 
effects of different types of media exposure on voter turnout among all citizens has 
received significant attention from political communication scholars. Prior (2007), for 
example, demonstrated that the long-term decline in network television news viewership 
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has produced a decline in turnout among marginally-interested citizens. However, there 
are essentially no detailed comparisons of media exposure among voters versus exposure 
among nonvoters using representative national samples in the existing literature. I 
therefore conducted an analysis of how much political media voters and nonvoters in the 
2008 and 2012 studies consumed. The results of this analysis help to inform my key 
hypotheses related to the effects of vicarious winning and vicarious losing and the effects 
of partisan media exposure on nonvoters. 
 Despite their lower levels of political interest and involvement, nonvoters’ 
consumption of news and public affairs-related television programs in 2008 and 2012 
was fairly similar to voters’ consumption of these programs. Figure 6.2 illustrates the 
mean number of news and public affairs programs voters and nonvoters reported 
watching in each election study. In 2008, voters reported watching two more politically-
oriented programs than non-voters on average. However, the average nonvoter still 
reported regularly watching more than four such programs, a number that is hardly 
consistent with the caricature of the completely tuned-out nonvoter. In fact, the mean 
number of news and public affairs programs watched by the average nonvoter in 2008 
was not statistically distinguishable from the mean number of news and public affairs 
programs watched by the average voter in 2012. Nonvoters may be less interested in 
political information than voters, but they still encounter their fair share of politically-
oriented media. 
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Figure 6.2: Mean Number of News and Public Affairs Programs Watched by Voters 
and Nonvoters  
 
 
Note: 13,549 voters and 2,291 nonvoters who participated in the 2008 study are 
represented in this figure while 1,758 voters and 640 nonvoters who participated in the 
2012 study are represented. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Columns with the same pattern indicate 
means that are not statistically distinguishable at the p<.05 level. 
 
 Nonvoters may encounter news and public affairs on television with some 
regularity, but do they consume partisan media? If nonvoters have weaker partisan 
attachments than voters, we might reasonably expect them to exhibit a stronger 
preference for neutral media. Figure 6.3 provides only partial support for this expectation. 
In 2008, the proportion of like-minded programs watched to total programs watched by 
the average nonvoter (23%) was notably lower than the proportion of like-minded 
programs watched by the average voter (32%). The proportion of like-minded media 
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watched by voters in 2012, on the other hand, was statistically indistinguishable from the 
proportion watched by nonvoters in both election years.  
 
Figure 6.3: Mean Proportion of Like-Minded Programs Watched to Total News and 
Public Affairs Programs Watched by Voters and Nonvoters  
 
 
Note: 13,175 voters and 1,967 nonvoters who participated in the 2008 study are 
represented in this figure while 1,638 voters and 569 nonvoters who participated in the 
2012 study are represented. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Columns with the same pattern indicate 
means that are not statistically distinguishable at the p<.05 level. 
 
What about cross-cutting media? Figure 6.4 shows that in each election year, the 
proportions of cross-cutting programs watched by voters versus nonvoters were 
statistically indistinguishable. For the most part, then, the proportions of partisan media 
watched by nonvoters were not much different from the proportions watched by voters. 
Although their preferences may have been weaker than voters’, nonvoters held candidate 
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preferences and watched partisan media in accordance with those preferences, preferring 
like-minded media to cross-cutting media. 
 
Figure 6.4: Mean Proportion of Cross-Cutting Programs Watched to Total News 
and Public Affairs Programs Watched by Voters and Nonvoters 
 
 
Note: 13,175 voters and 1,967 nonvoters who participated in the 2008 study are 
represented in this figure while 1,638 voters and 569 nonvoters who participated in the 
2012 study are represented. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Columns with the same pattern indicate 
means that are not statistically distinguishable at the p<.05 level. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Past studies of winning and losing have not considered the possibility of vicarious 
effects among nonvoters. On one hand, scholars examining the positive effects of 
winning and negative effects of losing have tended to argue that the behavior of casting a 
ballot for a candidate who proceeds to lose is what produces dissonance that is then 
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resolved by a decrease in perceptions of legitimacy (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005). If the act 
of casting a ballot is the main source of observed winner/loser effects, we should not 
expect to see effects from vicarious winning or losing among nonvoters. However, 
nonvoters can commit to a candidate in a meaningful way without casting a vote. A 
citizen who planned to vote for the eventual loser on Election Day but failed to get to the 
polls in time still held an acknowledged preference for one candidate over the other. They 
also may have engaged in activities ranging from taking a side in the election in a 
conversation with a friend or relative, to liking a candidate on social media, to donating 
money to the preferred candidate.  
A nonvoters’ mere preference for one candidate or the other should be enough to 
give them a feeling of investment in the outcome. Despite experiencing the election 
vicariously, they should react positively to a victory for the preferred candidate and 
negatively to a loss much as voters do. This expectation formed the basis of my first two 
hypotheses regarding the effects of vicarious winning and vicarious losing on nonvoters. 
H5.1: Vicarious winning increases nonvoters’ perceptions of electoral integrity. 
H5.2: Vicarious losing decreases nonvoters’ perceptions of electoral integrity. 
 I further predicted that exposure to partisan media conditions the effects of 
vicarious winning and vicarious losing in the same manner as I expected partisan media 
to condition the effects of winning and losing among voters. Specifically, I expected like-
minded media exposure to amplify the effects of vicarious winning and vicarious losing 
and cross-cutting media to mute the effects. Because the experiences of winning and 
losing are vicarious for nonvoters, nonvoters may rely on media to an even greater extent 
than voters to make sense of an electoral outcome. If this is the case, we might observe a 
106 
 
conditioning effect of like-minded or cross-cutting media on nonvoters even if there is no 
evidence of a main effect from vicarious winning and vicarious losing. In other words, 
vicarious winning and vicarious losing might not produce changes in perceptions of 
electoral integrity among the majority of nonvoters, but a combination of vicarious 
winning (or losing) and exposure to high proportions of like-minded (or cross-cutting) 
partisan media might nonetheless produce a significant change in perceptions. 
H6.3: Exposure to like-minded partisan media amplifies the positive effects of vicarious 
winning and the negative effects of vicarious losing. 
H6.4: Exposure to cross-cutting partisan media mutes the positive effects of vicarious 
winning and the negative effects of vicarious losing. 
 
Data & Methods 
I began by categorizing nonvoters as vicarious winners or vicarious losers. I 
identified 2012 nonvoters, and 2008 nonvoters who participated in both studies, using 
verified voter data collected by Catalist. For 2008 respondents who did not participate in 
2012, I identified nonvoters based on voting self-reports from the 2008 post-election 
survey. Nonvoters did not report a voting decision after the election and relatively few 
reported an overt candidate preference in the pre-election survey, with 31% of nonvoters 
in 2008 declining to report a preference for a major-party candidate, compared to only 
12% of voters. I therefore used feeling thermometer ratings of the two major party 
presidential nominees to determine which candidate a nonvoter preferred and classified 
nonvoters as vicarious winners or losers accordingly. 
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I followed the same procedures to test my hypotheses regarding nonvoters as in 
my analyses of the effects of winning and losing and of the conditioning effects of 
partisan media upon voters. I examined whether partisan media exposure conditioned the 
effects of vicarious winning and vicarious losing on perceptions of electoral integrity 
using fixed effects regression models. To test whether vicarious winning increased and 
vicarious losing decreased perceptions of electoral integrity, I regressed perceptions of 
electoral integrity on wave and the interaction between vicarious loser status and wave. 
Wave was once again a dummy variable coded with 0 for pre-election and 1 for post-
election. Vicarious loser status was coded 0 to indicate a nonvoter who preferred Barack 
Obama, the winner of both elections, and 1 to indicate a nonvoter who preferred his 
Republican rival in the relevant year. If vicarious winning produced increases in 
perceptions of electoral integrity, we should observe a statistically significant and 
positive effect from wave. If vicarious losing produced decreases in perceptions, we 
should observe a statistically significant and negative effect from the interaction between 
wave and vicarious loser status. Because total effects on losers are calculated as a linear 
combination of the wave term and the interaction term, the coefficient for wave * 
vicarious loser status should also be larger in magnitude than the coefficient for wave 
alone. 
To test the conditioning effects of partisan media exposure, I looked at the effects 
of the independent variables vicarious loser status, proportion like-minded, and 
proportion cross-cutting, as well as the dummy variable representing survey wave (pre-
election vs. post-election) and the control variable strength of preference. If proportion 
like-minded amplified the positive effects of vicarious winning, we should observe 
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significant positive interactions between proportion like-minded and wave in each 
election year. If proportion like-minded amplified the negative effects of vicarious losing, 
we should observe significant negative three-way interactions between wave, proportion 
like-minded, and loser status. If proportion cross-cutting muted the effects of vicarious 
winning and vicarious losing, the two-way interaction between wave and proportion 
cross-cutting would be significant and negative whereas the three-way interaction 
including loser status would be positive. 
The purpose of including the strength of preference variable in my analyses was 
once again to strengthen the validity of the causal inferences I wished to draw. In theory, 
exposure to partisan media could be confounded with stable levels of strength of 
partisanship or strength of candidate preference. In other words, a nonvoter with a strong 
preference for Barack Obama may have watched more Democratic-leaning television 
programs as a result of that strong preference. He may have subsequently experienced a 
large increase in perceptions of electoral integrity when Barack Obama won. Was this 
effect driven by messages contained in Democratic-leaning media, or by the fact that this 
hypothetical nonvoter was particularly pleased with the electoral process when the 
candidate he strongly preferred won? Controlling for an interaction between wave and 
strength of preference (and a three-way interaction between wave, strength of preference, 
and vicarious loser status) ensured that this potentially-confounding relationship did not 
lead me to misattribute any observed effects to differing levels of partisan media 
exposure when they were actually the product of differing strengths of preference. 
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Results 
 My first two hypotheses predicted that vicarious winners increase in perceptions 
of electoral integrity and vicarious losers decrease. Did nonvoters’ perceptions of 
electoral integrity change from pre to post-election in 2008 and 2012 based on whether 
they were vicarious winners or vicarious losers? Figure 6.5 shows the aggregate increases 
and aggregate decreases in perceptions among vicarious winners and vicarious losers, 
respectively.  
 Vicarious winning produced increases in perceptions of electoral integrity and 
vicarious losing produced decreases in perceptions of integrity in both election years. 
Fixed effects regressions of perceptions of electoral integrity on wave and vicarious loser 
status confirm that the increases and decreases were statistically significant in both 2008 
and 2012, as shown in Table 6.1. Similar to my analysis of winners and losers in 2014, a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the term for wave indicates that 
vicarious winners gained in perceptions of integrity from pre to post-election. A 
statistically significant and negative coefficient on the term for wave interacted with 
vicarious loser status that is larger in absolute value than the positive coefficient 
associated with wave alone indicates that vicarious losers decreased from pre to post-
election. 
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Figure 6.5: Effects of Presidential Election Outcomes on Nonvoters’ Perceptions of 
Electoral Integrity 
 
Note: 760 nonvoters who rated John McCain more positively than Barack Obama are 
classified as Vicarious Losers and 807 nonvoters who rated Obama more positively than 
McCain are classified as Vicarious Winners in the top panel of this figure. 226 nonvoters 
who rated Mitt Romney more positively than Barack Obama are classified as Vicarious 
Losers and 321 nonvoters who rated Obama more positively than Romney are classified 
as Vicarious Winners in the bottom panel of this figure. 
Electoral integrity is measured using an index calculated as the mean of four standardized 
survey items. The results of fixed effects regressions of vicarious loser status on 
perceptions of electoral integrity show that the effects of both winning and losing were 
statistically significant in each election (see Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1: Effects of Vicarious Winning and Vicarious Losing on Nonvoters’ Pre-
Election to Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity 
 
  2008 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
 2012 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status  -0.62*** 
(0.033) 
-0.55*** 
(0.054) 
Wave  0.28*** 
(0.023) 
 0.25*** 
(0.034) 
Constant -0.086** 
(0.012) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
N   1,530   547 
**p<.01    ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
 
 I next tested whether exposure to like-minded media amplified the effects of 
vicarious winning and vicarious losing in 2008. In the 2008 election, exposure to like-
minded media amplified the negative effect of losing for voters but not the positive effect 
of winning. Exposure to like-minded media amplified the effects of losing in 2012 and 
2014, as well. Did exposure to like-minded media similarly amplify the negative effect of 
vicarious losing on nonvoters? When it comes to nonvoters in 2008, the answer was 
clearly no. The first column of Table 6.2 displays the results of the fixed effects 
regression of perceptions of electoral integrity on proportion like-minded, proportion 
cross-cutting, strength of preference, and vicarious loser status for 2008 nonvoters. The 
three-way interaction between wave, proportion like-minded, and vicarious loser status 
was not statistically significant. Nor was the two-way interaction between wave and 
proportion like-minded. Like-minded media did not amplify the positive effects of 
vicarious winning or the negative effects of vicarious losing in 2008. As in my analysis of 
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voters, I also found no evidence that exposure to cross-cutting media muted the effects of 
vicarious winning or vicarious losing. Neither of the interactions incorporating 
proportion cross-cutting were statistically significant in the analysis of 2008 nonvoters. 
 
Table 6.2: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Nonvoters’ Pre-Election to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity 
 
    2008 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
   2012 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded -0.071 
(0.082) 
-0.044 
(0.12) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.012 
(0.19) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.056 
(0.11) 
-0.34 
(0.49) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.00057 
(0.15) 
 0.72 
(0.56) 
Wave * Strength of Preference  0.0073*** 
(0.00089) 
 0.0059*** 
(0.0014) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.015*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.012*** 
(0.0021) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status   0.0049 
(0.072) 
-0.0063 
(0.12) 
Wave -0.025 
(0.053) 
-0.031 
(0.079) 
Constant -0.078*** 
(0.011) 
-0.018** 
(0.019) 
N   1,494   530 
†p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.01 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
 
 Data from the 2012 election panel show that exposure to partisan media had no 
measured effects on vicarious winners or vicarious losers in the latter presidential 
election. The second column of Table 6.2 presents the results of the fixed effects 
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regression of perceptions of electoral integrity on proportion like-minded, proportion 
cross-cutting, strength of preference, and vicarious loser status for 2012 nonvoters. Once 
again, none of the interactions including the partisan media variables were statistically 
significant. I therefore found no evidence in support of hypotheses 6.3 or 6.4, which 
predicted that exposure to like-minded media would amplify the effects of vicarious 
winning and vicarious losing whereas exposure to cross-cutting media would mute the 
effects of vicarious winning and vicarious losing. 
 
Summary 
 Nonvoters experience elections vicariously, as demonstrated by their changing 
perceptions of electoral integrity in response to electoral outcomes. Vicarious winners in 
both 2008 and 2012 became more confident in the fairness of the electoral process from 
pre to post-election whereas vicarious losers became less confident. This suggests a level 
of investment in the outcome of elections not typically associated with nonvoters. 
Additionally, it argues against the belief that winner/loser effects depend upon the act of 
casting a ballot. Simply holding a preference for one candidate over the other appears to 
have triggered increases in nonvoters’ perceptions of electoral integrity when the 
preferred candidate won and decreases when the preferred candidate lost. 
 Nonvoters do not cast ballots, and so they have no direct experience of the 
competence of election judges at their local polling place or of whether the voting 
machines used in their county are easy to interact with. Nonvoters must experience 
elections vicariously through friends, family members, co-workers, and, of course, media. 
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I expected nonvoters’ assessments of legitimacy to depend on whether they were pleased 
with the outcome, but I also expected this relationship to be conditioned by exposure to 
partisan media. I found no evidence supporting the latter prediction.  
Studying nonvoters presents methodological challenges insofar as it can be 
difficult to reach habitual nonvoters in national surveys of political attitudes and 
behavior. Even though the panel data I used produced samples that were highly 
representative of the American adult population in general, the types of people most 
likely to have been nonvoters may have been somewhat underrepresented in the 2008 and 
2012 panels. Notably, the two major demographic groups that were consistently 
underrepresented in the panel studies were young adults and citizens who lacked a high 
school degree, groups that are also known to contain relatively high proportions of 
nonvoters (see Table 3.3). Additionally, although voter participation in presidential 
elections is typically in the 50-60% range, 73% of 2012 panelists were voters, with this 
percentage confirmed by Catalist’s voter verification data.  
The nonvoters I included in my analysis may not be perfectly representative of 
nonvoters in the general population due to the underrepresentation of certain 
demographic groups as well as panelists’ tendency to vote at higher rates than the general 
population. However, these differences between nonvoter panelists and nonvoters in the 
general population could only explain my null findings regarding the conditioning effects 
of partisan media if there were some theoretically-driven reason to believe that the types 
of nonvoters underrepresented in the panels were also more likely to be affected by 
partisan media exposure than the nonvoters I observed. If anything, the opposite is likely 
true: young nonvoters and nonvoters without a high school diploma are presumably less 
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likely to watch, and therefore less likely to be affected by, partisan television programs 
than other types of nonvoters.  
In Appendix B, I present replications of each of my major analyses using GfK’s 
recommended population weights. Using the weighted data resulted in evidence of a 
statistically significant conditioning effect of like-minded media on nonvoting vicarious 
losers in 2008 (p<.05) and of a statistically significant conditioning effect of cross-cutting 
media on nonvoting vicarious losers in 2012 (p<.05). Though these results alone are 
insufficient to claim that exposure to partisan media influenced changes in losers’ 
perceptions of electoral integrity, they do suggest that issues of representativeness among 
nonvoters might have affected my previous findings.  
Issues of representativeness may have impacted my results for nonvoters, but they 
don’t suggest an obvious compelling explanation for why those results diverged from my 
hypotheses. Nonetheless, there are significant obstacles to designing a survey project that 
samples large numbers of nonvoters, many of whom are precisely the types of people 
survey researchers have the most difficulty reaching (see, for example, Pew Research 
Center, 2014b). Research that is better able to help us understand influences on 
nonvoters’ perceptions of legitimacy would be quite valuable in the future. 
Assuming my null findings were not the product of methodological weaknesses, 
why should voters who directly participate in elections be affected by like-minded media 
when nonvoters who rely exclusively on others for information about the process are not? 
The most likely answers lie in the specific mechanisms that produce the conditioning 
effect of exposure to like-minded media on losing. I expected like-minded media to 
undermine losers’ consent in part because losers are looking for explanations for a 
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surprising and disappointing outcome, and like-minded media can provide excuses for a 
loss that blame allegedly unfair features of the process and therefore do not require a 
reevaluation of issue preferences or beliefs about a candidate's qualities. Nonvoters may 
also be disappointed by a preferred candidate’s loss but have a lesser need for 
explanations for the disappointing outcome. Perhaps lower levels of political interest 
leave many nonvoters uninterested in exploring the reasons for a loss. Relatedly, 
nonvoters may not seek out detailed explanations for a loss because even though they 
preferred a losing candidate they don’t have to retroactively justify having voted for her.  
Like voters, nonvoters react to a preferred candidate’s loss with decreased 
confidence in the fairness of the electoral process. Unlike voters, nonvoters do not react 
more negatively to a loss when they consume higher proportions of like-minded media. 
Understanding why like-minded media amplifies the effects of losing on voters would 
shed light on the reasons why like-minded media exposure does not have a similar effect 
on nonvoters.  
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7. WHY DOES EXPOSURE TO LIKE-MINDED MEDIA CONDITION THE 
EFFECTS OF LOSING ON PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY? 
 
Losers who consumed more like-minded media relative to neutral or cross-cutting 
media experienced larger decreases in perceptions of electoral integrity than losers who 
consumed lower proportions of like-minded media. This effect occurred in response to 
both presidential elections as well as the 2014 midterm elections, and it was apparent 
even after I controlled for strength of preference.  
Why should exposure to like-minded media amplify the negative effects of 
losing? I previously identified two specific mechanisms through which exposure to 
partisan media might condition the effects of winning and losing. First, media may play 
an important role in setting voters’ expectations for an election’s outcome. Viewers of 
like-minded media content were more likely to expect their preferred candidate to win in 
the 2004 and 2012 elections than viewers of neutral or cross-cutting content (Tsfati et al., 
2014; Hollander, 2015). This effect is potentially attributable to two characteristics of 
partisan media, their coverage of polling results and their use of exemplars.  
News media in the United States tend to focus their coverage of election 
campaigns on strategic matters, with news outlets devoting attention to the current state 
of the horse-race in particular (e.g. Capella & Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, Norpoth, & 
Hahn, 2004; Benoit, Stein, & Hansen, 2005). Do partisan media outlets tend to promote 
poll results that favor the preferred party and candidates? They may do so in the interest 
of giving their viewers good news and keeping spirits high among the party faithful. An 
alternative hypothesis is that partisan outlets may strategically understate a preferred 
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candidate’s chances to emphasize the importance of viewers turning out to vote. Over a 
decade-long period, each of the major American television networks preferred to report 
on public opinion polls that contained positive results for the party favored by a given 
network (Groeling, 2008). More evidence is needed to determine whether partisan outlets 
consistently emphasize favorable results during an election as opposed to in non-election 
years, but to the extent this phenomenon occurs, viewers of like-minded content will 
presumably have greater expectations for their preferred candidates. 
A second characteristic of partisan media that may inflate expectations for a 
preferred candidate is an outlet’s choice of exemplars, or the people used to represent 
public opinion. People often form beliefs about others’ opinions from the views 
expressed by influential individuals, and exposure to media reports highlighted by the 
opinions of certain (perhaps unrepresentative) exemplars produces skewed assessments 
of overall public sentiments (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Brosius & Bathelt, 1994; Zillmann & 
Brosius, 2000; Zillmann, 2006; Tsfati et al., 2014). Partisan television programs typically 
devote the most time to expert commentators, program hosts, and everyday citizens who 
express congruent partisan opinions. Those consuming primarily like-minded programs 
may therefore form electoral expectations based on how individuals appearing on these 
shows say they personally will vote or how these individuals expect the public at large to 
vote (Tsfati et al., 2014). 
If individuals are surprised by an election’s outcome, they may be more likely to 
doubt whether the process was fair. Suppose hypothetically in the months leading up to 
an election nearly all the polls encountered by a habitual viewer of Republican-leaning 
media predicted that the Republican candidate would win by a healthy margin. Come 
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Election Day, however, the Democratic candidate claimed more votes. Might that imply 
that the election was somehow stolen, or at the very least, that there was a flaw in the 
vote-counting process? By inflating expectations for a preferred candidate, like-minded 
media may make it more likely that losers will question the legitimacy of the process 
when their inflated expectations go unmet. 
Like-minded media may also condition the effect of losing through explanations 
for the outcome. Media have long been known to offer explanations for electoral 
outcomes, with traditional news media filtering a variety of possible narratives about the 
election into a relatively small set of reasons why one candidate defeated the other 
(Hershey, 1992, 1994). In the late-twentieth century, a striking feature of this process was 
the level of consensus that members of the national press reached regarding a handful of 
agreed-upon reasons for the outcome within just a few weeks following an election 
(Hershey, 1992). In an era of partisan news, it is likely that outlets with different partisan 
leanings will offer different and potentially contradictory explanations for an electoral 
outcome rather than converging on the same explanations, even well into the post-
election period.  
Why might partisan media’s explanations for a result produce lowered 
perceptions of electoral integrity? The phenomenon of trusting winners and distrusting 
losers has itself been hypothesized to have its roots in cognitive dissonance (Anderson et 
al., 2005; Sances & Stewart, 2015). A supporter of the losing side must find some 
justification for their decision to support a party or candidate that was rejected by most 
citizens. Within the framework of cognitive dissonance theory, a belief that democratic 
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processes and institutions are unfair or illegitimate serves to excuse a vote for a losing 
candidate without requiring a reevaluation of the decision. 
Like-minded media should offer specific explanations for an unwanted outcome 
that don’t require a voter to change his or her belief that they made the correct choice at 
the ballot box. An explanation such as the outsized influence of wealthy interests or 
alleged voter fraud would not require a reevaluation of the preferred candidate’s strengths 
and weaknesses since the better candidate never had a fair chance in the first place. Like-
minded viewers will, in theory, accept these alternative explanations as a means of 
reducing dissonance. To the extent the proffered explanations suggest that the outcome 
was illegitimate, perceptions of electoral integrity may be harmed. 
Partisan media had no significant effect on changes in winners’ perceptions of 
electoral integrity, and the muting effect of cross-cutting media on losers’ perceptions did 
not reach statistical significance in two of the three elections I examined. I therefore 
considered only the negative effect of like-minded media on losers in testing whether 
each proposed mechanism serves as a plausible explanation for the observed effects of 
partisan media. 
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
I expected like-minded media to condition the relationship between losing and 
changes in perceptions of electoral integrity through the effects of like-minded media on 
both expectations and explanations. An ideal test of this prediction would incorporate a 
detailed analysis of both the pre-election polling results and the explanations for the 
121 
 
outcome presented by various partisan media outlets in addition to individual-level 
measures of partisan media exposure and perceptions of electoral integrity. 
Unfortunately, such a far-reaching content analysis falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation. However, I conducted an exploratory analysis of the viability of the two 
proposed mechanisms by leveraging two features of the panel studies that served as my 
main source of data.  
First, interview dates in the post-election survey period of the 2008 panel were 
randomly assigned. The two proposed mechanisms suggest different likely patterns of 
changes in perceptions of electoral integrity during the post-election period. If like-
minded media influence perceptions of integrity through the expectations mechanism, 
there should be evidence of a significant negative effect of exposure to like-minded 
media among losers who are interviewed immediately after an election. This would 
indicate that losers whose expectations for the election are not met respond to the 
surprising election results with immediate distrust.  
On the other hand, if like-minded media influence perceptions of integrity through 
the explanations mechanism, the magnitude of the negative effect of like-minded media 
exposure on losers should increase as more time passes between Election Day and the 
date of the post-election interview. This would indicate that as time passes partisan news 
sources settle on preferred explanations for the outcome and viewers begin to adopt those 
explanations. Finally, if both expectations and explanations contribute to like-minded 
media’s effect, there should be evidence of a significant effect of like-minded media 
among losers interviewed immediately following an election, and the effect of like-
minded media should also increase in magnitude as time passes following the election.  
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RQ7.1: Is the effect of exposure to like-minded media on changes in losers’ perceptions 
of electoral integrity apparent when considering losers interviewed immediately 
following an election? 
RQ7.2: Does the effect of exposure to like-minded media on changes in losers’ 
perceptions of electoral integrity grow larger as time passes following the election? 
Secondly, respondents to the 2012 pre-election survey were asked to answer a 
pair of questions about their expectations for the outcome, allowing me to conduct a 
formal test of whether expectations mediated the relationship between exposure to like-
minded media and changing perceptions of electoral integrity in the 2012 presidential 
election. Respondents were asked to predict which candidate, Democratic incumbent 
Barack Obama or Republican challenger Mitt Romney, would win the presidential 
election prior to the 2012 election. They were then asked whether the chosen candidate 
would win by a lot or by a little. I combined these two survey items to test the hypothesis 
that the effect of like-minded media exposure on perceptions of electoral integrity 
operates through an effect on expectations. 
H7.1: Partisan media influence perceptions of electoral legitimacy through an effect on 
pre-election expectations for the outcome.  
 
Data and Methods 
My research questions asked whether changes in perceptions of electoral integrity 
among respondents interviewed at different points in time following the election were 
consistent with the patterns predicted by the expectations and explanations mechanisms. 
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The large size of the 2008 NAES panel produced an average of 1,602 interviews in each 
of the twelve weeks in which post-election interviews were conducted, making it possible 
to draw meaningful inferences regarding changes in the relationship between partisan 
media exposure and perceptions of electoral integrity as time passed following the 
election.  
As noted earlier, the two proposed mechanisms of media influence suggest 
different patterns in the post-election relationship between partisan media exposure and 
perceptions of electoral integrity. If exposure to like-minded media influences 
expectations, with inflated and subsequently unmet expectations producing distrust, the 
conditioning effect of partisan media on the experience of losing should be immediately 
apparent after the results of an election become known. Assuming like-minded media 
operate solely or primarily through expectations, the observed effects should remain 
constant or possibly wane as the immediate disappointment of the election fades into the 
past.  
Alternatively, if like-minded media primarily influence post-election explanations 
for the outcome, it should take time for delegitimizing explanations to filter through news 
sources and become accepted by citizens. In this case, we would observe an initially 
small amplifying effect of like-minded media that increases in magnitude as time passes 
following the election. Finally, my prediction that both mechanisms contribute to the 
effect of like-minded media suggests a pattern in which the amplifying effect of like-
minded media is immediately apparent after an election but becomes larger as time 
passes and explanations for the outcome filter out from the media.  
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Which description is consistent with the actual effects of like-minded media? I 
conducted a series of parallel fixed effects regression analyses in which perceptions of 
electoral integrity were regressed on wave and interactions between wave and proportion 
like-minded, wave and proportion cross-cutting, and wave and strength of preference for 
groups of 2008 losers interviewed during different time periods following the election. 
Like-minded media conditioned the effect of losing but not the effect of winning, so I 
included only electoral losers in these regression models. This eliminated the need for an 
interaction between wave and loser status, as well as the need for any three-way 
interactions incorporating loser status. In these regression models, the coefficient 
associated with the wave variable represents the main effect of losing in 2008, controlling 
for the differential effects of different levels of exposure to partisan media and of strength 
of candidate preference over time. The two-way interaction between wave and proportion 
like-minded represents the differential effects of exposure to varying proportions of like-
minded programs watched on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity, controlling 
for the main effect of losing, the effect of proportion cross-cutting, and the effect of 
strength of preference.  
 To test the hypothesis that expectations mediate the relationship between like-
minded media and changes in perceptions of electoral integrity, I recoded responses to 
the two expectations questions from the 2012 pre-election survey to create a five-point 
scale of expectations. In this scale, 1 indicates an expectation that Obama would win the 
2012 presidential election by a lot; 2 indicates an expectation that Obama would win by a 
little; 3 indicates a response of “Don’t Know”; 4 indicates an expectation that Romney 
would win by a little; and 5 indicates an expectation that Romney would win by a lot. 
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Because I was only interested in losers in this analysis, I coded this scale such that higher 
values indicated greater expectations for eventual loser Romney’s performance. A 
positive effect of like-minded media exposure on expectations among 2012 losers would 
therefore indicate that like-minded media promoted favorable expectations for an 
electoral loser’s preferred candidate. 
 A classic test of a mediation hypothesis involves four steps (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). First, it is necessary to demonstrate that the independent variable, in this case 
proportion like-minded, influences the dependent variable, in this case perceptions of 
electoral integrity. The next step is to show that the independent variable influences the 
proposed mediator, in this case expectations. Third, the mediator must also influence the 
dependent variable. Finally, the relationship between the mediator and the dependent 
variable must account for at least part of the previously observed effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. Because expectations were measured at a 
single point in time, I tested the relationship between proportion like-minded and 
expectations using ordinary least squares regression. I then conducted fixed effects 
regressions of perceptions of electoral integrity first on proportion like-minded and then 
on proportion like-minded and expectations.  
The classic approach to testing a mediation hypothesis has been criticized for a 
lack of statistical power and for an incorrect approach to estimating the sampling 
distribution of an indirect effect (e.g. MacKinnon et al., 2002; Hayes, 2009). The lack of 
power means this approach is conservative in its estimation of mediation effects and can 
fail to detect mediation that does occur. There is no single widely accepted approach to 
overcoming this problems when testing for mediation using panel data in which the 
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dependent variable is measured at multiple times. However, I conducted an additional test 
for the hypothesized mediation effect by using a slightly adapted approach to Preacher 
and Hayes’s (2004) bootstrapping technique for estimating the size of an indirect effect. 
To apply this technique to my dataset, I converted the pre and post-election measures of 
perceptions of electoral integrity into change scores, subtracting the earlier measure of 
perceptions from the later measure. I then used the bootstrapping technique to estimate a 
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect of proportion like-minded on 
changes in perceptions as mediated by expectations, using the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013). Because I used change scores as the dependent variable, I used 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in the bootstrapping procedure to fit an 
appropriate model.  
 
Results 
Which theorized pattern better describes changes in perceptions of electoral 
integrity in the post-election period? I divided the full sample of 2008 losers into three 
separate groups. The first group included respondents interviewed during the first four 
weeks following the election, the second included those interviewed during weeks five 
through eight following the election, and the third included those interviewed during 
weeks nine through twelve following the election. I then conducted three separate, 
parallel fixed effects regressions, one for each post-election period. Figure 7.1 presents 
the estimated coefficients for the interaction between wave and proportion like-minded 
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for the electoral losers interviewed in each of the three post-election periods. The mean 
number of losers included in the regression analysis for each period was n=1,526. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Effect of Like-Minded Media On 2008 Losers by Time of Post-
Election Interview 
 
 
Note: y-values are the coefficients for the interaction between wave and proportion like-
minded from a series of fixed effects regression models where perceptions of electoral 
integrity is the dependent variable and an interaction between wave and proportion cross-
cutting, an interaction between wave and strength of preference, and wave are included as 
additional independent variables. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The effect of like-minded media was statistically significant (p<.001) when 
considering only those voters interviewed in the four-week period immediately following 
the election, consistent with the expectations hypothesis which predicted an immediate 
effect from frustrated expectations. However, the magnitude of the effect of exposure to 
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like-minded media did not significantly increase as time passed. Although the size of the 
estimated coefficient for the interaction term grew slightly larger from the first interview 
period to the second and again from the second to the third, there is substantial overlap in 
the 95 percent confidence intervals for all three interview periods. The available evidence 
is therefore consistent with the predicted influence of like-minded media on expectations 
but not with the predicted influence of like-minded media on explanations.  
These results would have been substantively the same had I divided respondents 
into larger or smaller groups. Similar analyses using two six-week interview periods, six 
two-week periods, and twelve one-week periods all produced evidence of a significant 
effect that appeared immediately following the election and remained relatively constant 
in magnitude throughout the post-election interviews. There was therefore no indication 
that my initial finding depended upon the decision to use three four-week interview 
periods to divide respondents. 
These results are suggestive, but far from conclusive. A better test of the 
mechanisms by which like-minded media exposure might influence changes in losers’ 
perceptions of electoral integrity would include an analysis of whether expectations and 
explanations mediate the relationship between the key independent and dependent 
variables. I therefore tested the hypothesis that exposure to like-minded media conditions 
the effect of losing through an effect on loser’s expectations. Once again, I considered 
only losers in my analysis due to my finding that exposure to partisan media conditions 
the effects of losing but not the effects of winning. 
The first step in a classic test of a mediation hypothesis is to establish that the 
independent variable predicts the dependent variable. Exposure to different proportions 
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of like-minded media produced differential changes in perceptions of electoral integrity 
among electoral losers in 2012, as demonstrated previously. The first column of Table 7.1 
shows the effect of the interaction between proportion like-minded and wave among 2012 
losers when controlling for the effects of the interactions between proportion cross-
cutting and wave and between strength of preference and wave as well as for the main 
effect of losing, which is represented by the wave term in the regression model. The 
omission of winners from the fixed effects regression simplifies the interpretation of this 
model by eliminating the need for interactions with loser status, but the results are 
substantively the same as in my analysis of all 2012 voters. 
 
Table 7.1: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media and Expectations on Pre-Election 
to Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Among 2012 Losers 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Expectations  —— -0.11*** 
(0.023) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded -0.20** 
(0.071) 
-0.16* 
(0.071) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.14 
(0.11) 
 0.11 
(0.11) 
Wave * Strength of Preference -0.0048*** 
(0.00083) 
-0.0036*** 
(0.00086) 
Wave -0.013 
(0.052) 
 0.32*** 
(0.086) 
Constant -0.086*** 
(0.015) 
-0.086*** 
(0.015) 
N   764   764 
*p < .05     **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
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 The next question to be answered in a classic mediation analysis is whether the 
independent variable predicts the mediator variable. Did exposure to like-minded media 
influence expectations in 2012? The data indicate that it did, with Romney supporters 
who consumed Republican-leaning media becoming more positive about their 
candidate’s chances than those who did not. 
Some degree of wishful thinking influences electoral expectations, with 
Democrats being consistently more likely to expect the Democrat to win and Republicans 
being consistently more likely to predict a Republican victory (e.g. Granberg & Brent, 
1983; Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2010; Delavande & Manski, 2012). Was this true in 2012? 
Figure 7.2 shows that Mitt Romney’s supporters generally expected their candidate to 
win whereas most Barack Obama supporters predicted a Barack Obama victory. If, 
however, exposure to like-minded media was strongly correlated with predicting a 
victory for the preferred candidate in 2012 even after controlling for candidate preference 
and for the strength of that preference as measured with feeling thermometer ratings of 
the two candidates, it is reasonable to infer that like-minded media promoted the belief 
that the preferred candidate would win the election. 
Because expectations were measured only once, in the pre-election survey, and 
because post-election media exposure cannot plausibly have influenced expectations that 
were reported prior to the election, I used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the 
effect of like-minded media exposure on expectations. The use of cross-sectional data 
rather than panel data in this analysis meant that stable individual characteristics were no 
longer automatically controlled for as in fixed effects regression models. I therefore 
incorporated a standard series of demographic control variables, including age, gender, 
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educational attainment, and race, in addition to a control for strength of preference. 
Since I only considered losers in this analysis, it was again unnecessary to control for 
loser status. 
 
Figure 7.2: Pre-Election Expectations for the Outcome of the 2012 Presidential 
Election by Candidate Preference 
 
Table 7.2 presents the results of the regression of expectations on proportion like-
minded. The results show that the proportion of like-minded programs watched had a 
significant and positive effect on electoral expectations, with a 2012 loser who watched 
more like-minded media relative to cross-cutting or neutral media having been more 
likely to expect their preferred candidate to win prior to the election. The inclusion of the 
control variable strength of preference means that this finding cannot be explained by 
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more committed partisans having watched more like-minded media and spuriously 
having had more confidence in their candidate.  
 
Table 7.2: Effects of Exposure to Like-Minded and Cross-Cutting Media on Pre-
Election Expectations of a Mitt Romney Victory in the 2012 Presidential Election 
 
  Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
Proportion Like-Minded  0.38** 
(0.11) 
Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.31† 
(0.18) 
Strength of Preference  0.011*** 
(0.0013) 
Age -0.00027 
(0.0027) 
Gender: Female -0.0097 
(0.066) 
Race: Non-white -0.15 
(0.098) 
Education: Less than a high school degree  0.23 
(0.19) 
Education: High school degree or equivalent  0.030 
(0.097) 
Education: Some college  0.072 
(0.092) 
Constant  2.97*** 
(0.14) 
N  764 
R2  0.16 
*p < .05     **p < .01      
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from an ordinary 
least squares regression. The dependent variable is Expectations, coded such that 1 
indicates a belief that Mitt Romney would lose by a lot; 2 indicates a belief that Mitt 
Romney would lose by a little; 3 indicates that the respondent answered “Don’t know” 
when asked who would win; 4 indicates a belief that Mitt Romney would win by a little; 
and 5 indicates a belief that Mitt Romney would win by a lot. 
The reference category for Education is Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
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 Exposure to like-minded media influenced both expectations and changes in 
perceptions of electoral integrity. For expectations to have mediated the relationship 
between like-minded media exposure and changes in perceptions, expectations must also 
have influenced perceptions of electoral integrity. The second column of Table 7.1 
presents the results of a fixed effects regression of perceptions of electoral integrity on 
expectations, proportion like-minded, proportion cross-cutting, and wave. The results 
clearly indicate that losers with different pre-election expectations for their preferred 
candidate changed differentially in response to the election’s outcome. The coefficient 
associated with the interaction between wave and expectations is statistically significant 
and negative, indicating that a loser who was more positive about Romney’s chances of 
victory experienced a larger decrease in perceptions of electoral integrity than a loser 
whose hopes were not as high. 
 Finally, the inclusion of the mediating variable must account for at least some of 
the originally observed effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. A 
comparison of the two columns of Table 7.1 suggests that expectations partially mediated 
the effects of proportion like-minded on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity. 
Regardless of whether expectations were included in or omitted from the regression 
model, the proportion of like-minded programs to total programs watched had a 
significant and negative effect on changes in losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity. 
However, this effect was smaller in magnitude (-0.16 versus -0.20) when expectations 
were included as an explanatory variable. Expectations therefore explain some of the 
negative effect of like-minded media exposure on losers’ changing perceptions of 
electoral integrity, but only a small portion, approximately 20 percent, of the total effect. 
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Figure 7.3 illustrates the direct and indirect effects of proportion like-minded on changes 
in perceptions of electoral integrity.   
 
Figure 7.3: Direct and Indirect Effects of Like-Minded Media On Changes in 2012 
Losers’ Perceptions of Electoral Integrity 
 
 
Note: Figure presents coefficients from the fixed effects regression of Perceptions of 
Electoral Integrity on Expectations and Proportion Like-Minded and from the ordinary 
least squares regression of Expectations on Proportion Like-Minded, with standard errors 
in parentheses. 
*p < .05     **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
These results are suggestive of a mediating relationship. However, modern 
approaches to mediation analysis tend to incorporate bootstrapping to estimate the size of 
the indirect effect. I therefore conducted an additional test of my mediation hypothesis by 
applying this technique to my dataset. The bootstrapping procedure estimated a 95 
percent confidence interval ranging from -0.079 to -0.017 for the size of the indirect 
effect of proportion like-minded on changes in perceptions of electoral integrity. This 
confidence interval indicates that the portion of the total effect mediated by expectations 
was small but significantly different from zero, and of a similar magnitude to that 
estimated using the classic approach to mediation analysis. The two methods combined 
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provide clear evidence that like-minded media’s influence on expectations explains part 
of the effect of like-minded media on changes in perceptions of legitimacy among losers. 
A large proportion of the effect of like-minded media remains unaccounted for, though. 
 
Summary 
 Analysis of the effect of exposure to like-minded media on changes in perceptions 
of electoral integrity among losers who were interviewed at different points in time 
following the 2008 election showed that the negative impact of like-minded media was 
present among respondents interviewed within the first week following Election Day. 
The magnitude of the observed effect was no larger among respondents interviewed later 
in the post-election period. This pattern of results is consistent with that predicted by the 
expectations mechanism but not with the pattern predicted by the explanations 
mechanism. 
 Additional support for the expectations mechanism comes from two different 
methods of testing whether exposure to like-minded media indirectly influenced changes 
in perceptions of electoral integrity through an effect on losers’ pre-election expectations 
for the outcome. Both the classic approach to mediation analysis and a slightly modified 
version of the Preacher and Hayes (2004) bootstrapping technique provided evidence of 
an indirect effect on perceptions through expectations. Like-minded media appear to 
promote the idea that a preferred candidate is likely to win an upcoming election. Should 
supporters be disappointed by an outcome that goes against their expectations, they may 
subsequently have less confidence in the fairness of the electoral process. 
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 While expectations explain part of like-minded media’s negative influence on 
losers’ perceptions of electoral integrity, the mediation analysis failed to account for most 
of the overall effect. This implies two possible conclusions. First, exposure to like-
minded media may condition the relationship between losing and perceptions of electoral 
integrity through some third mechanism I have failed to consider. Additional theorizing 
may be necessary to fully explain why exposure to like-minded media has the observed 
effect on perceptions. Secondly, additional research incorporating an analysis of the 
content of partisan media is required to fully explore the hypothesized influence of 
partisan media on explanations for the outcome. 
 Even though the pattern of results in 2008 was inconsistent with the pattern 
predicted by the explanations mechanism, the explanations mechanism cannot be ruled 
out entirely. Following the 1984 election, it took only one week for the national press to 
winnow over 80 possible explanations for the results into half as many explanations 
(Hershey, 1992). Within another week, daily newspapers were citing fewer than twenty 
different possible explanations for the results. CNN was still in its infancy in 1984 and 
political news websites did not yet exist. The modern news cycle, driven by 24-hour 
cable news channels and the internet, might produce an even faster winnowing process 
than the one observed by Hershey (1992). Additionally, partisan media outlets may 
present excuses for an anticipated disappointing outcome even before the election occurs. 
In the 2016 campaign, Republican nominee Donald Trump regularly spoke of a rigged 
process in the months leading up to Election Day. His allegations of voter fraud and 
related issues were presumably repeated and amplified by outlets friendly to his 
candidacy. It is quite possible, and perhaps even likely, that exposure to like-minded 
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media influenced perceptions of electoral integrity in 2008 through an effect on 
explanations, but that this effect had already occurred before the conclusion of the first 
week of post-election interviews. 
 Further testing of the mechanisms that might explain the conditioning effect of 
exposure to like-minded media on the relationship between losing and changes in 
perceptions of electoral integrity should include a description of the specific messages 
presented by media outlets that favored the losing side in an election. A systematic 
content analysis of the explanations for an electoral outcome presented by partisan media 
outlets would make it possible to track the frequency with which various explanations 
were offered over different time periods both before and after the election. Combining 
this data with survey data showing how individual supporters of the losing candidate 
explained the election results would allow for an analysis of whether media’s 
explanations influence individuals’ explanations and of whether some explanations are 
associated with more negative perceptions of electoral integrity. 
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8. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PARTISAN MEDIA FOR PERCEPTIONS OF 
ELECTORAL INTEGRITY 
 
 Facing an uphill battle in the polls, Republican presidential nominee Donald 
Trump spent much of the summer and fall of 2016 warning his supporters that 
Democrats, the media, and the country’s elites were working hard to rig the election in 
favor of his opponent Hillary Clinton (Weigel, 2016; Parker, 2016). Some Republican 
elected officials, including Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, issued statements disputing 
Trump’s claims (Martin & Burns, 2016). However, Trump and his surrogates continued 
to advance a variety of conspiracy theories about the electoral process that were 
amplified by allies in Republican-leaning media such as Fox News hosts Sean Hannity 
and Steve Doocy (e.g. Kaplan, 2016; Brennan, 2016).  
Trump went so far as to refuse to say whether he would concede defeat when 
directly asked during the third general election debate, promising to keep the country “in 
suspense” if he lost (Tumulty & Rucker, 2016). Trump’s surprising victory on November 
8 allowed the country to avoid a potential crisis of legitimacy, at least for the time being. 
Democratic nominee Clinton promptly conceded the race and outgoing President Barack 
Obama, one of Clinton’s most vocal supporters during the campaign, quickly pledged his 
full support to the new president-elect so as to ensure a successful transition of power to 
the new administration (Nakamura & Eilperin, 2016). 
The United States has recent experience with a disputed election. In 2000, George 
W. Bush claimed victory over Al Gore only after an extended recount in Florida that was 
ultimately settled by the Supreme Court. However, Trump’s willingness to deny the 
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legitimacy of the voting process before the voting was even finished remains 
unprecedented. In 2000, Al Gore and his supporters fought for a full accounting of all 
votes that had been cast in Florida, but quickly conceded the election to Bush as soon as 
the Supreme Court ruled that it was time for the vote counting to stop. If Trump had 
clearly lost the election yet refused to concede even after exhausting the recount options 
provided by the law, how would his supporters have reacted? Could Clinton have 
effectively governed the country if the other side refused to acknowledge her as the 
legitimate president? Might more violence have followed the election?  
At a theoretical level, free and fair elections are the cornerstones of representative 
democracy (e.g. Dahl, 1989). If large numbers of citizens believe that their country’s 
elections are consistently unfair, manipulated, or an invalid means of selecting the best 
leaders, there is little reason for those citizens to believe that the democratic regime itself 
is legitimate. Citizens who perceive the electoral process as unfair will also have low 
levels of trust in elected leaders and government institutions. 
At a practical level, low perceptions of legitimacy can be harmful to the everyday 
functioning of democratic institutions. Winning officials will have difficulty 
implementing the policies they campaigned upon when the opposition denies that the 
winners’ claim to power is legitimate (Nadeau & Blais, 1993). At the most extreme, 
losers’ distrust of the electoral process may produce disruptive forms of protest or even 
political violence. Typically, losers are more likely to protest unwanted results in 
countries whose democratic institutions are relatively new (Anderson & Mendes, 2006). 
However, an extreme lack of confidence in the legitimacy of an outcome may encourage 
an unusual level of political instability even in a long-established democracy such as the 
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United States. Dissatisfaction with the electoral process can drive not merely peaceful 
protest, but boycotts and political strikes (Norris, 2014). As Anderson and colleagues 
argue, “Particularly unhappy losers have diminished incentives to play by the rules” 
(2005, p. 188). 
Could the lack of legitimacy attributed to Donald Trump’s election by citizens 
who voted against him be driving the wave of protests, including calls for general strikes, 
of early 2017? There are numerous reasons for citizens to oppose Trump’s policies, and 
yet perceptions of legitimacy (or the lack thereof) are undoubtedly playing an important 
role in the response to his administration. Though evidence is largely anecdotal at this 
stage, protest signs and chants have frequently referenced Trump’s substantial loss in the 
popular vote and the FBI’s alleged role in helping to tilt the Electoral College to the 
Republicans. 
The United States is in the midst of a political era when election outcomes are 
playing an especially prominent role in undermining losers’ consent. Electoral outcomes 
have important implications for citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy even in the context of 
relatively low salience midterm elections. Nonvoters who preferred a losing candidate to 
the winning candidate likewise experience significant decreases in perceptions of 
electoral integrity, despite their lack of direct participation in the electoral process. 
Perhaps most worryingly given the prominent role of partisan outlets in today’s media 
environment, exposure to like-minded media consistently exacerbates the negative effects 
of losing on perceptions of electoral integrity. After reviewing the implications of each of 
my key findings in turn, I discuss some of the potential limitations of the research I 
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conducted. I then return to the core question posed by this dissertation: Is the resurgence 
of partisan media in the United States a threat to perceptions of electoral legitimacy? 
 
The Psychological Power of Winning or Losing 
A wealth of data confirms that winners generally have higher perceptions of 
legitimacy than losers following an election. However, past studies of winners and losers, 
particularly those relying on data from the United States, have produced mixed 
conclusions regarding the precise nature of the effects of winning and losing on 
perceptions of legitimacy. Some evidence suggests that winners increase in legitimacy 
while losers generally hold constant, or vice versa. In the 2008 and 2012 presidential 
elections, the effects of winning and losing were quite clear. Losers in both years 
decreased in perceptions of electoral integrity in response to the electoral outcome. 
Winners in both years increased in perceptions in response to the outcome. These 
changes were measured at the individual level and therefore represent unusually strong 
confirmation that winning produces increases in perceptions and losing produces 
decreases. 
The experiences of winning and losing were also surprisingly powerful among 
citizens who voted in the 2014 midterm elections. Past studies of winning and losing in 
American congressional elections failed to produce evidence that winning or losing at the 
congressional level influenced perceptions of legitimacy. By contrast, in 2014 supporters 
of the winning Republican Party clearly increased in perceptions of electoral integrity in 
response to the election results and supporters of the losing Democratic Party clearly 
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decreased in perceptions of integrity. The phenomenon of satisfied winners and 
disappointed losers does not require that the White House be at stake. Less salient 
contests are capable of producing significant winner/loser effects on perceptions of 
legitimacy. 
Nonvoters also experienced changes in perceptions of legitimacy according to 
whether they preferred the winner or the loser in each presidential election year. This 
result contradicts the notion that nonvoters are generally tuned out of politics. Many 
nonvoters actually hold electoral preferences, and those preferences are strong enough to 
drive partisan media consumption as well as vicarious winner and vicarious loser effects. 
Neither Americans’ general lack of interest in midterm elections nor nonvoters’ 
individual failures to participate prevent citizens from experiencing elections through the 
lenses of winning and losing. 
Taken together, these extensions of past findings related to winners and losers are 
quite suggestive. They demonstrate the power of the psychological processes that prompt 
citizens to reevaluate electoral legitimacy in light of favorable or unfavorable outcomes. 
One of the most common explanations for the negative effect of losing comes from 
cognitive dissonance theory. Electoral winners can be satisfied that the process worked 
the way it should have because the best candidate won. Electoral losers, on the other 
hand, must retroactively justify their support for a losing candidate. A newfound (or 
strengthened) belief that the process itself was unfair fulfills this cognitive need. There 
may even be a physiological component to the negative effects of losing that goes beyond 
the compelling psychological need for cognitive consistency. Recent research has linked 
the experience of learning that a favored candidate lost a presidential election to a drop in 
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men’s testosterone levels similar to the drop that might occur after losing an interpersonal 
competition (Stanton, Beehner, Saini, Kuhn, & LaBar, 2009). 
Past research may have understated the power of winning and losing, but the 
powerful nature of these effects does not necessarily have negative implications for 
American democracy. The mere fact that winners consistently gain in legitimacy and 
losers consistently decrease may not be a problem insofar as the two effects are relatively 
symmetrical over time and insofar as members of the two dominant political parties 
regularly alternate in the roles of winners and losers. These two conditions could ensure 
that aggregate levels of perceptions of legitimacy in society remain relatively constant 
over time, with no single set of partisans becoming excessively dismissive of the process. 
While there is a strong historical record showing that the two major parties regularly 
alternate control of the White House in the post-World War II era of American politics, 
additional study of the effects of winning and losing would help to clarify whether these 
effects are relatively balanced over time or not. 
In addition to a regular alternation of power in presidential elections, there is a 
long track record of divided government in the United States. The presidential out-party 
has a historical tendency to gain seats in Congress during midterm elections. Partisans 
who support a losing presidential candidate should typically have the opportunity to 
regain confidence in the fairness of the electoral process following a victory for the 
preferred party in the next midterm election just two years later, helping to counter the 
negative effects of having lost at the presidential level. 
Finally, these results speak to the need for a renewed effort to understand 
nonvoters’ perceptions of democratic legitimacy. Ignoring changes in nonvoters’ 
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perceptions of legitimacy means ignoring how a sizable proportion of citizens—typically 
more than 40% in any given presidential election—feel about their democratic 
government. Even though nonvoters by definition don’t vote, their belief that democratic 
processes and institutions are fundamentally legitimate is vital to the stability and long-
term health of the regime. Losers’ consent alone can’t maintain a modern democracy. 
Nonvoters’ consent is also necessary. 
 
Like-Minded Media Embitters Losers 
Exposure to like-minded media exacerbated the negative effects of losing in both 
the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. Exposure to like-minded media also 
exacerbated the negative effects of losing in the 2014 congressional elections. The 
conditioning effect from like-minded media occurred in two presidential elections and 
one midterm election, as well as in two elections when Republicans emerged as losers 
and one election when Democrats emerged as losers. Attitude-congruent partisan media 
clearly reinforce citizens’ propensity to blame the electoral process itself when an 
unfavorable electoral result occurs. 
On the other hand, like-minded media exposure did not condition the effects of 
winning in any of the elections studied. Nor did cross-cutting media exposure condition 
the effects of winning or losing. The negative effect of like-minded media on losers’ 
perceptions of electoral integrity is both highly consistent across different contexts and 
unique among the possible effects of partisan media I tested. 
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Past studies of the negative effects of partisan media have largely focused on 
echo-chamber effects, the idea that partisan news exposure leads many citizens to 
encounter only one side of an argument. As a result, citizens may become more polarized 
both in terms of issue opinions and in terms of affect toward members of the opposition 
(e.g. Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Levendusky, 2013). I 
identified a qualitatively distinct type of negative effect associated with partisan media. 
Exposure to like-minded media conditions the negative effects of losing, further lowering 
electoral losers’ perceptions of legitimacy beyond the decrease associated with losing 
alone. The result is not lowered affect for the opposition party or greater certainty about 
an issue position, but decreased legitimacy in the most fundamental institution of 
democracy. 
Because I only found an effect from losers’ exposure to like-minded media, and 
not from losers’ exposure to cross-cutting media or winners’ exposure to either type of 
partisan media, there is no obvious counterbalance to the negative effect observed here. 
In the present media environment, losers who consume large proportions of like-minded 
media will come to view the electoral process as illegitimate. No comparable media 
effect serves to counter the influence of like-minded media content on these individuals. 
Nor will winners increase in perceptions of electoral integrity to the same degree. The 
most likely result will be more individual losers with dangerously low perceptions of 
legitimacy combined with an aggregate decrease in perceptions of legitimacy among all 
voters. Insofar as legitimacy is required both for winners to govern effectively and for 
society to avoid having citizens who refuse to play by the democratic rules, this is a 
highly troubling outcome. 
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Mechanisms of Influence 
I identified two possible mechanisms through which like-minded media might 
condition the effects of losing, an effect on expectations for the outcome and an effect on 
explanations for the outcome. Exposure to like-minded media made Mitt Romney 
supporters more likely to believe that Romney would win, and by a larger margin, in 
2012. Romney supporters who expected their preferred candidate to win subsequently 
experienced larger decreases in perceptions of electoral integrity following the election 
than Romney supporters who expected their candidate to lose. Expectations therefore 
partially mediated the relationship between exposure to like-minded media, losing, and 
changes in perceptions of electoral integrity in 2012. 
Although exposure to like-minded media increased expectations for a preferred 
candidate in 2012, this may not always occur. The available evidence suggests that 
partisan media tend to exaggerate a favored candidate’s chances, but additional analysis 
of the content of partisan media would be useful in verifying this pattern. Exposure to 
like-minded media appears to inflate expectations, and frustrated expectations produce 
larger decreases in perceptions of electoral integrity. If this description of the mechanism 
by which like-minded media affects losers’ perceptions of legitimacy is correct, the 
conditioning effect of like-minded media may become more severe in future elections. 
The massive proliferation of publicly available polls of varying quality has made it easier 
and easier for partisan news outlets to cherry-pick “good news” for their like-minded 
viewers. 
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Expectations only explained a small portion, about one-fifth, of the total 
conditioning effect of like-minded media on 2012 losers. What might explain the 
remainder of the effect? There was no clear evidence of an indirect effect of like-minded 
media exposure on perceptions through explanations, the other proposed mechanism of 
influence. However, my test of the explanations mechanism was only exploratory in 
nature. Future research should focus on analyzing the expectations mechanism more 
thoroughly to determine whether this mechanism accounts for the remaining effect of 
like-minded media exposure. 
In 2016, like-minded media anecdotally appear to have provided delegitimizing 
excuses for partisans even before the results of the election are known. Led by the 
Republican Party’s nominee for president, Republican-leaning media responded to 
unfavorable polls by promoting allegations of voter fraud that would effectively steal the 
election. My analysis may have failed to uncover evidence of an effect on explanations in 
part because partisan media influence explanations for the outcome in the pre-election 
period and not exclusively in the post-election period. A systematic content analysis of 
the explanations for election results provided by a variety of media outlets both before 
and after an election would better account for how partisan media outlets explain election 
outcomes. Combining this analysis with survey data that shows how individuals 
themselves explain election results could potentially provide a direct link between 
explanations provided by media, explanations provided by individuals, and changes in 
perceptions of electoral integrity. 
Of course, some third mechanism I failed to identify could potentially account for 
a portion of the observed conditioning effect of exposure to like-minded media. 
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Additional theorizing about other possible mechanisms of influence may be necessary in 
addition to future research examining the explanations mechanism in greater depth. 
 
Limitations 
 In any observational study, it is necessary to rule out spurious explanations for the 
observed results. Throughout my analysis, I measured individual-level changes in 
perceptions of electoral integrity from pre to post-election through interviews of the same 
individuals at different points in time. Fixed effects regression’s use of individuals as 
their own controls eliminated the need to control for an extensive series of stable 
individual characteristics. Assuming I accounted for any variables that may have 
plausibly produced differential changes in winners’ and losers’ perceptions of electoral 
integrity over time and that may have confounded the relationship between my variables 
of interest, there is no reason to believe that the relationships I observed were spurious.  
The only stable variable that plausibly could have produced differential changes 
in perceptions of electoral integrity over time and also could have confounded the 
relationship between media exposure and changes is strength of preference. If strength of 
preference influenced both exposure to partisan media and the magnitude of the effects of 
winning and losing on perceptions of legitimacy, as we might reasonably expect, an 
observed relationship between partisan media exposure and perceptions of legitimacy 
could potentially be explained by this third variable. I therefore controlled for an 
interaction between survey wave and strength of candidate or party preference in each of 
my tests of whether partisan media exposure conditioned the effects of winning or losing. 
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By controlling for strength of preference, I ensured any relationships between partisan 
media exposure and perceptions of legitimacy that persisted would be attributable to the 
conditioning effect of partisan media exposure on changes in perceptions. 
It is unnecessary to control for stable characteristics in fixed effects regression 
barring a specific theoretical reason to believe that the effect of the stable characteristic in 
question may have varied over time. However, spurious relationships may still arise from 
individual characteristics that change over time. The variable representing survey wave in 
each of my regression models accounted for the aggregate effects of all time-variant 
factors that may have occurred in between the pre and post-election surveys in any given 
election. Given the control for the effect of time, a time-variant factor could only have 
produced a spurious relationship between my key variables of interest if this factor also 
caused winners and losers to diverge in their perceptions of electoral integrity. No 
variable that I failed to account for could plausibly have had this effect. 
 Observational studies must also account for the possibility of reverse causation. In 
this case, reverse causation cannot explain the observed effects of winning and losing on 
perceptions of electoral integrity. For reverse causation to have occurred, survey 
respondents would have needed to anticipate their own changes in perceptions of 
electoral integrity and then chosen to support the winning or losing candidate 
accordingly. Such a causal relationship is highly implausible. 
Because all three panel studies employed random stratified sampling techniques 
to obtain nationally representative samples, and because I did not consider differing 
effects of partisan media exposure across different demographic subgroups, all of my key 
findings are applicable to the U.S. adult population. My estimates of specific effect sizes 
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may have been influenced by the underrepresentation of certain subgroups among 
panelists. However, the results for models using recommended population weights, 
presented in the appendix, show that my substantive findings were largely unchanged by 
the incorporation of statistical weighting. 
I obtained substantively similar results in three different elections, so my findings 
were not dependent upon the unique circumstances of any one of those election cycles. 
My results most likely cannot be generalized beyond the current U.S. media environment, 
though. The recent resurgence of partisan media only reached its current state, especially 
in the realm of television, with MSNBC’s shift toward an overtly Democratic-leaning 
primetime line-up in the middle of the last decade. My results are unlikely to apply to 
elections that occurred prior to 2004, and I can only speculate as to how well they will 
apply in the future given potential changes in the structure and content of news and 
public affairs media. 
Relatedly, perhaps the most significant threat to the validity of this study results 
from my exclusive focus on television media. The Pew Research Center (2016) continues 
to report in its annual updates that more Americans get their news from television than 
from any other source. The gap between television and internet-based sources closes with 
each passing year, however. To highlight one example of why this might matter, one of 
the biggest post-election narratives about media’s role in the 2016 presidential election 
has been about the prevalence of fake news online. My analysis makes no effort to 
account for the effects of partisan-oriented stories that circulate online, many of which 
may relate either directly or indirectly to the integrity of the electoral process. Future 
research that seeks to expand upon my findings ought to include partisan news that 
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appears and is shared online in order to determine whether the effects of online news are 
similar to the effects of partisan television news. 
 
Implications for American Democracy in 2016 and Beyond 
 Despite strong public reactions to some of Trump’s most inflammatory claims 
that the process was rigged, Hillary Clinton and her most visible supporters engaged in 
their own version of questioning the integrity of American elections during the 2016 
campaign. For example, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman (2016) had no 
problem suggesting that media bias could unfairly cost Clinton the election. And less than 
three weeks after the election, Clinton agreed to join a Green Party-led recount effort in 
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The potential effect of this decision is an 
indication to Clinton’s supporters that the previously reported results should not be 
trusted, despite the fact that the proposed recounts have virtually no chance of producing 
a new result. 
Additionally, Clinton was widely expected to win throughout much of the 
campaign. As I have demonstrated, losers surprised by the results tend to be less trusting 
than those who were uncertain of the outcome or anticipated a loss. Meanwhile, 
favorability ratings for both major party nominees in 2016 were at historical extremes, 
with Clinton’s supporters generally despising Trump and vice versa (e.g. Enten, 2016; 
Bump, 2016). Regardless of who won, the sizable gap between evaluations of the two 
candidates meant that voters on the losing side were sure to be particularly dissatisfied 
with the outcome. 
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  Clinton supporters who consumed large proportions of like-minded media 
relative to neutral or cross-cutting media in the weeks surrounding the election are 
particularly likely to have experienced large decreases in perceptions of electoral 
integrity upon discovering that a figure they truly despised won an election he was 
supposed to have lost. Despite promises from Democratic elites to work with a 
legitimately elected president from the other party, Trump’s election has been met with a 
number of protests from citizens who oppose him. Democrats won the popular vote for 
president but lost in the Electoral College for the second time in five presidential 
elections, a factor that will surely contribute to claims that Trump’s presidency is 
illegitimate. Trump opponents who wish to cast doubt on the electoral process will not 
have to reach very far to argue that the process produced an unfair outcome.  
In the latest bizarre development in one of the most extraordinary elections in 
recent memory, Donald Trump—the winner of the election—is now advancing claims 
that millions of votes were illegally cast for his (losing) opponent. Combined with a 
steady stream of pre-election delegitimizing talk, including claims that Trump’s opponent 
ought to be in jail, this latest narrative suggests that many Trump supporters may not 
have experienced increased perceptions of electoral integrity as would normally be 
expected of winners. Trump supporters who were most tuned in to the various conspiracy 
theories surrounding the election via right-wing partisan media could quite plausibly have 
decreased in perceptions of electoral integrity from pre to post-election despite having 
voted for the winning candidate. 
Exposure to like-minded media produced greater decreases in perceptions of 
electoral integrity among losers. These exacerbated decreases were not balanced at the 
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individual level by positive effects from cross-cutting media or at the aggregate level by 
positive effects of like-minded media on winners. Previously-distrusting Republicans’ 
gains in perceptions of electoral integrity, if they even occurred in 2016, may well be 
outweighed in the aggregate by previously-trusting Democrats’ more severe decreases. If 
this trend holds over the long-term, the result would be a populace with slowly but 
steadily eroding confidence in the legitimacy of elections.   
Donald Trump’s victory prevented the country from having to wait and see 
whether the loser of the 2016 election would concede. And yet, he may have set a 
dangerous precedent. Political campaign professionals have historically looked for 
concise explanations for why past campaigns succeeded or failed and have been quick to 
adopt tactics used by successful campaigns in the recent past (Issenberg, 2012). Will 
Trump’s victory in the 2016 race lead more candidates to base their campaigns around 
claims that the democratic process is fundamentally unfair in 2020 and subsequent 
elections? Will partisan media outlets embrace these arguments in an effort to keep 
devoted partisans in a state of frenzy much like the ones that produced violence at several 
Trump campaign rallies? Unfortunately, these outcomes are quite plausible if by no 
means guaranteed.  
Many partisans experience elections in much the same way that sports fans 
experience a contest involving their favorite team. By no means should this metaphor 
imply that politics is just a game without serious consequences. As Chicago Cubs fans 
who cried following their team’s victory in the 2016 World Series can attest, sports 
produce powerful feelings of despair and of joy. And, as witnesses to soccer riots in any 
number of European countries (and fans from other cities who have ever attended a 
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sporting event in Philadelphia) know, sports can spark significantly more dangerous 
outcomes, as well.  
Partisan media have served to undermine losers’ consent in three recent American 
elections. American democracy has lasted through periods when media outlets were 
closely aligned with political parties in the past. However, Donald Trump’s successful 
campaign for the presidency in which he embraced doubts about the electoral process 
presents a strong counterweight to efforts to place the effects of like-minded media in a 
rosy context. Candidates who seek to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process 
have a powerful megaphone in the form of partisan media outlets. Barring major changes 
in the American media environment, like-minded media appear likely to continue to 
embitter electoral losers in coming elections. If partisan outlets embrace the types of 
messages that produce this effect, losers will become even less confident that the 
electoral process—the cornerstone of representative democracy—is fair and just. 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTION WORDING 
Partisan identification 
Asked in the pre and post-election surveys in 2008 as well as the pre-election survey in 
2012  
 
1. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ... 
Republican 
Democrat 
Independent 
Another party, please specify  
No preference 
 
2. [If thinks of self as a Republican:] Would you call yourself a ... 
Strong Republican 
Not very strong Republican 
 
3. [If thinks of self as a Democrat:] Would you call yourself a ... 
Strong Democrat 
Not very strong Democrat 
 
4. [If thinks of self as an Independent or of another political party, or has no party 
preference:] Do you think of yourself as closer to the ... 
Republican Party 
Democratic Party 
 
Pre-election candidate preferences 
2008 
 
1. If the presidential election was held today and John McCain and Sarah Palin, the 
Republicans, were running against Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats, who 
would you vote for? 
John McCain and Sarah Palin, the Republicans 
Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats 
Ralph Nader and Matt Gonzalez, the Independents 
Bob Barr and Wayne Allyn Root, the Libertarians 
Cynthia McKinney and Rosa Clemente, the Green Party candidates 
Other, specify 
Don't know 
 
2012 
 
1. [Randomized to show either Romney and Ryan first and Obama and Biden second or 
Obama and Biden first and Romney and Ryan second:] If the presidential election were 
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held today between Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, the Republicans, against Barack Obama 
and Joe Biden, the Democrats, who would you vote for? 
[Rotated to match order in question text:] 
Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, the Republicans 
Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the Democrats 
Other [specify] 
Don’t know 
 
Voting Self-Reports 
Asked in the post-election surveys for all three elections 
 
1. This question is about the [2008/2012/2014] November election. In talking to people 
about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they 
weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Which of the following 
statements best describes you? 
I did not vote in the November election. 
I thought about voting in that election but didn't. 
I usually vote but didn't in that election. 
I am sure I voted in the November election. 
 
Media exposure 
In the pre-election surveys for all three elections and the post-election surveys in 2008 
and 2012, respondents were first asked: 
 
1. From which of the following sources have you heard anything about the presidential 
campaign? 
Television news programs (morning or evening) 
Newspapers, either online or print versions 
Television talk shows, public affairs or news analysis programs 
Internet sites, chat rooms or blogs 
Radio news or radio talk shows 
News magazines 
Have not heard anything about the presidential campaign 
 
Respondents who selected “Television news programs” and/or “Television talk shows, 
public affairs or news analysis programs” were then shown a series of four screens 
divided among the remainder of the survey, with each screen listing approximately 13 
different television programs as well as a none of the above option following this text: 
2. Which of the following programs do you watch regularly on television? Please check 
any that you watch at least once a month. 
 
Perceptions of Electoral Legitimacy 
Asked in the pre and post-election surveys for all three elections 
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1. How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to 
what the people think: a good deal, some, or not much? 
A good deal 
Some 
Not much 
 
2. In general, do you think the best candidates win the elections, or is it just the 
candidates who raise the most money that get elected, or something in between? 
Best candidates win 
Candidates who raise the most money win 
Something in between 
 
3. In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other 
countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Do you believe 
presidential elections in the United States are generally … 
Very fair 
Somewhat fair 
Neither fair nor unfair 
Somewhat unfair 
Very unfair 
 
4. How confident are you that the votes across the country are accurately counted on 
Election Day? 
Very confident 
Somewhat confident 
Not too confident 
Not at all confident 
 
System Support 
Asked in the pre and post-election waves in 2012 
 
Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
[Respondents shown Strongly agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor 
disagree/Somewhat disagree/Strongly disagree scale for each] 
 
1. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of. 
 
2. Our system of government is in need of some serious changes. 
3. Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is best for representing the 
interests of the country’s citizens. 
 
4. At present I feel very critical of our political system. 
 
Expectations 
Asked in the pre-election wave in 2012 
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1. Regardless of who you might vote for, who do you think is most likely to win the 
election for president this November? [Randomized to show either Romney first and 
Obama second or Obama first and Romney second:] Barack Obama, the Democrat, or 
Mitt Romney, the Republican?  
[Rotated to match order in question text:] 
Barack Obama 
Mitt Romney 
Don’t know 
 
[If the first question was skipped, respondents were shown the following prompt:]  
Please just give us your best guess. Who do you think is most likely to win the election 
for president? 
Barack Obama 
Mitt Romney 
Don’t know 
 
2. Do you think [choice from first question] will beat [other candidate] by a lot or by just 
a little?  
By a lot 
By just a little 
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APPENDIX B: REPLICATIONS USING WEIGHTED DATA 
 
Table B.1: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2008 Using Weighted Data 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.008 
(0.057) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.38*** 
(0.073) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.081 
(0.090) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.15 
(0.12) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.0053*** 
(0.00064) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.012*** 
(0.00092) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.096† 
(0.052) 
Wave  0.084* 
(0.036) 
Constant  0.032*** 
(0.0052) 
N   8,982 
†p<.10   *p<.05   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
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Table B.2: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2012 Using Weighted Data 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.041 
(0.088) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.24† 
(0.13) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.55 
(0.52) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.45 
(0.53) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.0035*** 
(0.0010) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -
0.0083*** 
(0.0016) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.050 
(0.088) 
Wave  0.041 
(0.061) 
Constant  0.033*** 
(0.0092) 
N   1,593 
†p<.10   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
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Table B.3: Effects of Winning and Losing on Pre-Election to Post-Election Changes 
in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2014 Using Weighted Data 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.26*** 
(0.040) 
Wave  0.15*** 
(0.027) 
Constant  0.0084 
(0.010) 
N   1,060 
***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
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Table B.4: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2014 Using Weighted Data 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.11 
(0.081) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.36** 
(0.13) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.042 
(0.16) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.61 
(0.41) 
Wave * Strength of Preference  0.0072 
(0.033) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.052 
(0.048) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.088 
(0.11) 
Wave  0.12 
(0.074) 
Constant  0.0084 
(0.0099) 
N   1,060 
**p<.01 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
 
163 
 
Table B.5: Effects of Vicarious Winning and Vicarious Losing on Nonvoters’ Pre-
Election to Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2008 and 
2012 Using Weighted Data 
 
  2008 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
 2012 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status  -0.54*** 
(0.059) 
-0.52*** 
(0.061) 
Wave  0.21*** 
(0.042) 
 0.25*** 
(0.037) 
Constant -0.079*** 
(0.015) 
-0.0094 
(0.015) 
N   1,530   547 
***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
 
164 
 
Table B.6: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Nonvoters’ Pre-Election to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Using Weighted Data 
 
    2008 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
   2012 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.054 
(0.14) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.37* 
(0.18) 
 0.052 
(0.22) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.048 
(0.25) 
-0.82 
(0.51) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.094 
(0.32) 
 1.44* 
(0.63) 
Wave * Strength of Preference  0.0081*** 
(0.0017) 
 0.0054*** 
(0.0014) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.017*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.011*** 
(0.0024) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status   0.21† 
(0.12) 
-0.053 
(0.14) 
Wave -0.20* 
(0.087) 
 0.0063 
(0.078) 
Constant -0.072*** 
(0.015) 
-0.00013 
(0.014) 
N   1,494   1,529 
†p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.01 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX C: REPLICATIONS INCORPORATING DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
 
Table C.1: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2008 Controlling for Demographic 
Variables 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded -0.0026 
(0.034) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.35*** 
(0.043) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.032 
(0.065) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.16* 
(0.078) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.0052*** 
(0.00037) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.011*** 
(0.00052) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.15*** 
(0.031) 
Wave * Age -0.0018*** 
(0.00044) 
Wave * Gender: Female  0.021 
(0.013) 
Wave * Race: Non-white  0.071*** 
(0.017) 
Wave * Education: Less than a high school degree -0.017 
(0.034) 
Wave * Education: High school degree or equivalent  0.033† 
(0.017) 
Wave * Education: Some college  0.010 
(0.015) 
Wave  0.15*** 
(0.034) 
Constant  0.032*** 
(0.0044) 
N   8,982 
†p<.10   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
The reference category for Education is Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
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Table C.2: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2012 Controlling for Demographic 
Variables 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded -0.079 
(0.072) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.28** 
(0.10) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.13 
(0.44) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.0040 
(0.46) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.0031*** 
(0.00082) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.0079*** 
(0.0012) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.080 
(0.074) 
Wave * Age -0.00090 
(0.0012 
Wave * Gender: Female -0.0045 
(0.029) 
Wave * Race: Non-white  0.036*** 
(0.037) 
Wave * Education: Less than a high school degree -0.012 
(0.087) 
Wave * Education: High school degree or equivalent  0.037 
(0.042) 
Wave * Education: Some college  0.064† 
(0.039) 
Wave  0.82 
(0.075) 
Constant  0.031** 
(0.010) 
N   1,593 
†p<.10   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
The reference category for Education is Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
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Table C.3: Effects of Winning and Losing on Pre-Election to Post-Election Changes 
in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2014 Controlling for Demographic Variables 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.26*** 
(0.035) 
Wave * Age -0.00067 
(0.0014) 
Wave * Gender: Female -0.048 
(0.034) 
Wave * Race: Non-white -0.061 
(0.043) 
Wave * Education: Less than a high school degree -0.096 
(0.099) 
Wave * Education: High school degree or equivalent -0.051 
(0.049) 
Wave * Education: Some college -0.050 
(0.047) 
Wave  0.26*** 
(0.073) 
Constant  0.018 
(0.012) 
N   1,060 
†p<.10   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
The reference category for Education is Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
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Table C.4: Effects of Partisan Media Exposure on Pre-Election to Post-Election 
Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2014 Controlling for Demographic 
Variables 
 
  Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded  0.14† 
(0.076) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Like-Minded -0.34** 
(0.12) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.059 
(0.14) 
Wave * Loser Status * Proportion Cross-Cutting  0.28 
(0.49) 
Wave * Strength of Preference 0.023 
(0.029) 
Wave * Loser Status * Strength of Preference -0.075† 
(0.041) 
Wave * Loser Status  -0.032 
(0.092) 
Wave * Age -0.0011 
(0.0014) 
Wave * Gender: Female -0.034 
(0.034) 
Wave * Race: Non-white -0.037 
(0.044) 
Wave * Education: Less than a high school degree -0.017 
(0.034) 
Wave * Education: High school degree or equivalent -0.046 
(0.049) 
Wave * Education: Some college -0.090 
(0.099) 
Wave  0.20*** 
(0.093) 
Constant  0.032* 
(0.0044) 
N   1,060 
†p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
The reference category for Education is Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
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Table C.5: Effects of Vicarious Winning and Vicarious Losing on Nonvoters’ Pre-
Election to Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in 2008 and 
2012 Controlling for Demographic Variables 
 
  2008 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
 2012 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status  -0.60*** 
(0.035) 
-0.55*** 
(0.056) 
Wave * Age -0.00092 
(0.0012) 
 0.0037† 
(0.0021) 
Wave * Gender: Female  0.081* 
(0.034) 
-0.021 
(0.054) 
Wave * Race: Non-white  0.071 
(0.042) 
 0.020 
(0.064) 
Wave * Education: Less than a high school degree -0.12† 
(0.064) 
 0.073 
(0.13) 
Wave * Education: High school degree or equivalent -0.019 
(0.045) 
-0.00052 
(0.073) 
Wave * Education: Some college -0.038 
(0.043) 
 0.097 
(0.074) 
Wave  0.28*** 
(0.067) 
 0.052 
(0.11) 
Constant -0.086*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.027 
(0.019) 
N   1,530   547 
†p<.10   *p<.05   ***p<.001 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
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Table C.6: Effects of Exposure to Partisan Media on Nonvoters’ Pre-Election to 
Post-Election Changes in Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Controlling for 
Demographic Variables 
 
    2008 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
   2012 
Nonvoters 
 Coeff. 
 (S.E.) 
Wave * Proportion Like-Minded -0.087 
(0.083) 
-0.028 
(0.12) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Proportion Like-
Minded 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.074 
(0.20) 
Wave * Proportion Cross-Cutting -0.061 
(0.11) 
-0.59 
(0.50) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Proportion 
Cross-Cutting 
 0.014 
(0.15) 
 0.97† 
(0.56) 
Wave * Strength of Preference  0.0073*** 
(0.00090) 
 0.00758*** 
(0.0014) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status * Strength of 
Preference 
-0.015*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.012*** 
(0.0021) 
Wave * Vicarious Loser Status   0.0048 
(0.72) 
-0.0068 
(0.12) 
Wave * Age -0.0011 
(0.0011) 
 0.0046* 
(0.0021) 
Wave * Gender: Female  0.073* 
(0.033) 
-0.0081 
(0.054) 
Wave * Race: Non-white  0.029 
(0.041) 
-0.018 
(0.064) 
Wave * Education: Less than a high school degree -0.11† 
(0.063) 
 0.11 
(0.13) 
Wave * Education: High school degree or 
equivalent 
-0.0040 
(0.044) 
 0.0039 
(0.075) 
Wave * Education: Some college -0.016 
(0.042) 
 0.13† 
(0.074) 
Wave -0.20* 
(0.087) 
-0.28* 
(0.13) 
Constant -0.072*** 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.018) 
N   1,494   530 
†p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.01 
 
Note: Table entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from linear fixed 
effects regression models. The dependent variable is Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. 
GfK’s recommended sampling weights for each respondent have been applied in this 
analysis. 
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